1. Review of death sentence for murder — Plea of juvenility under Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 at review stage. (Para 25 , 26 )
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2001 Supreme(SC) 442
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
RAM DEO CHAUHAN ALIAS RAJ NATH CHAUHAN
Versus
State of Assam
Decided on : May 10, 2001
Review jurisdiction in criminal cases is limited to correcting manifest errors. Juvenility must be established by reliable evidence; radiological age tests are approximations and cannot routinely supersede other probable evidence of age to commute a death sentence.
Headnote:(A) Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 - Section 22(1) - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Sections 235(2) and 309(2) - Constitution of India - Articles 21 and 137 - Death penalty vs. Life imprisonment - Determination of age for juvenility - Benefit of doubt regarding age in death sentence cases - Review jurisdiction of the court in criminal proceedings. (Paras 2, 5, 11, 12)
(B) Code of Criminal Procedure - Section 235(2) and Section 309(2) - Hearing on sentence - The general rule is that the sentence should be passed on the same day as the pronouncement of conviction - The proviso to Section 309(2) does not prohibit the court from granting an adjournment in grave cases, particularly those involving the death penalty, if the interest of justice demands it to enable parties to place relevant material before the court, although such a proviso does not entitle the accused to an adjournment as a matter of right. (Paras 2, 3, 49, 50)
(C) Constitution of India - Article 137 - Scope of review in criminal proceedings - While review is generally limited to errors apparent on the face of the record, the power is wide, especially where life or liberty is in peril - Review is intended to correct accidental mistakes or manifest wrongs to avoid miscarriage of justice and is not a substitute for a rehearing or a fresh decision on the merits of the evidence. (Paras 6, 7, 8, 28)
Facts of the case:
A convict, sentenced to death for the murder of four family members, filed a review petition seeking commutation of the sentence to life imprisonment. The petitioner contended that he was a juvenile (under 16 years of age) at the time of the commission of the offense, asserting that the death penalty is prohibited for juveniles under the applicable law. The claim was supported by a school register and a radiological ossification test, while the prosecution relied on witnesses and official statements. It was further contended that the trial court violated sentencing procedures by passing the sentence on the same day as the conviction.
Findings of Court:
The court found that the claim of juvenility was an afterthought and a concoction intended to escape the death penalty. The school register was deemed unreliable as it was not maintained according to statutory requirements and lacked official authenticity. The medical expert's opinion regarding age was viewed as a mere approximation and not proof positive of juvenility. Regarding the sentencing procedure, the court found the trial court's action permissible under the proviso to Section 309(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
Issues: Whether the convict was a juvenile on the date of the occurrence entitling him to a commutation of the death sentence; whether the trial court's failure to adjourn the proceedings between conviction and sentencing violated the mandate of the law; and whether the review jurisdiction could be invoked for a re-appraisal of evidence regarding age.
Ratio Decidendi: Radiological ossification tests provide only an approximate age range and are not infallible substitutes for proof; such opinions cannot be the sole basis for establishing juvenility when other evidence suggests otherwise. Review jurisdiction cannot be used to re-evaluate the entire gamut of evidence but is limited to correcting grave errors. In cases of death penalty, while a court may exercise discretion to adjourn the sentencing hearing in the interest of justice, such an adjournment is not a mandatory requirement that would invalidate a sentence of life imprisonment if the court chooses not to adjourn.
Result: Review petition dismissed.
Legal Category Hierarchy
Table of Contents
2. Petitioner claims death sentence barred for juvenile; prosecution opposes, arguing age was not proven as under 16. (Para 10 , 28 )
3. Evidence inconclusive on age; school register unreliable but medical opinion creates reasonable doubt about juvenility. (Para 18 , 19 , 20 , 21 , 22 , 23 )
4. Death penalty cannot be imposed if reasonable doubt exists that accused was a juvenile on the crucial date. (Para 14 , 23 )
5. Majority dismisses review petition; dissenting judge allows review and commutes death sentence to life imprisonment. (Para 24 , 58 , 59 )
6. What is the scope of review in criminal proceedings before the Supreme Court under Article 137?
Review in criminal proceedings is limited to an error apparent on the face of the record, but the power is wider than the rule suggests and can be exercised to prevent miscarriage of justice. (Para 6 , 7 , 8 , 9 , 28 )
