2009 Supreme(SC) 1852

2009(8) Supreme 259
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Tarun Chatterjee and V.S. Sirpurkar,JJ.
Bhuwalka Steel Indus. Ltd. — Appellant
versus
Bombay Iron & Steel Labour Bd. & Anr. — Respondents
Civil Appeal No. 8452 of 2009
(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 1982 of 2007)
Decided on : 17-12-2009

IMPORTANT POINT
1. Plain meaning of the language is almost a rule and it is only by way of an exception that the external aids of interpretation can be used.
2. The law of supplying the casus omissus by the Courts is extremely clear and settled that though Court may supply the casus omissus, it would be in the rarest of the rare cases and thus supplying of this casus omissus would be extremely necessary due to the inadvertent omission on the part of the legislature.

Headnote:Maharashtra Mathadi, Hamal and other Manual Workers (Regulation of Employment and Welfare) Act, 1969 – Section 2(11) – Issue in consideration in instant case was whether in view of the statutory definition of the expression “unprotected worker” in Section 2(11) of Act, 1969 the interpretation placed by Division Bench in Century Textiles & Industries Ltd. Vs. State of Maharashtra, 2000 II CLR 279 on the aforesaid expression that it was only casually engaged workers who come within the purview of the Act, correct and proper – Case of appellants that Section 2(11) of the Mathadi Act could not be interpreted independently of Section 2(12) of the Mathadi Act, which is definition of `worker’ and conjoined reading of these two Sections in the light of other provisions of the Act would clearly bring out that those workers who are regularly employed and who have the protection of other labour legislations, cannot be termed as `unprotected workers’ – For that purpose, the two Sections cannot be interpreted merely on the basis of plain meaning of the language of the Sections, instead interpretation has to be done taking into consideration the context of the Mathadi Act, the Statement of Objects and Reasons and legislative history of the Act – Appellants further contended that Full Bench had erred in interpreting the said definition in isolation and not in the context of the Act-Plea of appellants that Mathadi Act was intended to cover only itinerant workers doing manual works for short time periods- Question referred to the Full Bench was restricted to the correctness of the interpretation of the term `unprotected worker’ in Section 2(11) of Mathadi Act as given in the case of Century Textiles & Industries Ltd.Vs. State of Maharashtra – In that case, it was held by Division Bench of that Court that the workers who were working in factory of the petitioner could not be termed as `unprotected workers’- It was held specifically that the Mathadi Act did not deal with the employees engaged on monthly basis, as such workers were protected under the Shops and Establishments Act and other enactments-It was further held that it was only the casually engaged workmen, who would come within the purview of the Mathadi Act- The majority judgment gave a straight answer to this question that the meaning of the term `unprotected worker’ was only the casual workman, was not correct, while the Single Judge did not stop at that and gave a broader answer interpreting Section 2(11) of the Mathadi Act and held that every manual worker engaged or to be engaged in any scheduled employment, irrespective of whether he is protected by other labour legislations or not, would be termed as `unprotected worker’, and further that the definition was not restricted to those manual workers who were casually engaged- It had been correctly held in the judgment of Single Judge that these two definitions (“worker” and “unprotected worker”) given in Sections 2(11) and 2(12) of the Mathadi Act would have to be read together for realizing the scope of the Section 2(11) of the Mathadi Act – Therefore, insofar as the language of Section 2(11) is concerned, it is plain, unambiguous and clear – It means that every worker, who is doing manual work and is engaged or to be engaged in any scheduled employment, would be covered by that definition and would become an unprotected worker – Full Bench was absolutely correct in coming to the conclusions that it did – Appeals dismissed. (Paras 10)

       Interpretation of statutes – Plain meaning of the language is almost a rule and it is only by way of an exception that the external aids of interpretation can be used – Where the language of the Statue is clear and unambiguous, the external aids for interpretation should be avoided – When the language is plain and unambiguous and admits of only one meaning, no question of construction of a statute arises,for the Act speaks for itself – There can be no dispute that the language of Section 2(11) of the Mathadi Act is not capable of any other meaning since it is clear and unambiguous – Where the language of the provision is plain and unambiguous, then that is the only avenue available while interpreting the same – Once the language of the Section is absolutely clear, there is hardly any scope for interpretation. (Para 19)

