1. Challenge to the validity of a Regulation abolishing village proprietorship and vesting land in Government, specifically regarding protection under Article 31A of the Constitution. (Para 1 , 3 )
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1966 Supreme(SC) 229
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
K. SUBBA RAO, C.J.I., M. HIDAYATULLAH, S.M. SIKRI, V. RAMASWAMI AND J.M. SHELAT, JJ.
Gulabbhai Vallabbhai Desai and others, Petitioners
Versus
The Union of India and others, Respondents.
Writ Petns. Nos. 148, 149, 233 and 238 of 1962, and 216 of 1963, D/- 27-9-1966.
Cases Referred : Chronological Paras
Advocates appeared
Mr. A. K. Sen, Senior Advocate, (M/s. R. J. Joshi, B. Dutta and Dalip M. Desai, Advocates and M/s. J. B. Dadachandji, O. C. Mathur and Ravinder Narain, Advocates of M/s. J. B. Dadachandji and Co., with him), for Petitioner in W. P. No. 148 of 1962.
Mr. Purshottam Trikumdas, Senior Advocate, (M/s. R. J. Joshi, B. Dutta and Dalip M. Desai, Advocates, and M/s. J. B. Dadachandji, O. C. Mathur and Ravinder Narain, Advocates of M/s. J. B. Dadachandji and Co., with him), for Petitioner in W. P. No. 149 of 1962.
M/s. R. J. Joshi and B. Dutta, Advocates, and M/s. J. B. Dadachandji, O. C. Mathur and Ravinder Narain, Advocates of M/s. J. B. Dadachandji, and Co., for Petitioners in W. P. Nos. 233 and 238 of 1962.
Mr. Purshottam Trikumdas, Senior Advocate, (Mr. B. Dutta, Advocate, and M/s. J. B. Dadachanji, O. C. Mathur and 1111 Ravinder Narain, Advocates of M/s. J. B. Dadachanji and Co., with him), for Petitioners in W. P. No. 216 of 1963.
Mr. C. K. Daphtary, Attorney-General for India and Mr. N. S. Bindra, Senior Advocate. (M/s. R. H. Dhebar and B. R. G. K. Achar, Advocates, with them), for Respondent No. 1 in all the Petitions.
Advocates:
A.K.SEN GUPTA, B.DUTTA, B.R.G.K.Achar, C.K.DAFTARY, DALIP M.DESAI, J.B.DADACHAN, N.S.BINDRA, O.C.MATHUR, PURSHOTTAM TRIKAMDAS, R.H.Dhebar, R.J.JOSHI, Ravindra Narayan
A.K.SEN GUPTA, B.DUTTA, B.R.G.K.Achar, C.K.DAFTARY, DALIP M.DESAI, J.B.DADACHAN, N.S.BINDRA, O.C.MATHUR, PURSHOTTAM TRIKAMDAS, R.H.Dhebar, R.J.JOSHI, Ravindra Narayan
Article 31A protects the acquisition of "estates," including agricultural and ancillary lands. If a statute's definition of land is broader than the constitutional definition of "estate," the statute remains valid, but constitutional protection applies only to land strictly fitting the definition of "estate" via the doctrine of severability.
Headnote:(A) Constitution of India - Articles 14, 19, 31 and 31A - Regulation for abolition of proprietorship of villages - Acquisition of estates - Validity of legislation providing for extinguishment of proprietary rights - Protection under Article 31A depends on whether the interest abolished falls within the definition of "estate" - Inclusive definition of "estate" includes land held or let for purposes of agriculture or purposes ancillary thereto, including waste land, forest land, land for pastures or sites of buildings occupied by cultivators, agricultural labourers and village artisans (Paras 5 and 15-A).
(B) Doctrine of Severability - Where a statute is in part void, it will be enforced as regards the rest if that is severable from what is invalid - It is immaterial whether the invalidity arises from the subject-matter being outside legislative competence or from contravening constitutional prohibitions - If a legislative definition of "land" is wider than the constitutional definition of "estate," the protection of Article 31A will not be available for land not strictly within the constitutional definition, but the Regulation remains valid for the remainder (Paras 16, 17 and 18).
Facts of the case:
Petitioners challenged the validity of a Regulation abolishing the proprietorship of villages in a Union Territory, claiming violations of fundamental rights. The Government contended that the Regulation was protected by Article 31A of the Constitution as it provided for the acquisition of "estates." The court examined whether the proprietary interests in the villages, including agricultural lands, salt pans, quarries, and municipal areas, constituted "estates."
Findings of Court:
The court found that lands devoted to agriculture or ancillary purposes fall within the inclusive definition of "estate" under Article 31A. However, lands such as salt pans, quarries, and municipal areas do not fit this definition. The wider definition of "land" in the Regulation was held to be severable from the constitutional definition of "estate."
Issues: Whether the proprietary interests abolished by the Regulation constitute an "estate" under Article 31A of the Constitution and whether the Regulation is void due to its definition of "land" being broader than the definition of "estate" in Article 31A.
Ratio Decidendi: The court ruled that the protection of Article 31A applies to the acquisition of "estates," which includes land used for agriculture or ancillary purposes. When a statute's definition of land exceeds the constitutional definition of "estate," the statute is not entirely void if the offending part is severable; instead, the constitutional protection applies only to the land that strictly meets the definition of "estate."
