1. Disciplinary proceedings for financial irregularities — Dismissal from service — Challenge on grounds of violation of natural justice and non-disclosure of material documents. (Para 8 )
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2025 Supreme(SC) 1219
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
DIPANKAR DATTA, PRASHANT KUMAR MISHRA, JJ.
K. Prabhakar Hegde – Appellant
Versus
Bank of Baroda – Respondent
Civil Appeal No. 6599 of 2025 [Arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 6358 of 2022]
Decided On : 19-08-2025
Advocates appeared:
For the Appellant(s) : Mr. Anand Sanjay M. Nuli, Sr. Adv. M/S. Nuli & Nuli, AOR
For the Respondent(s): Mr. Basava Prabhu Patil, Sr. Adv. Ms. Praveena Gautam, AOR Mr. Pawan Shukla, Adv. Ms. Tissy Annie Thomas, Adv. Mr. Rohan Bansla, Adv. Mr. Arijeet Shukla, Adv.
For the Appellant(s) : Mr. Anand Sanjay M. Nuli, Sr. Adv. M/S. Nuli & Nuli, AOR
For the Respondent(s): Mr. Basava Prabhu Patil, Sr. Adv. Ms. Praveena Gautam, AOR Mr. Pawan Shukla, Adv. Ms. Tissy Annie Thomas, Adv. Mr. Rohan Bansla, Adv. Mr. Arijeet Shukla, Adv.
Natural justice principles enforce mandatory questioning of charged officers on adverse evidence, with violation leading to action being invalidated, regardless of proven prejudice.
Headnote:(A) Natural Justice - Principles of natural justice are integral to Article 14 of the Constitution. Rights to a fair hearing must be upheld irrespective of potential prejudice. - Cases cited include S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan [(1980) 4 SCC 379] and Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation [(1985) 3 SCC 545]. (Paras 1-6)
(B) Administrative Disciplinary Proceedings - The importance of a preliminary inquiry in deciding if a disciplinary inquiry is necessary. A failure to provide a preliminary inquiry report does not necessarily vitiate disciplinary proceedings unless it prejudices the charged officer. (Paras 18-31)
(C) Inquiry Regulations - Regulation 6(17) of the Vijaya Bank Officer Employees’ (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1981 mandates that an Inquiry Officer must question a charged officer on adverse evidence unless the officer has personally given evidence in defense; failure to do so is a definite breach of procedure. (Paras 32-56)
(D) Decision Impact - The Court held that the disciplinary proceedings against the officer were flawed by non-compliance with mandatory inquiry regulations. Both the dismissal and appellate orders were quashed, with directions for only partial terminal benefits to be awarded. (Paras 72-76)
Facts of the case:
The appellant was dismissed from service after being charged with financial irregularities. Upon challenge, the Single Judge quashed the dismissal, but this was reversed by the High Court. (Paras 7-15)
Findings of Court:
The High Court's reliance on non-provided documents and failure to adhere to inquiry procedures was deemed a violation of natural justice. (Paras 56, 72)
Issues: 1) Did the failure to provide the preliminary report bias the proceedings? 2) Did the Inquiry Officer's failure to question the appellant as per Regulation 6(17) amount to a procedural violation? 3) Was the continuation of proceedings after superannuation valid? (Paras 16-17)
Ratio Decidendi: The court found that non-compliance with mandatory procedural regulations leads to automatic invalidation of disciplinary action, reaffirming the rights to a fair hearing as part of natural justice principles. The violation of such principles does not require proof of actual prejudice. (Paras 1-6, 55-56)
Result: The appeal is allowed and the order of dismissal is quashed with limited benefits mandated for the appellant. (Paras 73-76)
Legal Category Hierarchy
- administrative law
- constitutional law
- practice and procedure
Table of Contents
2. Whether non-furnishing of preliminary report and CVC recommendations, and failure to question the officer under statutory regulations, vitiated the inquiry and caused prejudice. (Para 13 , 15 )
3. Preliminary reports are internal unless relied upon; mandatory statutory requirements for questioning the charged officer must be observed; CVC recommendations used for punishment must be disclosed. (Para 18 , 19 , 20 , 21 , 22 , 23 , 24 , 25 , 26 , 27 , 28 , 29 , 30 , 31 , 32 , 33 , 34 , 35 , 36 , 37 , 38 , 39 , 40 , 41 , 42 , 43 , 44 , 45 , 46 , 47 , 48 , 49 , 50 , 51 , 52 , 53 , 54 , 55 , 56 , 57 , 58 , 59 , 60 , 61 , 62 , 63 , 64 , 65 , 66 , 67 , 68 , 69 , 71 )
4. Violation of mandatory procedural safeguards in disciplinary proceedings constitutes prejudice per se; material used by disciplinary authority for punishment must be furnished to the employee. (Para 44 , 54 , 55 , 64 )
5. Order of dismissal quashed — Appellant granted lump-sum amount equal to gratuity — No interest payable unless delayed. (Para 73 , 74 , 75 , 76 )
6. Is the non-furnishing of a preliminary inquiry report sufficient to vitiate disciplinary proceedings?
No, provided the report is an internal document used only to determine if regular proceedings are necessary and is not relied upon to reach the final conclusions in the inquiry report. (Para 19 , 20 , 25 , 27 )
7. Is the requirement to generally question a charged officer on adverse circumstances in disciplinary regulations mandatory or directory?
