SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
R.F. NARIMAN, B.R. GAVAI, JJ.
PSA SICAL Terminals Pvt. Ltd. – Appellant
Versus
The Board of Trustees of V.O. Chidambranar Port Trust Tuticorin – Respondent
Civil Appeal Nos. 3699-3700 of 2018
Decided On : 28-07-2021
(A) Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Section 34 – Petition against arbitral award – In an application under Section 34, court is not expected to act as an appellate court and reappreciate evidence – Scope of interference would be limited to grounds provided under Section 34 of Arbitration Act – Interference would be so warranted when award is in violation of public policy of India – Judicial intervention on account of interfering on merits of award would not be permissible – However, principles of natural justice as contained in Section 18 and 34(2)(a)(iii) of Arbitration Act would continue to be grounds of challenge of an award – An award would be set aside on the ground of patent illegality appearing on face of award and as such, which goes to roots of matter – However, an illegality with regard to a mere erroneous application of law would not be a ground for interference – Equally, reappreciation of evidence would not be permissible on the ground of patent illegality appearing on face of award – A decision which is perverse, though would not be a ground for challenge under public policy of India, would certainly amount to a patent illegality appearing on face of award – However, a finding based on no evidence at all or an award which ignores vital evidence in arriving at its decision would be perverse and liable to be set aside on the ground of patent illegality. (Paras 42 and 43)
(B) Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Section 37(1)(c) – Appeal against arbitral award – Dispute emanating from License Agreement – Bid document itself provides that prescribed rates and charges to be collected by Licensee from users shall not exceed maximum rates as approved by Government/Tariff Regulatory Authority – Licensee was entitled to recover from owners/consignees or vessel owners/agents, rates and/or charges due and payable by them for use of Container Terminal services including terminal charges, wharfage on cargo containerized, container box and cargo related charges in respect of cargo and other services provided by Licensee – However, it was provided, that rates and/or charges to be collected by Licensee shall not exceed rates fixed by Licensor in respect of similar services and duly notified by GoI in official gazette or to be fixed by TAMP constituted under Section 47A of Major Port Trusts Act, 1963 – According to Arbitral Tribunal, there was a change in policy which amounted to change in law which, in turn, adversely affected SICAL – Neither under Section 34 nor under Section 37 of Arbitration Act, Court is entitled to reappreciate evidence – Said limitation would be equally applicable to this Court also – When the bid document was notified and when SICAL submitted its bid and LoI was issued to it, there were no guidelines in vogue – Finding of Arbitral Tribunal that there was an existing law to the effect that royalty payable shall be permitted as a pass-through in cost while fixation of tariff, is based on ‘no evidence. (Paras 48, 52, 59, 60, 76, 77 and 78)
(C) Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Section 37(1)(c) – Appeal against arbitral award – Contract duly entered into between parties cannot be substituted unilaterally without consent of parties – Intention of parties could be gathered from documents on record – SICAL wanted Agreement to be amended so as to change ‘royalty payment method’ to‘revenue-sharing method’ – However, ignoring stand of TPT, by impugned Award, Arbitral Tribunal has thrust upon a new term in Agreement between parties against wishes of TPT – ‘Royalty payment method’ has been totally substituted by Arbitral Tribunal, with ‘revenue-sharing method’ – Award has created a new contract for parties by unilateral intention of SICAL as against intention of TPT – Unilateral addition or alteration of a contract has been foisted upon an unwilling party – Fundamental principle of justice has been breached – Role of Arbitrator is to arbitrate within terms of contract – He has no power apart from what parties have given him under contract – If he has travelled beyond contract, he would be acting without jurisdiction-Jurisdiction of Arbitrator being confined to four corners of agreement, he can only pass such an order which may be subject-matter reference – Impugned Award would come under realm of ‘patent illegality’ and has been rightly set aside by High Court – Appeals dismissed. (Paras 79, 80, 81, 83, 85, 87, 88 and 95)
Facts of the case:
Appellant has approached this Court being aggrieved by the judgment and order dated 1st November 2017, passed by Division Bench of the Madras High Court in C.M.A. (MD) No. 345 of 2016 and C.M.P. (MD) No. 4867 of 2016, thereby allowing the appeal of the respondent No.1 herein under Section 37(1)(c) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 vide which the High Court set aside the award dated 14th February 2014, passed by the Arbitral Tribunal and the order passed by the District Judge dated 25th February 2016, rejecting application filed by the respondent No.1 herein under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.
Findings of Court:
Any observations made by the High Court with regard to other aspects of the matter except the validity of the Award, would not come in the way of either of the parties raising their grievances in either the proceedings which are pending before the Division Bench of the High Court or any other proceedings to which either of it would be entitled to take recourse in law.
Result : Appeals dismissed.
Certainly. Based on the provided legal document, the key points are as follows:
The Arbitral Tribunal is not a Court of law and its orders are not judicial orders. It cannot exercise powers ex debito Justitiae and must operate within the scope of the contract and the law (!) (!) .
The role of the Arbitrator is to arbitrate within the terms of the contract. They have no authority beyond what is granted by the parties' agreement, and cannot unilaterally alter or substitute the terms of the contract without mutual consent (!) (!) .
