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2026 Supreme(SC) 268

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
J.B. PARDIWALA, R. MAHADEVAN, JJ.
Hamsaanandini Nanduri – Petitioner
Versus
Union Of India & Ors. – Respondents
Writ Petition (C) No. 960 of 2021
Decided On : 17-03-2026

Advocates appeared:
For the Petitioner(s): Ms. Bani Dikshit, Adv. Mr. Mukesh Kumar Singh, Adv. Mr. Kishan Kumar, Adv. Mr. Uddhav Khanna, Adv. Mr. Dhruva Vig, Adv. Mr. Narendra Kumar Goyal, Adv. Mr. Santanu Jugtawat, Adv. Mr. Kadam Hans, Adv. Mr. Komal Singh, Adv. Mr. Subodh, Adv. Mr. Ikshit Singhal, Adv. Mr. Harsh Chaturvedi, Adv. For M/s.Mukesh Kumar Singh And Co., AOR
For the Respondent(s): Mr. K.M. Nataraj, A.S.G. (Not present) Mr. Shailesh Madiyal, Adv. (Not present) Mr. Sandeep Kumar Mahapatra, Adv. Mr. Vatsal Joshi, Adv. Mr. Praneet Pranav, Adv. Mr. Amrish Kumar, AOR

The court ruled that Section 60(4) of the Social Security Code, limiting maternity benefits to adoptive mothers of children under three months, is unconstitutional as it arbitrarily discriminates against mothers adopting older children, violating their rights under Articles 14 and 21.

Headnote:(A) Maternity Benefit Act, 1961 - Section 5(4) - Amendment Act, 2017 - Social Security Code, 2020 - Constitution of India - Articles 14, 19(1)(g), and 21 - Writ petition challenging the constitutionality of Section 60(4) which limits maternity benefits to adoptive mothers of children under three months. The provision was found unconstitutional as it unjustly discriminated against women adopting older children, violating their rights to dignity and reproductive autonomy. The Court emphasized the need for institutional and social support for all mothers, regardless of how they attain motherhood, affirming that motherhood encompasses emotional, psychological, and nurturing responsibilities that extend beyond biological birth. (Paras 3, 4, 60-63, 167-170)

(B) Right to Equality - Legal classification must serve a real distinction - The classification of adoptive mothers distinguishing between those who take children below and above three months old was held arbitrary, lacking rational connection to the legislative objectives. The ruling underscores that the necessity for caregiving and integration into a family is equally crucial for all adoptive mothers irrespective of the child's age. (Paras 64-80, 90-92)

Judgement Key Points

Key Points: - The impugned provision Section 60(4) of the 2020 Code restricting maternity benefits to adoptive/comissioning mothers of children under three months is held unconstitutional for violating Articles 14 and 21. (!) (!) (!) - The judgment treats maternity protection as a basic human right and a social security measure to dignify motherhood and ensure employment participation. (!) (!) (!) (!) - It holds that adoption and commissioning mothers have reproductive autonomy and that motherhood extends beyond biological birth, reinforcing that adoptive mothers deserve maternity benefits similar to biological mothers. (!) (!) (!) - The decision emphasizes best interests of the child as paramount in adoption-related matters and that protection should facilitate bonding and integration regardless of the child’s age at adoption. (!) (!) (!) - The Court directs that Section 60(4) should be read to provide twelve weeks of maternity benefit to adoptive/commissioning mothers from the date the child is handed over, without an age cap. (!) - It condemns under- and over-inclusiveness in classification and stresses rational nexus between the objective of the 2020 Code and its provisions, warning against arbitrary age-based distinctions. (!) (!) (!) (!) - The judgment discusses the need for paternity leave recognition and institutional support, though this is ancillary to the core ruling on adoptive maternity benefits. (!) (!) (!)

What is the constitutionality of Section 60(4) of the Social Security Code, 2020 as it restricts maternity benefits to adoptive mothers of children under three months?

What is the proper test for permissible classification under Article 14 when evaluating age-based distinctions in maternity benefits for adoptive mothers?

What is the Court's stance on the scope of maternity protection as a fundamental right and its relation to reproductive autonomy and best interests of the child in adoption?


Table of Content
1. transition into motherhood as a gradual process. (Para 1 , 2)
2. petitioner challenges constitutionality of maternity benefit act. (Para 3 , 4 , 5 , 6)
3. petitioner argues unreasonable distinctions in adoption regulations. (Para 7 , 8 , 9 , 10 , 11 , 12)
4. respondents defend the necessity of age limit for maternity benefits. (Para 14 , 15 , 16 , 17)
5. issues for consideration: age limit's legality raised. (Para 19)
6. maternity protection is a basic human right. (Para 20 , 21 , 22 , 24 , 31 , 55)
7. best interest of the child principle. (Para 119 , 130)
8. provision found unconstitutional regarding age limit. (Para 166 , 168)

JUDGMENT

J.B. PARDIWALA, J.:

For the convenience of exposition, this judgment is divided into the following parts:-

INDEX

I.

THE CONTEXT

III.

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PARTIES

i.

Submissions on behalf of the Petitioner

ii.

Submissions on behalf of the Respondents

IV.

ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION

V.

ANALYSIS

A.

Maternity protection as a basic human right

i.

Recognition of maternity protection in the International Law framework

ii.

Statutory recognition of maternity benefit in India

iii.

Relevant precedents encapsulating judicial interpretation of maternity benefit

B.

The constitutional guarantee of equality under Article 14 of the Constitution

a.

Purpose of social security benefits

i.

Examining validity of the impugned provision through the test of permissible classification

C.

The right to a dignified life for adoptive parents and adopted child under Article 21 of the Constitution

i.

Adoption as an expression of reproductive autonomy

ii.

Scope and application of the principle of “best interest of the child”

D.

Examining validity of the impugned provision through its workability

E.

Institutional invisibility of household and care work

F.

Highlighting the importance and need for paternity leave

V.

CONCLUSION

“Not flesh of my flesh, nor bone of my bone, But still miraculously my own.

Never forget for a single minute,

You didn’t grow under my heart, but in it.”

1. We are tempted to preface our judgment with the words of poet Fleur Conkling Heyliger. The stanza captioned above resonates with an undiminishing force in the present petition as well. It communicates that transition into motherhood does not occur in the brief moment when legal formalities are completed, rather it is a gradual process that takes shape in the heart of the mother. It is within these unspoken moments of reassurance and bonding that the relationship between a mother and child is gradually formed and strengthened.

2. Before we address ourselves on the issues raised in the writ petition, we find it apposite to note that the petitioner filed the I.A. No. 33856/2026 to amend the writ petition to bring on record the amendment and consolidation of the impugned provision by way of the Code on Social Security , 2020. We allow the I.A. for the amendment of the writ petition. The amended writ petition is considered for the purposes of the following exposition.

I. THE CONTEXT

3. The petitioner, who is an adoptive mother of two children, has filed the present petition under Article 32 of the Constitution in public interest, seeking a declaration to the effect that Section 5 (4) of the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961 (for short, “MB Act”) as amended by the Maternity Benefit (Amendment) Act, 2017 (for short, “Amendment Act, 2017”) is unconstitutional, being violative of Articles 14, 19(1)(g) and 21 of the Constitution, respectively. The prayer in the petition reads thus:-

“a) Issue a Writ, Order or direction, more particularly one in the nature of Writ of Mandamus or any other writ or direction in the nature of the writ and declare Section 5(4) of the Maternity Benefit (Amendment) Act 2017) as ultra vi

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