1. Mortgage recovery suit — Transfer of property during pendency — Auction sale — Separate suit challenging sale validity on grounds of fraud and material irregularities. (Para 4 , 5 , 6 , 7 , 8 , 9 , 11 , 12 , 13 , 14 )
2025 Supreme(SC) 2050
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
J. B. Pardiwala, R. Mahadevan, JJ.
Danesh Singh & Ors. – Appellants
Versus
Har Pyari (Dead) Thr. Lrs. & Ors. – Respondents
Civil Appeal No. 14761 of 2025 (Arising out of SLP(C) No. 14461 of 2019)
Decided On : 15-12-2025
Important Points
Subject
Civil Law - Property and Execution Proceedings
Act Referred
CONSTITUTION OF INDIA: Art.142
LIMITATION ACT: Art.127, Art.128
TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT: S.52, S.58
Headnote
(B) Execution proceedings - Bar to separate suit - When property is sold in execution of a decree and confirmed, separate suits questioning the validity of proceedings are barred if the party is a representative of the judgment-debtor or can avail remedies under Order XXI - Questions regarding execution, discharge, or satisfaction must be adjudicated by the executing court under Section 47 CPC, not by a separate suit. (Paras 141-147, 256-257).
(C) Lis Pendens - Doctrine of - Applicability to money suits - Where a suit includes a prayer for sale/charge on mortgaged property, any transfer during pendency is hit by lis pendens irrespective of notice to the transferee. (Paras 48-52, 63-66).
Facts of the case:
A financial institution initiated a suit for recovery of money and mortgage enforcement. During the litigation, the property was sold to third-party vendees. After a decree was passed, the court ordered an auction, where the property was purchased by the auction-purchasers. The vendees, claiming title, instituted a separate suit after the auction sale was confirmed, seeking a declaration that the sale was void and claiming possession.
Findings of Court:
The court held that the sale during the pendency of the litigation is subject to the result of the proceedings. As the transferees stepped into the shoes of the judgment-debtor, they are considered representatives under the law and are barred from initiating a separate suit to challenge the execution proceedings, which are governed by specific procedures under the code.
Issues: Whether the transfer of property is affected by the doctrine of lis pendens; whether a separate suit is maintainable by pendente lite transferees; and whether the executing court is the sole forum for resolving disputes regarding execution and sale validity.
Ratio Decidendi: Pendente lite transferees are bound by the outcome of pending litigation. Being representatives of the judgment-debtor, they must seek recourse within the existing execution framework under the code. Allowing a separate suit would defeat the mandate of Section 47 and Rule 92(3), rendering the statutory limitation and finality of execution proceedings redundant.
Result: Appeal allowed; suit held non-maintainable.
The Supreme Court's findings in this case can be summarized as follows:
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The Court held that the transfer of the property in question during the pendency of the suit is subject to the doctrine of lis pendens, as embodied in Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act. The Court emphasized that when a suit is pending in a competent court in which any right to immovable property is directly and specifically in question, the property cannot be transferred or dealt with in a manner that affects the rights of the parties under any decree or order, unless authorized by the court (!) (!) .
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The Court clarified that the scope of Section 52 has been widened by amendments, such that it applies not only to contentious suits but also to suits or proceedings where any right to immovable property is directly and specifically in question. The Court underscored that the transfer during the pendency of such a suit would be invalid and subject to the doctrine of lis pendens, regardless of whether notice was given or the transfer was made in good faith (!) (!) .
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It was determined that a transfer of property made after the institution of a suit in which the right to the property is directly in question is liable to be invalidated under Section 52, especially if the transfer occurs during the pendency of the suit and before final disposal (!) (!) .
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The Court found that the transfer of the property by the judgment-debtor after the institution of the suit and before final judgment was in violation of the lis pendens doctrine, rendering the transfer illegal and not binding on the parties involved in the suit (!) (!) .