        Maharashtra Mathadi, Hamal and other Manual Workers (Regulation of Employment and Welfare) Act, 1969 – Section 2(11) – Issue in consideration in instant case was whether in view of the statutory definition of the expression “unprotected worker” in Section 2(11) of Act, 1969 the interpretation placed by Division Bench in Century Textiles & Industries Ltd. Vs. State of Maharashtra, 2000 II CLR 279 on the aforesaid expression that it was only casually engaged workers who come within the purview of the Act, correct and proper – Case of appellants that on going through the Objects and Reasons and Preamble and if the definition is read in that light, there would be no question of accepting the literal interpretation – In view of the clear and settled law of interpretation, it would really not be necessary to go into these contentions, particularly, because the law is very clear that where the language is clear and admits of no doubts, it is futile to look for the meaning of the provision on the basis of these external aids – It is possible where the plain meaning rungs counter to the objects or creates absurdity or doubts by attributing that plain language – It is very difficult to find out any such absurdity or contradiction if the plain language of the Section 2(11) is accepted and acted upon for the purposes of interpretation- Inspite of Section 2(11), which included the words “but for the provisions of this Act is not adequately protected by legislation for welfare and benefits of the labour force in the State”, these precise words were removed by the legislature and definition was made limited as it has been finally legislated upon – When the Bill came to be passed aforementioned words were omitted – Therefore, this was a clear pointer to the legislative intent that the legislature being conscious of fact and being armed with all the Committee Reports and also being armed with the factual data, deliberately avoided those words – What the appellants are asking was to read in that definition, these precise words, which were consciously and deliberately omitted from the definition – That would amount to supplying the casus omissus which is not possible, particularly, in this case – The law of supplying the casus omissus by the Courts is extremely clear and settled that though this Court may supply the casus omissus, it would be in the rarest of the rare cases and thus supplying of this casus omissus would be extremely necessary due to the inadvertent omission on the part of the legislature. But, that is certainly not the case here – Definition given in Section 2(11) of the Mathadi Act is extremely clear and there is no vagueness or ambiguity about it- The omission of the words as proposed earlier from the final definition is a deliberate and conscious act on the part of the legislature, only with the objective to provide protection to all the labourers or workers, who were the manual workers and were engaged or to be engaged in any scheduled employment- Therefore, there was a specific act on the part of the legislature to enlarge the scope of the definition and once we accept this, all the arguments regarding the objects and reasons, the Committee Reports, the legislative history being contrary to the expressed language, are relegated to the background and are liable to be ignored – Absurdity which the appellants were referring again and again had to be such that it should be contrary to the sense and reason and, therefore, should include a result, which is unworkable or impracticable, inconvenient, anomalous or illogical, futile or pointless,artificial or productive of a disproportionate counter-mischief- However held that Once literal construction was accepted there would be no further question of holding otherwise on the basis of the intent of the legislature. (Paras 24 to 35)

        Rule of stare decisis – Plea of appellants that under this rule, where a particular enactment has received a consistent interpretation by Courts of law for a considerable period of time, that interpretation must be respected because the rights and obligations by parties covered by such interpretation have remained settled thereby during the long period of time involved – It was urged by him that if the settled interpretation is upset,then it would do a greater injustice to all the parties concerned – Held Application of doctrine of stare decisis cannot help the appellants in this case – While rejecting the arguments of appellants, we have in our minds, those thousands of workmen who are otherwise exploited by Toliwalas, Mukadams and at times, the employers – The enactment is a beneficial enactment, providing the protection to such workers, who do not have the honest representation and it is with this lofty idea that a progressive State like State of Maharashtra has brought about this legislation – Viewed from these angles, it will have to be held that definition would have to be all the more broad, engulfing maximum area to the advantage of a workman – It is with this idea that we reject argument of the stare decisis, though very ably put by Shri Cama, Shri C.U. Singh, Learned Senior Counsel and other Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants. (Paras 36 to 38)

