Judgment

THOMAS, J.

( 1 ) AFTER reading the draft judgment prepared by my esteemed brother Sethi, J. supported by reasons forcefully and lucidly advanced there could not have been much difficulty for me to concur with it. However, having regard to certain aspects revolving on the issue whether a young man should be hanged by neck till he is dead pursuant to the judgment pronounced by us, I am unble to resist the urge to look at the question of sentence once again in an effort to see whether there is any legally permissible outlet through which his life can be spared from the hangmans noose. In my thoughtful rumination on that alternative option I feel inclined to respectfully dissent from my learned brothers conclusion that there is no scope to alter the death penalty impose on the petitioner.

( 2 ) AT the outset I may state that I have no doubt in my mind regarding the correctness of the observations of Sethi, J. that the sentence cannot be altered on the reasoning that the trial court did not adjourn the proceedings, after pronouncing the conviction, for the purpose of providing the convicted person time to reflect on the question of sentence. The trial judge chose to pronounce the sentence on the same day of pronouncing the verdict of conviction. When the Code of Criminal Procedure was amended in 1978 (By Act 45 of 1978) a proviso was introduced to sub-section (2) of Section 309 of the Code by which an interdict has been added that "no adjournment shall be granted for the purpose only of enabling the accused persons to show cause against the sentence proposed to be imposed on him. " We make a note that the said proviso does not make a distinction between offences punishable with death or imprisonment for life and the other offences, in relation to the application of the said proviso. The proviso thus reflects the parliamentary concern that the rule in all cases must be that sentence shall be passed on the same day of pronouncement of judgment in criminal cases as far as possible, and perhaps by way of exception the said rule can be relaxed by adjourning the case to another day for passing orders on the sentence.

( 3 ) IN Muniappan v. State of Tamil Nadu (1981) 3 SCC 11 : (AIR 1981 SC 1220 : 1981 Cri LJ 726) this court emphasised the need to make a genuine effort to elicit all relevant information from the accused for considering the question whether the extreme penalty is to be awarded or not. In Allauddin Mian v. State of Bihar (1989) 3 SCC 5 : (AIR 1989 SC 1456 : 1989 Cri LJ 1466) a two Judge Bench of this Court S. Natarajan, J and A. M. Ahmadi, J (as he then was) and again in Malkiat Singh v. State of Punjab (1991) 4 SCC 341 a three Judge Bench ( A. M. Ahmadi, V. Ramaswamy and K. Ramaswamy, JJ) have indicated the need to adjourn the case to a future date after pronouncing the verdict of conviction. In those two decisions the direction contained in the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 309 of the Code was not considered, presumably because it was not brought to the notice of the Court. Hence in State of Maharashtra v. Sukhdev Singh (1992) 3 SCC 700 : (1992 AIR SCW 2486 : AIR 1992 SC 2100 : 1992 Cri LJ 3454) the two Judge Bench (A. M. Ahmadi and K. Ramaswamy, JJ) considered the implication of the said proviso also. Learned judges observed that the proviso to Section 309 (2) does not entitle an accused to adjourn though it does not prohibit the court from granting such adjournment in serious cases. This is what Ahmadi J ( as he then was) observed for the Bench ( para 56) :"if the court feels that the interest of justice demands that the matter should be adjourned to enable both sides to place the relevant material touching on the question of sentence before the court, the above extracted proviso cannot preclude the court from doing so. "

( 4 ) IT must be remembered that two alternative sentences alon are permitted for imposition as for the offence under Section 302 IPC - imprisonment for life or death. Thus no court is per