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The Court also examined the remedies available under the relevant procedural rules, including applications to set aside sales on grounds of irregularity or fraud, and the conditions under which such applications could be made. It emphasized that these remedies are time-sensitive and must be exercised within prescribed limitation periods, and that such applications are the primary recourse for contesting irregularities in the conduct of sales or transfers during litigation (!) (!) .
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The Court reaffirmed that the proper procedural course for challenging a sale or transfer that is alleged to be invalid due to irregularities or fraud is through specific applications under the relevant rules, and that filing a separate suit is generally barred if the remedy under those rules is available and has not been exhausted within the statutory time limits (!) (!) .
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It was held that persons who are not parties to the original suit, or their representatives, can institute a separate suit challenging the validity of a sale or transfer only if they are "third parties" who did not have the opportunity to raise their rights during the original proceedings. Such third parties can seek relief if they establish that the sale was a nullity, for instance, due to lack of jurisdiction or the absence of any title of the judgment-debtor to the property (!) (!) .
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The Court clarified the interplay between Section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code and the procedural rules governing execution and sale, emphasizing that questions relating to the right, title, or interest in the property are to be determined by the executing court, and that a separate suit is barred when such questions could and should have been raised during the execution proceedings (!) (!) .
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The Court also addressed the scope of third-party rights, including transferees pendente lite, stating that such transferees are generally barred from instituting separate suits to challenge the validity of the sale or transfer if they are transferees from the judgment-debtor during the pendency of the suit, unless they can demonstrate that they had no notice and that the sale was a nullity for lack of jurisdiction or title (!) (!) .
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Overall, the Supreme Court emphasized the importance of adhering to procedural remedies within prescribed time limits, the finality of orders passed under the relevant rules, and the necessity of proper parties being involved in proceedings to challenge transfers or sales. It reinforced that the doctrine of lis pendens and the procedural rules are designed to prevent the transfer of rights in properties during ongoing litigation, thereby ensuring the integrity of the judicial process and the rights of all parties involved (!) (!) .
These findings collectively underscore the Court's stance that transfers or sales during the pendency of a suit involving rights to immovable property are generally invalid unless expressly authorized by the court, and that procedural remedies are the appropriate and exclusive means to challenge irregularities or nullities in such proceedings.
Legal Category Hierarchy
- practice and procedure
- property law
Advocated appeared:
For Petitioner(s):Mr. Vikas Singh, Sr. Adv. Mr. Lakshmi Raman Singh, AOR Ms. Deepeika Kalia, Adv. Mrs. Udita Singh, Adv. Mr. Sudeep Chandra, Adv. Ms. Vasudha Singh, Adv. Mrs. Divya Sharma, Adv. Mr. Punit Budhiraja, Adv. For Respondent(s): Mr. Rashid Khan, Adv. Mr. Anirudh Singh, Adv. Mr. Abhijeet Singh, Adv. Mr. Dashrath Singh, Adv. Mr. Gp. Capt. Karan Singh Bhati, AOR Mr. Vipin Kumar Jai, AOR Mrs. Gurinder Jai, Adv. Ms. Sanjna Dua, Adv.
