2002 Supreme(SC) 659

2002(4) Supreme 552
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
(From Madhya Pradesh High Court)
R.C. Lahoti & B.N. Agrawal, JJ.
Dhannalal -Appellant
versus
Kalawatibai & Ors. -Respondents
Civil Appeal No. 3652 of 2002
(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 8193 of 2001)
With
Civil Appeal No. 3653 of 2002
(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 8776 of 2001)
Decided on 8-7-2002
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appellant : Siddharth Shankar Ray, Sr. Advocate, Sushil Kumar Jain, A. Ranganathan and Ms. Ruchi Kohli, Advocates.
For the Respondents : A.K. Chitale, Sr. Advocate, M. Manan and Niraj Sharma, Advocates.

IMPORTANT POINT
Looking to the nature of bona fide requirement pleaded by the co-landlord-respondents viz. widow landlady required it for business need of her sons in their applications, the form of Rent Control Authority was available to them under Chapter IIIA of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 and they were not required to have recourse to the jurisdiction of Civil Court by filing suits for eviction under Section 12 of the Act.

Headnote:(i) M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961-Sections 12, 23A, 23J and 45-Suit for eviction filed by co-owner landlord, a widow, with other two co-owner landlords for bona fide non-residential need of widow for her sons before Rent Control Authority-Whether maintainable under Chapter IIIA of the Act or whether they were required to have recourse to jurisdiction of Civil Court by filing suits for eviction under Section 12 of the Act? (the former).

       Held : Broadly speaking, the main features of Chapter III-A are that it provides a summary procedure for the hearing of applications on the lines similar to those contained in Order 37 of the CPC. The tenant cannot contest the prayer for eviction from accommodation unless leave to defend is sought for by moving an application within the prescribed period of time and allowed. Default in appearance or refusal of leave results in the statement made by the landlord in the application for eviction being deemed to have been admitted by the tenant obliging the Rent Controlling Authority to pass an order of eviction. Where leave is granted to the tenant to contest the application, the Rent Controlling Authority shall hold an enquiry consistently with the practice and procedure of a Court of Small Causes. The requirement of the landlord is presumed to be bona fide unless the contrary is proved, that is to say, the burden of proof is placed on the tenant to rebut the case of the landlord contrary to the ordinary procedure in a Civil Court where the burden of proof lies on the landlord. As against an order of eviction passed by the RCA, a revision lies to the High Court and the remedy of appeal is excluded. (Para 9)

       It follows that a widow, who is a co-owner and landlady of the premises can in her own right initiate proceedings for eviction under Section 23-A(b), as analysed hereinbefore, without joining other co-owners/co-landlords as party to the proceedings if they do not object to the initiation of proceedings by such landlady, because she is the owner of the property and requires the tenanted accommodation for the purpose of continuing or starting the business of any of her major sons. The major sons though co-owners/co-landlords may not have been joined as party to the proceedings but it would not adversely affect the maintainability of the proceedings. It would also not make any difference if they are also joined as party to the proceedings. Their presence in the proceedings is suggestive of their concurrence with the widow landlady maintaining the proceedings in her own right. The presence of such co-landlords, as co-plaintiffs or co-applicants, as are not classified landlords as defined in Section 23-J of the Act does not alter the nature of claim preferred by the widow landlady and therefore does not take the proceedings out of the scope of Section 23-A(b). (Para 17)

       When the law - procedural or substantive - does not debar any two seekers of justice from joining hands and moving together, they must have a common path. Multiplicity of proceedings should be avoided and same cause of action available to two at a time must not be forced to split and tried in two different fora as far as practicable and permissible. (Para 20)

       Thus in case of a cause of action being triable in more than one forum it may be tried by any one forum subject to any other provision or rule of law. (Para 24)

       Keeping in view the three relevant principles (i) that every wrong must have a remedy and every right to relief must have a forum for enforcement, (ii) that plaintiff is dominus litis, and (iii) that one co-owner/landlord can file a suit for ejectment of tenant and it is not necessary that all co-owner/landlords must jointly sue for ejectment though they are not prevented from - rather entitled to -joining together and suing jointly if they wish to do so, we proceed to state our conclusions as under :-

        (i) where a claim for eviction is filed by a landlord, or a co-landlord, belonging to any one of the five categories defined in Section 23-J of the Act, as the sole applicant without objection by other co-landlords who have not joined as co-applicants and the nature of claim for eviction is covered by Section 23-A(b) of the Act, the proceedings would lie only before the Rent Controlling Authority;

        (ii) where a claim for eviction is filed by a landlord or by such a co-landlord who does not belong to any of the categories defined by Section 23-J and the other co-landlord/landlady falling in one of the categories defined in Section 23-J is not joined as co-plaintiff the claim shall have to be filed only by way of a suit instituted in a Civil Court;

        (iii) if the proceedings are initiated by such co-owner landlords, one or more of whom belong to Section 23-J category while some others are those not falling within the definition of landlord under Section 23-J and the requirement pleaded provides a cause of action collectively to all the landlords arrayed as plaintiffs or applicants, the choice of forum lies with the landlords. They may file an application before R.C.A. under Chapter III-A or may file a civil suit in a Civil Court under Section 12 of the Act; in either case the proceedings would be competent and maintainable.