A contract duly entered into between parties cannot be unilaterally substituted or amended without the consent of all parties involved. Any attempt to do so would breach fundamental principles of justice and the contractual agreement (!) .
Judicial intervention to reappreciate evidence or interfere with the merits of an arbitral award is limited. Such interference is only justified if the award is in violation of public policy, involves patent illegality, or is perverse, based on no evidence, or ignores vital evidence (!) (!) (!) .
An arbitral award can be set aside if it involves a patent illegality that goes to the roots of the matter or if it is based on no evidence or is perverse. Errors of law or mere erroneous applications of law, without going to the core of the matter, are generally not sufficient grounds for setting aside an award (!) (!) .
The scope of judicial review under Sections 34 and 37 of the Arbitration Act is narrow. Courts are not to act as appellate bodies but only to ensure that the arbitral process has not exceeded its jurisdiction or violated fundamental principles, especially public policy or natural justice (!) (!) .
Change in law, as defined in the contractual provisions, can provide grounds for relief if it substantially and adversely affects the rights of the Licensee and alters the commercial viability of the project. However, the interpretation of such clauses depends on the conduct of the parties and the context of the agreement (!) (!) .
The Arbitrator's authority is confined to the terms of the contract. Any deviation or alteration, such as substituting the royalty payment method with a revenue-sharing model against the explicit wishes of one party, constitutes a breach of jurisdiction and fundamental principles of justice (!) (!) .
The conduct of the parties, including their representations, correspondence, and the course of their dealings, is relevant in interpreting the contract and determining the intention of the parties. Such conduct can influence the scope and interpretation of contractual clauses (!) .
The document emphasizes that the arbitration process and the courts should not rewrite or modify the contract, especially by unilateral or unjustified amendments that alter the fundamental terms agreed upon by the parties (!) (!) .
The judgments reinforce that interference with arbitral awards is only justified in exceptional circumstances, such as when the award shocks the conscience or breaches fundamental principles of justice, and not for mere errors or disagreements with the outcome (!) (!) (!) .
Overall, the legal principles highlight the importance of respecting the contractual scope of arbitration, limiting judicial review to violations of public policy or patent illegality, and ensuring that arbitrators do not exceed their jurisdiction or alter the contractual balance unilaterally.
JUDGMENT :
B.R. GAVAI, J.
1. The appellant has approached this Court being aggrieved by the judgment and order dated 1st November 2017, passed by the Division Bench of the Madras High Court in C.M.A. (MD) No. 345 of 2016 and C.M.P. (MD) No. 4867 of 2016, thereby allowing the appeal of the respondent No. 1 herein under Section 37(1)(c) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Arbitration Act’) vide which the High Court set aside the award dated 14th February 2014, passed by the Arbitral Tribunal and the order passed by the District Judge dated 25th February 2016, rejecting the application filed by the respondent No. 1 herein under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.
2. The facts necessary for adjudication of the present appeals are as under:
3. In the meantime, the Tariff Authority for Major Ports (hereinafter referred to as ‘TAMP’) which is an authority constituted under the Major Port Trusts Act, 1963 adopted guidelines on 26th/27th February 1998. SICAL submitted its tariff proposal with regard to the Container Terminal on 28th September 1999. A revised proposal came to be submitted by SICAL on 8th October 1999, thereby including royalty as an element of cost. The said proposal was approved by TAMP’s order dated 8th December 1999. TAMP notified its order of 8th December 1999 vide gazette notification dated 28th December 1999, thereby approving the tariff as proposed by SICAL vide proposal dated 8th October 1999. SICAL submitted a further proposal on 8th February 2002 for review in tariff, again including therein an increase in royalty to be paid as an element of cost and proposed for an increase in the tariff. TPT vide communication dated 10th April 2002, objected to the proposal of SICAL for increase in tariff. TAMP vide its order dated 20th September 2002, rejected the proposal of SICAL for increase in tariff.
4. SICAL filed Writ Petition Nos. 40637-40639 of 2002 before the Madras High Court for quashing of the TAMP order dated 20th September 2002. In the said proceedings, the Madras High Court passed an order dated 8th November 2002 granting interim relief in favour of SICAL, thereby staying the TAMP order dated 20th September 2002. Vide the said order, SICAL was permitted to charge tariff at the rate prevailing prior to the TAMP order impugned in those petitions.
5. Ministry of Shipping, Government of India (hereinafter referred to as ‘GoI’) vide notification dated 29th July 2003, clarified that revenue sharing/royalty payment shall not be factored into as cost for fixation/revision of tariff by TAMP and further directed that the same shall be clearly indicated in subsequent bid documents. On 31st March 2005, TAMP notified the revised guidelines thereby disallowing royalty as an element of cost. However, it also provided that in BOT cases where bidding processes were finalized before 29th July 2003, the tariff computation will take into account royalty/revenue share as cost for tariff fixation in such a manner as to avoid likely loss to the operator on account of the royalty/revenue share not being taken into account. This was subject to a maximum of the amount
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