Table of Contents
2. Maintainability of separate suit — Bar under Section 47 CPC and Order XXI Rule 92(3) — Application of lis pendens — Status of purchasers as third parties. (Para 30 , 31 , 32 , 33 , 34 , 35 , 38 , 39 , 40 , 41 , 42 )
3. Transfer hit by lis pendens — Purchasers are representatives of judgment-debtor — Separate suit barred by Section 47 CPC and Order XXI Rule 92(3) — Rule 99 remedy unavailable. (Para 46 , 47 , 48 , 49 , 50 , 51 , 52 , 53 , 54 , 55 , 56 , 57 , 58 , 59 , 60 , 61 , 62 , 63 , 64 , 65 , 66 , 67 , 68 , 69 , 70 , 74 , 75 , 76 , 77 , 78 , 79 , 80 , 81 , 82 , 83 , 84 , 85 , 86 , 87 , 88 , 89 , 90 , 91 , 92 , 93 , 94 , 95 , 96 , 97 , 98 , 99 , 100 , 101 , 102 , 103 , 104 , 105 , 106 , 107 , 108 , 109 , 110 , 111 , 112 , 113 , 114 , 115 , 116 , 117 , 118 , 119 , 120 , 121 , 122 , 123 , 124 , 125 , 126 , 127 , 128 , 129 , 130 , 131 , 132 , 133 , 134 , 135 , 136 , 137 , 138 , 139 , 140 , 141 , 142 , 143 , 144 , 145 , 146 , 147 , 148 , 149 , 150 , 151 , 152 , 153 , 154 , 155 , 156 , 157 , 158 , 159 , 160 , 161 , 162 , 163 , 164 , 165 , 166 , 167 , 168 , 169 , 170 , 171 , 172 , 173 , 174 , 175 , 176 , 177 , 178 , 179 , 180 , 181 , 182 , 183 , 184 , 185 , 186 , 187 , 188 , 189 , 190 , 191 , 192 , 193 , 194 , 195 , 196 , 197 , 198 , 199 , 200 , 201 , 202 , 203 , 204 , 205 , 206 , 207 , 208 , 209 , 210 , 211 , 212 , 213 , 214 , 215 , 216 , 217 , 218 , 219 , 220 , 221 , 222 , 223 , 224 , 225 , 226 , 227 , 228 , 229 , 230 , 231 , 232 , 233 , 234 , 235 , 236 , 238 , 239 , 240 , 241 , 242 , 243 , 244 , 245 , 246 , 248 , 249 , 250 , 251 , 252 , 253 , 254 , 255 )
4. Pendente lite transferees are representatives under Section 47 CPC — Separate suits are barred for grounds covered by Order XXI Rules 89, 90, 91, or 99. (Para 66 , 130 , 146 , 178 , 221 , 247 )
5. Appeal allowed — Suit held non-maintainable — Appellants directed to pay a specified sum to respondents as an equitable measure. (Para 259 , 264 )
6. Does the doctrine of lis pendens under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act apply to suits for recovery of money where mortgaged property is specifically mentioned?
Yes. If the plaint contains a specific prayer for the attachment and sale of mortgaged property in case of default, the right to the property is directly and specifically in question, attracting the doctrine of lis pendens regardless of the transferee's knowledge. (Para 53 , 57 , 58 , 63 , 65 , 66 )
7. Can a separate suit be filed to set aside an auction sale on grounds of fraud or material irregularity after the sale is confirmed?
No. Such grounds must be raised via an application under Order XXI Rule 90 within the prescribed limitation period. Rule 92(3) specifically bars a separate suit to set aside an order confirming the sale on such grounds. (Para 124 , 130 , 131 , 132 , 133 )
8. Who qualifies as a third party under Order XXI Rule 92(4) entitled to file a separate suit challenging the judgment-debtor's title?
A third party is someone extraneous to the original suit and execution proceedings who is not a representative of the judgment-debtor and has not had their rights adjudicated under Rule 58, 97, or 99 of Order XXI. (Para 174 , 176 , 178 )
9. Does the bar under Section 47 CPC against separate suits apply to pendente lite transferees of a judgment-debtor?
Yes. Pendente lite transferees step into the shoes of the judgment-debtor and are considered their representatives; therefore, all questions relating to the execution, discharge, or satisfaction of the decree must be determined by the executing court. (Para 140 , 150 , 151 , 178 )