       We are, therefore, of the opinion that there is no merit in the plea raised on behalf of the appellants that the three respondents, one widow and her two major sons, could not have initiated proceedings for eviction before the Rent Controlling Authority. We have carefully perused the two applications for eviction filed by the respondents. The bonafide requirement pleaded is of the widow landlady, the respondent No.1, who requires the suit premises for Govinda, respondent No.2 for starting his business and that of another son Hemant, the respondent No.3 for continuing the business which presently he is carrying on in rented premises. Respondents 2 and 3 being major sons of the widow respondent No.1, such requirement clearly falls also within the purview of Section 23-A(b) of the Act. The proceedings initiated before R.C.A. do not suffer from want of jurisdictional competence. (Paras 25 & 26)

       (ii) M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961-Sections 12, 23A, 23J and 45-Suit for eviction by co-owner widow landlady along with other two other co-owners on ground of bona fide non-residential need of her sons to start business-Whether landlords have succeeded in making out a case of bona fide requirement of the suit premises within the meaning of Section 23A(b) of the Act? (Yes)-Appeals dismissed-(C.P.C. 1908-Section 17).

       Held : So far as the challenge to proof of requirement is concerned it merits a summary dismissal. The Rent Controlling Authority and the High Court, both, have on a meticulous evaluation of evidence found the requirement proved. None of the landlords is possessed of any other suitable alternative accommodation of his or her own to satisfy the requirement found proved. A landlord cannot be compelled to carry on business in rented premises and the proved requirement cannot be defeated by the tenant submitting that the landlord can start or comfortably continue to run his business in rented premises. It has come in evidence that the landlords have secured possession of some premises in Ahilyapura locality situated at a short distance from the suit premises but the Ahilyapura accommodation is again a tenanted accommodation and hence irrelevant for defeating the claim of the landlords. To be an alternative accommodation relevant within the meaning of Section 12(1)(f) or Section 23-A(b) it must be of his own , that is, the one owned by the landlord. Another alternative accommodation pointed out by the tenant is the one situated on the first floor of the building. It has come in the evidence that the second floor of the building is used for residence of the landlords while the first floor is used partly as a godown and partly for stitching the clothes which are sold as readymade garments in the shop of respondent No. 3. To amount to an alternate non-residential accommodation so as to defeat the requirement of the landlord for the suit premises, it should be reasonably suitable non-residential accommodation. It should be suitable in all respects as the suit accommodation is. In Shiv Sarup Gupta Vs. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta - (1999) 6 SCC 222 this Court has held that an alternative accommodation, to entail denial of the claim of the landlord, must be reasonably suitable, obviously in comparison with the suit accommodation wherefrom the landlord is seeking eviction. The availability of another accommodation, suitable and convenient in all respects as the suit accommodation, may have an adverse bearing on the finding as to bona fides of the landlord if he unreasonably refuses to occupy the available premises to satisfy his alleged need. The bona fides of the need of the landlord for the premises or additional premises have to be determined by the Court by applying objective standards and once the Court is satisfied of such bona fides then in the matter of choosing out of more accommodations than one available to the landlord, his subjective choice shall be respected by the Court. For the business, which the respondents No.2 and 3 propose to start or continue respectively, an accommodation situated on the first floor cannot be said to be an alternative suitable accommodation in comparison with the shops situated on the ground floor. A shop on the first floor cannot attract the same number of customers and earn the same business as a shop situated on the ground floor would do. Moreover, there is no evidence adduced by the appellants to show that in M.T. Cloth market shops are also situated on first floor of buildings and attract the same business as the shops on ground floor do. The High Court and the R.C.A. have held none of the premises pointed out by the tenant-appellants such alternate accommodation as may defeat the respondents claim. We find no reason to take a different view. Between the years 1987 and 1989 late Krishna Das, the then sole owner of the building, had sold three shops but that was an event which had taken place in the life-time of late Krishna Das and cannot have relevance for denying the claim of the respondent-landlords filed in the year 1995. For all the foregoing reasons we find the appeals devoid of any merit and liable to be dismissed. They are dismissed with costs. However, each of the appellants is allowed four months time for vacating the suit premises subject to each of them clearing all arrears of rent and filing usual undertaking, within a period of four weeks from today. (Paras 27 & 28)