A complainant lacks standing to appeal against a disciplinary decision of the Council unless an order has been made against them, as defined by the Medical Act 1971.

Introduction

[1] This is an appeal by the complainant, Dr Geoffrey Alan Williams ("the appellant") against the decision of the Malaysian Medical Council ("the Council") on 20 June 2022, dismissing charges of alleged professional misconduct which the Council had brought against the 1st respondent, Dr Tikfu Gee. The appellant is the complainant who alleged that the professional misconduct was committed by the 1st respondent, who is a registered medical practitioner with the Council.

[2] The disciplinary proceedings were brought under sub-section 29(2)(b) of the Medical Act 1971 ("the Act"), read together with the Medical Regulations 1974. There is provided a right of appeal by a person aggrieved against the decision of the Council directly to the High Court under sub-section 31(1) of the Act.

[3] The appeal in the instant case was brought by way of an Originating Summons pursuant to O 55A of the Rules of Court 2012. The complainant named himself as the appellant, citing the registered medical practitioner against whom disciplinary charges were dismissed as the 1st respondent and the Council as the 2nd respondent. In the Originating Summons, the appellant sought for one relief: an order that the decision of the Council be reversed and the 1st respondent be punished for the alleged misconduct under s 30 of the Act.

[4] At the commencement of the hearing of this appeal, the Council and the 1st respondent raised a preliminary objection, questioning the competency of the appellant, which is the complainant, to bring the appeal as a "person aggrieved" within the meaning of sub-section 31(1) of the Act. It was argued that the appellant is not a person aggrieved within the meaning of the said subsection, thereby, rendering the appeal incompetent, and this Court having no jurisdiction to hear the appeal.

[5] On 27 July 2023, after considering the written submissions and hearing all parties on the issue, I allowed the preliminary objection holding that the appeal is incompetent and dismissed the same with costs.

[6] This judgment contains the reason for my decision. For avoidance of doubt, the provisions applicable in this appeal are those prior to the amendment of the Act and the Medical Regulations 1974.

The Background Facts

[7] The Council is a statutory body established under s 3 of the Medical Act 1971 and, among others, is conferred power to exercise disciplinary jurisdiction over registered medical practitioners registered in the Register under the Act. Part IV of the Act sets out the disciplinary jurisdiction of the Council. The Council has power to commence disciplinary proceedings stipulated under sub-section 29(2) and impose any of the stipulated punishments prescribed in s 30 of the Act.

[8] The jurisdiction is invoked on allegations of professional misconduct by registered medical practitioners, either by way of a complaint or information provided to the Council. In the instant case, the appellant lodged a complaint on 16 November 2016 with the Council against eleven persons of a private medical hospital, amongst them, the 1st respondent. The complaint arose from events surrounding the treatment of a patient at the hospital. The complaint was treated in the manner provided under reg 26 of the Medical Regulations 1974. A Preliminary Investigation Committee ("PIC") was set up to investigate the complaint. The PIC inquired into the allegation and communicated with both the complainant (the appellant) and the 1st respondent in the manner set out in sub-regulation 29(1) of the Medical Regulations 1974. This included taking of written statements and documentary evidence from the complainant.

[9] The PIC found sufficient grounds to support