10. Can a pendente lite transferee of a judgment-debtor obtain relief under Order XXI Rule 99 upon dispossession?
While they may file an application under Rule 99 as a stranger to the decree, Rule 102 specifically bars the executing court from granting them relief under Rules 98 or 100, as they derive title from the judgment-debtor during the suit. (Para 193 , 194 , 224 , 225 , 226 )
JUDGMENT :
J.B. PARDIWALA, J:
For the convenience of exposition, this judgment is divided into the following parts:-
INDEX
| A. | FACTUAL MATRIX |
| B. | THE JUDGMENT & DECREE OF THE TRIAL COURT |
| I. Ownership and possession of the respondent nos. 1 and 2 respectively | |
| II. Knowledge of both the auction sale and the existence of the mortgage in favour of the respondent no. 6-bank on part of the plaintiffs-respondent nos. 1 and 2 respectively. 9 | |
| III. Manner in which the auction was conducted. | |
| IV. Maintainability of the suit instituted by the respondent nos. 1 and 2 respectively | |
| V. Relief granted | |
| C. | THE IMPUGNED JUDGMENT |
| D. | SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PARTIES |
| I. Submissions on behalf of the appellants | |
| II.Submissions on behalf of the respondent nos. 1 & 2 respectively | |
| E. | ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION |
| F. | ANALYSIS |
| I. Whether the transfer of the suit property is hit by Section 52 of the 1882 Act and the doctrine of Lis Pendens? | |
| a. Whether the suit property was “directly and specifically in question” in the suit instituted by the respondent no.6-bank and the import of the words “any suit” along with “any right” occurring in Section 58 of the 1882 Act. | |
| II. Whether the respondent nos. 1 and 2, respectively, could have sought for any relief under Rule(s) 89 or 90 of Order XXI CPC, respectively? | |
| a. Scope and application of Rule 89 of Order XXI CPC, with specific reference to whether pendente lite transferees can maintain such an application | |
| b. Scope and application of Rule 90 of Order XXI CPC | |
| i. The maintainability of an application under Rule 90 vis-á-vis fraud or irregularities pertaining to stages prior to the proclamation of sale i.e., at the stage of attachment | |
| ii. Questions on whether the judgment-debtor had any “saleable interest” over the attached/sold property cannot be brought under the ambit of Rule 90 | |
| III. Whether the respondent nos. 1 and 2 respectively, could have maintained a separate suit in light of the bar envisaged under Rule 92(3) of Order XXI CPC and Section 47 CPC respectively, and whether they are “third parties” as referred to under Rule 92(4) of Order XXI CPC? | |
| a. Scope and application of Rule 92 of Order XXI CPC | |
| b. The bar to a separate suit envisaged under sub-rule (3) of Rule 92. | |
| c. The interplay between the bar to a separate suit as provided in Rule 92(3) of Order XXI CPC and the bar to a separate suit referred to under Section 47 CPC. | |
| d. The scope and meaning of the term “third party” under Rule 92(4), the option of filing a separate suit being made available to such third parties and its interplay with Rule 58 of Order XXI CPC. | |
| IV. Whether the respondent nos. 1 and 2 respectively could have obtained any relief under Rule 99 of Order XXI CPC and in the absence of availing such remedy, could their suit be said to be not maintainable? | |
| a. Essential ingredients for the invocation of Rule 99 | |
| b. The scheme underlying Rules 100 to 104 respectively and the availability of the remedy of filing a separate suit as an alternative to an application under Rule 99 of Order XXI CPC | |
| V. Delineating when a third party could file an application under Order XXI CPC and when he could resort to a separate suit in order to assert his right, title and interest in the said property. | |
| VI. The decision of this Court in T. Vijendradas (supra) | |
| G. | CONCLUSION |
1. Leave granted.
2. This appeal arises from the judgment and order dated 29.01.2019 (hereinafter, the “Impugned Judgment”) passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in RSA. No. 2518 of 2004 (O&M) (hereinafter, the “High Court”), by which the second appeal filed by the appellants herein came to be dismissed, thereby affirming the judgment and order dated 12.05.2004 passed by the Court of District Judge, Faridabad (herein