        Maxim of Contemporanea Expositio Est Optima Et Fortissima In Lege, shortly stated, Contemporanea Expositio-Applicability of-Plea of appellants that Full Bench ought to have considered how the authorities themselves construed and understood the law –Said plea clearly held erroneous for the simple reason that it is not the task of the State Government, more particularly, the Executive Branch to interpret the law; that is the task of the Courts- Even if the State Government understood the Act in a particular manner, that cannot be a true and correct interpretation unless it is so held by the Courts- Therefore, how the State Government officials understood the Act, was really irrelevant- Even if the Mathadi Board’s stand was somewhat contradictory in the case of Irkar Sahu’s & Anr. Vs. Bombay Port Trust (cited supra), it did not really create a bar against it from changing its stance for a correct interpretation of Section 2(11) of the Mathadi Act. (Paras 39, 40)

       Facts of the Case :

        Issue in consideration in instant case was whether in view of the statutory definition of the expression “unprotected worker” in Section 2(11) of Act, 1969 the interpretation placed by Division Bench in Century Textiles & Industries Ltd. Vs. State of Maharashtra, 2000 II CLR 279 on the aforesaid expression that it was only casually engaged workers who come within the purview of the Act, correct and proper. Case of appellants that Section 2(11) of the Mathadi Act could not be interpreted independently of Section 2(12) of the Mathadi Act, which is definition of `worker’ and conjoined reading of these two Sections in the light of other provisions of the Act would clearly bring out that those workers who are regularly employed and who have the protection of other labour legislations, cannot be termed as `unprotected workers’. For that purpose, the two Sections cannot be interpreted merely on the basis of plain meaning of the language of the Sections, instead interpretation has to be done taking into consideration the context of the Mathadi Act, the Statement of Objects and Reasons and legislative history of the Act. Appellants further contended that Full Bench had erred in interpreting the said definition in isolation and not in the context of the Act-Plea of appellants that Mathadi Act was intended to cover only itinerant workers doing manual works for short time periods.

       Findings of the Court :

        Where the language is clear and admits of no doubts, it is futile to look for the meaning of the provision on the basis of these external aids. It is possible where the plain meaning rungs counter to the objects or creates absurdity or doubts by attributing that plain language. It is very difficult to find out any such absurdity or contradiction if the plain language of the Section 2(11) is accepted and acted upon for the purposes of interpretation. Inspite of Section 2(11), which included the words “but for the provisions of this Act is not adequately protected by legislation for welfare and benefits of the labour force in the State”, these precise words were removed by the legislature and definition was made limited as it has been finally legislated upon. When the Bill came to be passed aforementioned words were omitted. Therefore, this was a clear pointer to the legislative intent that the legislature being conscious of fact and being armed with all the Committee Reports and also being armed with the factual data, deliberately avoided those words. What the appellants are asking was to read in that definition, these precise words, which were consciously and deliberately omitted from the definition- That would amount to supplying the casus omissus which is not possible, particularly, in this case. The law of supplying the casus omissus by the Courts is extremely clear and settled that though this Court may supply the casus omissus, it would be in the rarest of the rare cases and thus supplying of this casus omissus would be extremely necessary due tothe inadvertent omission on the part of the legislature. But, that was certainlynot the case here. Definition given in Section 2(11) of the Mathadi Act is extremely clear and there is no vagueness or ambiguity about it. The omission of the words as proposed earlier from the final definition is a deliberate and conscious act on the part of the legislature, only with the objective to provide protection to all the labourers or workers, who were the manual workers and were engaged or to be engaged in any scheduled employment. Therefore, there was a specific act on the part of the legislature to enlarge the scope of the definition and once we accept this, all the arguments regarding the objects and reasons, the Committee Reports, the legislative history being contrary to the expressed language, are relegated to the background and are liable to be ignored. Absurdity which the appellants were referring again and again had to be such that it should be contrary to the sense and reason and, therefore, should include a result, which is unworkable or impracticable, inconvenient, anomalous or illogical, futile or pointless, artificial or productive of a disproportionate counter-mischief. However held that Once literal construction was accepted there would be no further question of holding otherwise on the basis of the intent of the legislature. Hence held that Full Bench was absolutely correct in coming to the conclusions that it did. Appeals dismissed.