Important point
A landlord need not lose his existing job nor resign it nor reach a level of starvation to comtemplate that he must get possession of his premises for establishing a business.
It is not necessary for the landlord to adduce evidence that he had money in deposit in a Bank nor produce proof of funds to prove his readiness and willingness as in a suit for specific performance of an agreement of sale of immovable property.

Headnote:Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates (Control) Act, 1947 - Section 13(1)(g)-Reasonable and bona fide requirement-Landlords plea that his company was in lockout, he was not in employment and he wanted to set up grocery business-Trial Court rejecting claim as not bona fide holding that he wasnot permanent out of employment, no proof of vaila bility of capital and no proof of preparation of business by landlord-Not sustainable-Need or requirement cannot be equated to absolute or compelling necessity-Landlord not required to adduce evidence to prove that he has sufficient found-On facts, landlord entitled to eviction order.
       Held : Section 13(1)(g) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates (Control) Act, 1947 uses the word “the premises are reasonably and bona fide required by the landlord for his own occupation etc”. The requirement must, therefore, be both reasonable and bona fide. The word ‘reasonable’, connotes that the requirement or need is not fanciful or unreasonable. It cannot be a mere desire. The word ‘requirement’ coupled with the word reasonable means that it must be something more than a more desire but need not certainly be a compelling or absolute or dire necessity. A reasonable and bona fide requirement is something in between a mere desire or wish on one hand and a compelling or dire or absolute necessity at the other end. It may be a need in presenti or within reasonable proximity in the future. The use of the word ‘bonafide’ is an additional requirement under Section 13(1)(g) and it means that the requirement must also be honest and not be tainted with any oblique motive. (Paras 5 & 6)
       The trial Court and the appellate Court had clearly erred in law. They practically equated the test of “need or requirement” to be equivalent to “dire or absolute or compelling necessity”. According to them, if the plaintiff had not permanently lost his job on account of the lock-out or if he had not resigned his job, he could not be treated as a person without any means of livelihood, as contended by him and hence not entitled to an order for possession of the shop. This test, in our view, is not the proper test. A landlord need not lose his existing job nor resign it nor reach a level of starvation to comtemplate that he must get possession of his premises for establishing a business. The manner in which the courts have gone into the meaning of “lock out” in the Industrial Disputes Actr, 1947 appears to us to be nothing but a perverse approach to the problem. One cannot imagine that a landlord who is in service should first resign his job, he might indeed end up in utter poverty. Joblessness is not a condition precedent for seeking to get back one’s premises. For that matter assuming that pending the long drawn litigation he started some other temporary water business to sustain himself, that would not be an indication that the need for establishing a grocery shop was not a bona fide or a reasonable requirement or that it was motivated or was a mere design to evict the tenant. It is not necessary for the landlord to adduce evidence that he had money in deposit in a Bank nor produce proof of funds to prove his readiness and willingness as in a suit for specific performance of an agreement of sale of immovable property. So far as experience is concerned, one would not think that a grocery business was one which required extraordinary expertise. It is, therefore, clear that the entire approach of both the Courts was absolutely the High Court simply dismissed the writ petition filed under Article 227 stating that the findings were one of fact. That is why we think that this is an exceptional case calling for interference under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. (Para 10)

Judgment

M. Jagannadha Rao, J.-Leave granted.

2. This is an appeal by the landlords for possession of a non-residential premises from the respondent-tenant. The suit No. 37 of 1986 was filed before the Civil Judge, Junior Division, Panvel by the original landlord for his own use pleading bonafide and reasonable requirement. The respondent-tenent resisted the suit contending that the plea of bona fide requirement was not acceptable. During the pendency of the case in the first Court, the original plaintiff died and his heirs, the appellants were brought on record. They filed an application for amendment under Order 6 rule 17 of the Code Procedure and the same was allowed. The third legal representative pleaded that the same premises was required for himself for starting a grocery business. He stated that he was working in Metal Box. Co., that there was a lock-out in that company, that he was finding it difficult to maintain the family and wanted to improve his livelihood by starting grocery business. On the amended pleadings, both parties led evidence. The trial Court held that on the death of the original landlord, the suit abated because the original landlord’s requirement was for himself and his requirement differed from that of his heirs. On merits, the trial Court held that there was no proof of lock-out, no proof of capital available for investment, no proof of preparations for business and that the appellant had no experience in grocery business. The lock out did not put the appellant out of his job permanently. The appellant had not resigned his job. Therefore, the requirement was not bonafide. The suit was dismissed. The lower appellate Court confirmed the finding on the question of bona fide requirement but reversed the finding as to abatement stating that the plaint was amended, and thereafter parties had adduced evidence on the question of the need of the legal representatives. The appellate Court gave a finding that the tenant had got three other shops. The appeal was dismissed. The landlord has come up in appeal.

3. We have heard elaborate arguments of the learned counsel on both sides. After hearing counsel, we are of the view, for reasons given below, that this is a fit case for interference under Article 136 inasmuch as the Courts were wrong in thinking that the plaintiff must prove not his need but his ‘dire or absolute necessity’. The above approach on the facts has appeared to us to be based on irrelevant circumstances.

4. Now, it is well-settled that this Court under Article 136 will not ordinarily interfere with the findings of fact arrived at by the Courts below except in rare situations. It was held in Variety Emporium v. V.R.M. Mohd. Ibrahim Naina1 which arose under a Rent Control statute, that though this Court would not ordinarily interfere, this Court could go into the correctness of findings of fact where “the concurrent decision of two or more courts or tribunals is manifestly unjust”. This burden is no doubt to be discharged by the appellant. “But once that burden is discharged, it is not only the right but the duty of Supreme Court to remedy injustice”. Similarly in Bega Begum and Ors. v. Abdul Ahad Khan and Ors.2, which also arose under the Rent Control law, it was again held that where the “High Court and the trial Court have made a legally wrong approach and have committed substantial and patent error of law in interpreting the scope and ambit of the words “reasonable requirement” and “own possession” in the section and “have thus misapplied the law and overlooked some of the essential features of the evidence, the Supreme Court has to enter into the merits of the case in order to prevent grave and substantial injustice”.

5. We shall initially refer to the legal principles applicable to the case. Section 13(1)(g) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates (Control) Act, 1947 uses the word “the premises are reasonably and bona fide required by the landlord for his own occupation etc”.

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1999 Supreme(SC) 1209

Cases Referred (12)