IMPORTANT POINT
The power of the High Court to quash criminal proceedings in cases of private nature and genuine settlements of matrimonial disputes.

JUDGMENT

Jyoti Singh, J. (Oral)

CRL.M.A. 25791/2023 (exemption)

1. Allowed, subject to all just exceptions.

2. Application stands disposed of.

CRL.M.C. 6900/2023

3. By this petition filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C., Petitioners seek quashing of FIR No. 328/2019 dated 05.06.2019, under Sections 498A/406/34 IPC, PS New Ashok Nagar, Delhi as well as all other consequential proceedings emanating therefrom in view of the settlement arrived at between Petitioner No. 1/Mr. Nipun Mehra and Respondent No. 2/Ms. Shweta Singh Chauhan. Petitioner No. 2 is the father of Petitioner No. 1 while Petitioner No. 3 is the mother.

4. Marriage between Petitioner No. 1 and Respondent No. 2 (hereinafter collectively referred to as `parties') was solemnized on 17.01.2016 as per Hindu rites and customs. No child is born out of the wedlock. Due to temperamental differences and certain other reasons, parties have been residing separately since 01.05.2018. Respondent No. 2 (Complainant) lodged an FIR against all the Petitioners herein, which was registered as FIR No. 328/2019. Respondent No. 2 also filed a complaint under Section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (DV Act) and a petition seeking divorce under Section 13(1)(ia) of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (HMA).

5. During the pendency of the proceedings, parties have amicably resolved and settled their inter se disputes and a Memorandum of Settlement was executed on 19.07.2022, which has been placed on record. In terms of the Settlement Deed, parties filed First Motion before the learned Family Court and the same was allowed on 26.09.2022. At the time of recording of statement of First Motion, Petitioner No. 1 paid a sum of Rs.2,50,000/- to Respondent No. 2 and thereafter parties preferred Second Motion, which was allowed on 15.05.2023, on which date Petitioner No. 1 paid another sum of Rs.2,50,000/- and a Decree of Divorce was passed, dissolving the marriage between the parties. It is stated in the petition that Respondent No. 2 has already withdrawn the complaint under Section 12 of the DV Act and the divorce petition under HMA. As a part of the settlement, Respondent No. 2 agreed that she will withdraw all proceedings arising out of the FIR in question and Petitioner No. 1 shall pay a sum of Rs.5,00,000/- at the time of quashing of the FIR.

6. Parties are physically present in Court while Petitioners No. 2 and 3 are appearing through video conferencing and have been identified by their respective counsels and the Investigating Officer (IO) SI Rekha Chauhan, PS New Ashok Nagar, Delhi. Honoring the obligation under the Settlement Deed, a Demand Draft bearing No. 485483 dated 15.09.2023 for a sum of Rs.5,00,000/- drawn on Punjab and Sind Bank has been handed over to Respondent No. 2 in Court and she has acknowledged the receipt of the same.

7. Respondent No. 2 states that since the matter has been settled between the parties and all terms of the settlement under the Settlement Deed dated 19.07.2022 have been complied with including payment of the amounts due and payable, she has no objection if the FIR is quashed against the Petitioners.

8. In view of the settlement between the parties, learned APP for the State does not object to the FIR being quashed.

9. I have heard the counsels for the parties and the learned APP. In Gian Singh v. State of Punjab and Another, (2012) 10 SCC 303, the Supreme Court held as follows:

"61. The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus : the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz. : (i) to secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court. In what case