IMPORTANT POINTS
(1) Appeal – Limitation—Appellate Courts have power to condone delay beyond 90 days period, despite language of 2nd proviso to Section 21(5) of NIA Act, 2008.
(2) NIA Act, as a whole, cannot said to be a complete Code in itself inasmuch as there are several provisions in NIA Act which have to be read in conjunction with other laws.

JUDGMENT

Revati Mohite Dere, J.—By this interim application, the applicant seeks condonation of delay of 838 days caused in filing the aforesaid appeal. By the said appeal, preferred under Section 21 of the National Investigation Agency Act (‘NIA Act’), the appellant has impugned the order dated 9th March 2020 passed below Exhibit 30 by the learned Special Judge, by which, the learned Judge was pleased to reject the applicant’s application seeking his enlargement on bail in connection with C.R. No. 13/2014 registered initially with the Kalachowky Police Station, Mumbai, Maharashtra, for the alleged offences punishable under Sections 16, 18, 18-A, 18-B and 20 of the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act, 1967 and under Sections 420, 465, 468, 471, 201 and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code, and subsequently transferred to NIA and re-registered as RC-02/2018/NIA/Mum on 2nd August 2018 by NIA, Mumbai.

2. The question that arises for consideration in the aforesaid application is, whether the Appellate Court has the power to entertain an appeal, filed beyond the period of 90 days, in view of the 2nd proviso to Section 21(5) of the NIA Act, 2008 and accordingly, condone the delay beyond the said period.

3. Mr. Sandesh Patil, learned Special P.P, appearing for the NIA submitted that the aforesaid application seeking condonation of delay of 838 days caused in filing the appeal is not maintainable, as the period sought to be condoned is beyond the period mandated by Section 21(5), 2nd proviso of the NIA Act, inasmuch as, the same prescribes an outer limit for condonation of delay.

4. Considering the vehement opposition by Mr. Sandesh Patil, learned Special P.P. for NIA, and keeping in mind the important question raised in this application, as to whether or not, delay can be condoned beyond the prescribed period of 90 days as stipulated in the 2nd proviso to sub-section (5) of Section 21 of the NIA Act, we thought it fit to appoint an amicus to assist us, in considering the question raised. Accordingly, we appointed Mr. Ponda, learned Senior Advocate, to appear as an amicus vide order dated 26th July 2023.

5. We may note here, that there was another connected application filed in an appeal seeking condonation of delay of 299 days i.e. more than the period prescribed under Section 21(5) of the NIA Act, and in that application, being Interim Application No. 913/2023 in Appeal (Stamp) No. 3994/2023, we had appointed Mr. Sharan Jagtiani, Senior Advocate as an amicus, to assist the Court vide order dated 26th July 2023. However, the appeal alongwith the application seeking condonation of delay was withdrawn by the applicant therein on 28th August 2023, on the day, the application was fixed for hearing, as the applicant wanted to approach the trial Court, in view of the subsequent development i.e. grant of bail to another co-accused by the Apex Court. Since we had appointed Mr. Sharan Jagtiani in that application as amicus, we permitted him to address us in the present application.

Submissions of Mr. Ponda, learned Sr. Advocate as A micus:—

6. Mr. Ponda, learned senior counsel urged before us that the appellate Court has the power to entertain an appeal even after the statutory period of 90 days despite the language employed in the 2nd proviso to Section 21(5) of the NIA Act. In this context, he submitted that Section 21(1) of the NIA Act commences with the words, ‘notwithstanding anything contained in the Code’ and as such, it excludes the Code of Criminal Procedure and not any other law for the time being in force. He submitted that there are analogous statutory provisions i.e. Section 14A in the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (‘SCST Act’) and Section 17 of the Fugitive Economic Offenders Act, 2018, and that although no appeal shall be entertained after the expiry of the period of 180 days under the 2nd proviso to Section 14A(3), and, the 2nd proviso to Section 17(2), Appellate Courts have be