Where the regulation uses the word shall, it imposes a mandatory duty. Failure to perform this duty is a violation of natural justice and Article 14, obviating the need to prove prejudice. (Para 53 , 54 , 55 )
8. Must a disciplinary authority furnish CVC recommendations to the charged employee if they are used to determine punishment?
Yes. If the authority accepts CVC recommendations that vary from the original proposal, the recommendations must be furnished to the employee to allow them to contest the veracity or explain. (Para 61 , 64 )
9. Can CVC recommendations be withheld from a charged employee under a claim of privilege?
No, unless the documents relate to affairs of State or national security. CVC recommendations in disciplinary matters do not typically meet this threshold and cannot be withheld. (Para 66 )
JUDGMENT :
DIPANKAR DATTA, J.
PREFACE
1. S.L. Kapoor vs. Jagmohan , (1980) 4 SCC 379 is a landmark decision of this Court, delivered more than half a century back, delineating the contours of the principles of natural justice, more particularly the right to be heard before one is condemned. The supersession of the New Delhi Municipal Committee was challenged on the ground that it was in violation of the principles of natural justice, since no show cause notice was issued before the order of supersession was passed. Linked with that question was the question whether the failure to observe the principles of natural justice matters at all, if such observance would have made no difference, iedthe admitted or indisputable facts speaking for themselves. The golden words of Hon’ble O. Chinappa Reddy, J. speaking for the three-Judge Bench, rings in our ears:
“24........In our view the principles of natural justice know of no exclusionary rule dependent on whether it would have made any difference if natural justice had been observed. The non-observance of natural justice is itself prejudice to any man and proof of prejudice independently of proof of denial of natural justice is unnecessary. It ill comes from a person who has denied justice that the person who has been denied justice is not prejudiced......” (Emphasis ours)
2. The above passage from S.L. Kapoor (supra) came to be noticed in the Constitution Bench decision of this Court in Olga Tellis vs. Bombay Municipal Corporation , (1985) 3 SCC 545 and met with an unconditional approval. Hon’ble Y.V. Chandrachud, CJI. speaking for the Bench (which incidentally included Hon’ble O. Chinappa Reddy, J.) ruled that the said observations sum up the true legal position regarding the purport and implications of the right of hearing.
3. Close on the heels of Olga Tellis (supra), Another Constitution Bench upon a survey of precedents on the point of fair and impartial hearing observed in Union of India vs. Tulsiram Patel , (1985) 3 SCC 398 as follows:
“95. The principles of natural justice have thus come to be recognized as being a part of the guarantee contained in Article 14 because of the new and dynamic interpretation given by this Court to the concept of equality which is the subject-matter of that article. Shortly put, the syllogism runs thus: violation of a rule of natural justice results in arbitrariness which is the same as discrimination; where discrimination is the result of State action, it is a violation of Article 14: therefore, a violation of a principle of natural justice by a State action is a violation of Article 14. Article 14, however, is not the sole repository of the principles of natural justice. What it does is to guarantee that any law or State action violating them will be struck down. The principles of natural justice, however, apply not only to legislation and State action but also where any tribunal, authority or body of men, not coming within the definition of State in Article 12, is charged with the duty of deciding a matter. In such a case, the principles of natural justice require that it must decide such matter fairly and impartially.” (Emphasis ours)
4. In another seminal decision, i.e. A.R. Antulay vs. R.S. Nayak , (1988) 2 SCC 602 a seven-Judge Constitution Bench while acknowledging that it had committed an error earlier which needed rectification, went on to assert that:
“55........No prejudice need be proved for enforcing the fundamental rights. Violation of a fundamental right itself renders the impugned action void. So also the violation of the principles of natural justice renders the act a nullity.......”
5. It has recently been held by us in State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Ram Prakash Singh , 2025 SCC Online SC 891 that just as Articles 14, 19 and 21 constitute a triumvirate of rights of citizens conceived as charters on equality, freedom and liberty, the trio of the Constitution Bench decisions in Olga Tellis (supra), Tulsiram Patel (supra) and A.R