7. Does the proviso to Section 309(2) CrPC bar a court from adjourning the case to hear the accused on sentence?
No. The proviso does not entitle an accused to an adjournment, but it does not preclude the court from granting one in serious cases, especially where the death penalty is proposed, to satisfy the requirements of justice under Section 235(2). (Para 2 , 3 , 48 , 49 , 50 )
8. Can death sentence be imposed if there is reasonable doubt about the accused's age and the possibility of juvenility?
No. If the prosecution fails to prove positively that the accused was above 16 on the crucial date, and a reasonable possibility of juvenility exists, the interdict in Section 22(1) of the Juvenile Justice Act prevents awarding death penalty. (Para 12 , 14 , 23 )
9. What is the evidentiary value of a school register entry for proving age in a criminal case?
An entry in a school register not maintained under a statutory requirement and whose author is not examined has little evidentiary value, especially if the register is poorly maintained and the source of the entry is unknown. (Para 20 , 41 )
10. What is the evidentiary value of a medical ossification test in determining age?
An X-ray ossification test provides a surer basis than a bare medical opinion but is not infallible for exact date of birth; there is a margin of error of about two years, and the test must be considered with all other evidence. (Para 22 , 43 )
Judgment
THOMAS, J.
( 1 ) AFTER reading the draft judgment prepared by my esteemed brother Sethi, J. supported by reasons forcefully and lucidly advanced there could not have been much difficulty for me to concur with it. However, having regard to certain aspects revolving on the issue whether a young man should be hanged by neck till he is dead pursuant to the judgment pronounced by us, I am unble to resist the urge to look at the question of sentence once again in an effort to see whether there is any legally permissible outlet through which his life can be spared from the hangmans noose. In my thoughtful rumination on that alternative option I feel inclined to respectfully dissent from my learned brothers conclusion that there is no scope to alter the death penalty impose on the petitioner.
( 2 ) AT the outset I may state that I have no doubt in my mind regarding the correctness of the observations of Sethi, J. that the sentence cannot be altered on the reasoning that the trial court did not adjourn the proceedings, after pronouncing the conviction, for the purpose of providing the convicted person time to reflect on the question of sentence. The trial judge chose to pronounce the sentence on the same day of pronouncing the verdict of conviction. When the Code of Criminal Procedure was amended in 1978 (By Act 45 of 1978) a proviso was introduced to sub-section (2) of Section 309 of the Code by which an interdict has been added that "no adjournment shall be granted for the purpose only of enabling the accused persons to show cause against the sentence proposed to be imposed on him. " We make a note that the said proviso does not make a distinction between offences punishable with death or imprisonment for life and the other offences, in relation to the application of the said proviso. The proviso thus reflects the parliamentary concern that the rule in all cases must be that sentence shall be passed on the same day of pronouncement of judgment in criminal cases as far as possible, and perhaps by way of exception the said rule can be relaxed by adjourning the case to another day for passing orders on the sentence.
( 3 ) IN Muniappan v. State of Tamil Nadu (1981) 3 SCC 11 : (AIR 1981 SC 1220 : 1981 Cri LJ 726) this court emphasised the need to make a genuine effort to elicit all relevant information from the accused for considering the question whether the extreme penalty is to be awarded or not. In Allauddin Mian v. State of Bihar (1989) 3 SCC 5 : (AIR 1989 SC 1456 : 1989 Cri LJ 1466) a two Judge Bench of this Court S. Natarajan, J and A. M. Ahmadi, J (as he then was) and again in Malkiat Singh v. State of Punjab (1991) 4 SCC 341 a three Judge Bench ( A. M. Ahmadi, V. Ramaswamy and K. Ramaswamy, JJ) have indicated the need to adjourn the case to a future date after pronouncing the verdict of conviction. In those two decisions the direction contained in the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 309 of the Code was not considered, presumably because it was not brought to the notice of the Court. Hence in State of Maharashtra v. Sukhdev Singh (1992) 3 SCC 700 : (1992 AIR SCW 2486 : AIR 1992 SC 2100 : 1992 Cri LJ 3454) the two Judge Bench (A. M. Ahmadi and K. Ramaswamy, JJ) considered the implication of the said proviso also. Learned judges observed that the proviso to Section 309 (2) does not entitle an accused to adjourn though it does not prohibit the court from granting such adjournment in serious cases. This is what Ahmadi J ( as he then was) observed for the Bench ( para 56) :"if the court feels that the interest of justice demands that the matter should be adjourned to enable both sides to place the relevant material touching on the question of sentence before the court, the above extracted proviso cannot preclude the court from doing so. "
( 4 ) IT must be remembered that two alternative sentences alon are permitted for imposition as for the offence under Section 302 IPC - imprisonment for life or death. Thus no court is pe