Result: Petitions dismissed, with declarations that non-agricultural lands and municipal areas do not vest in the Government under the Regulation and are not protected by Article 31A.
Legal Category Hierarchy
- constitutional law
- administrative law
- property law
- statutory interpretation
Table of Contents
2. Whether the proprietary interests abolished by the Regulation constitute an estate or similar grant under Article 31A, thereby immunizing the law from challenges under Articles 14, 19, and 31. (Para 5 , 6 )
3. The court analyzed Portuguese land laws and found that while traditional estates were absent, agricultural lands fell within the inclusive definition of estate under Article 31A. (Para 7 , 8 , 9 , 10 , 11 , 12 , 13 , 14 , 15 )
4. A law providing for acquisition of land held for agriculture is protected by Article 31A, but such protection does not extend to non-agricultural land not fitting the definition. (Para 16 , 17 , 18 )
5. Petitions dismissed; however, non-agricultural lands, including salt pans, quarries, and municipal areas, are excluded from the Regulation's protection and compensation scheme. (Para 19 )
6. Does the absence of a formal land-tenure system or land revenue in a territory preclude land from being classified as an estate under Article 31A?
No. While the absence of a tenure system may mean the land is not an estate in the traditional sense, it can still be an estate if it falls within the inclusive definition of land held or let for agricultural purposes or purposes ancillary thereto. (Para 11 , 14 )
7. How is a law treated when its definition of land is wider than the definition of estate protected by Article 31A?
The law is severable. The Regulation remains valid, but the constitutional protection of Article 31A applies only to the portion of the land that strictly fits the definition of an estate. (Para 16 , 17 , 18 )
8. What constitutes a similar grant under the inclusive definition of estate in Article 31A?
Grants such as jagirs, inams, or muafis, typically involving concessions in land revenue or service grants, are covered. Pure sales of immovable property without elements of grant or concession do not qualify. (Para 15 )
9. Does Article 31A protect the acquisition of non-agricultural lands like salt pans or municipal areas?
No. Land that is not held for agricultural purposes or ancillary purposes, such as municipal areas or certain industrial lands, does not fall within the definition of estate and is not protected by Article 31A. (Para 18 , 19 )
Judgement
HIDAYATULLAH, J. : This judgment will dispose of Writ Petitions Nos. 148, 149, 233 and 238 of 1962 and 216 of 1963. They raise a common question about the validity of the Daman (Abolition of Proprietorship of Villages) Regulation, 1962, (No. VII of 1962). We shall refer to this Regulation as "the Regulation" in this judgment.
2. By the Constitution (Twelfth Amendment) Act, 1962, the First Schedule to the Constitution was amended by including under the heading "The Union Territories after Entry 7, a new Entry which read:
"8. Goa, Daman and Diu.- The territories which immediately before the twentieth day of December 1961, were comprised in Goa, Daman and Diu".
Similarly, in Art. 240 which gives power to the President to make regulations for Union territories the words "Goa, Daman and Diu" were inserted. This followed the annexation of the territories belonging to India which had passed into Portuguese hands. On March 5, 1962 the President promulgated the Goa, Daman and Diu (Administration) Ordinance, 1962 to operate from the appointed day, namely, December 20, 1961 providing, among other things, for the continuance of all laws in force immediately before the appointed day in Goa, Daman and Diu or any part thereof until amended or repealed by a competent Legislature or other competent authority. A power to extend laws, with or without modification, and to remove difficulties by an order consistent with the Ordinance was also conferred on the Central Government.
3. In exercise of the powers so conferred the Regulation was enacted. The general scheme of the Regulation follows that of the other Reform Acts abolishing intermediaries in India. In some respects the Regulation makes a special provision in view of the laws in force in the former district of Daman. To these special features we may now refer. The Regulation purports to abolish the proprietorship of villages in Daman District. It defines the "appointed date" as the date on which it came into force and "land" as meaning "every class or category of land" and including "(i) benefits to arise out of such land, and (ii) things attached to earth". It also defines "proprietor" to mean "a person who holds any village or villages granted to him or any of his predecessors-in-interest by the former Portuguese Government by way of gift, sale or otherwise" and includes his co-sharers. "Cultivation" is defined as the use of lands for the purpose of agriculture or horticulture. It further defines the phrase "to cultivate personally" as meaning "to cultivate on one s own account" specifying in how many different ways a person could be said so to do, and a "cultivating tenant" as a person who cultivates personally any land belonging to another under an agreement, express or implied, and pays rent therefor in cash or kind or derives a share of the profit. By S. 3, the proprietary rights, title and interest of every proprietor in or in respect of all lands in his village or villages were extinguished and vested in the Government, free from all encumbrances etc., any contract, grant or document or any law for the time being in force to the contrary, notwithstanding. Section 4, however, saved, subject to other provisions, to the proprietor his homestead, buildings, structures together with land appurtenant thereto in the occupation of the proprietor and also lands under his personal cultivation, not being pastures or grass lands. By S. 7, cultivating tenants who had been evicted from any land after the 1st April, 1954, were restored to possession if the proprietor was personally cultivating those lands on December 20, 1961 provided an application was made in that behalf on or before December 31, 1962. After the appointed day all proprietors became occupants of the land. So also the cultivating tenants. Compensation was payable to the proprietors whose rights, title and interest in respect of their lands vested in Government and it was stated to be 20 times the annual payment (Contribuicao
