IMPORTANT POINT
Judicial review of medical examination decisions in recruitment is limited to procedural adherence and significant discrepancies, with higher fitness standards for disciplined forces.

JUDGMENT :

C. HARI SHANKAR, J.

1. This is a batch of petitions in which issues analogous to those which came up before this Court in Staff Selection Commission v. Aman Singh, 2024 SCC Online Del 7600 are involved. All these petitions involve cases in which the concerned respondents sought recruitment to the post of Constable in the Delhi Police and were, consequent to a Detailed Medical Examination [“DME” hereinafter] and Review Medical Examination [“RME” hereinafter] found unfit for appointment. The Central Administrative Tribunal [“The Tribunal” hereinafter] whom the respondents petitioned, has followed an earlier order passed by it in Teekam Singh Meena v. SSC, Order dated 10 May 2024 in OA 519/2024 and held, in each case, that the respondent should be subjected to a “Re-Review Medical Examination.” Aggrieved thereby, the Staff Selection Commission and the Union of India have petitioned this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

2. We went into the existing law on this issue in considerable detail and drew up the following guidelines in SSC v. Aman Singh, after considering earlier authorities on the issue:

“10.38 In our considered opinion, the following principles would apply:

(i) The principles that apply in the case of recruitment to disciplined Forces, involved with safety and security, internal and external, such as the Armed and Paramilitary Forces, or the Police, are distinct and different from those which apply to normal civilian recruitment. The standards of fitness, and the rigour of the examination to be conducted, are undoubtedly higher and stricter.

(ii) There is no absolute proscription against judicial review of, or of judicial interference with, decisions of Medical Boards or Review Medical Boards. In appropriate cases, the Court can interfere.

(iii) The general principle is, however, undoubtedly one of circumspection. The Court is to remain mindful of the fact that it is not peopled either with persons having intricate medical knowledge, or were aware of the needs of the Force to which the concerned candidate seeks entry. There is an irrebuttable presumption that judges are not medical men or persons conversant with the intricacies of medicine, therapeutics or medical conditions. They must, therefore, defer to the decisions of the authorities in that regard, specifically of the Medical Boards which may have assessed the candidate. The function of the Court can only, therefore, be to examine whether the manner in which the candidate was assessed by the Medical Boards, and the conclusion which the Medical Boards have arrived, inspires confidence, or transgresses any established norm of law, procedure or fair play. If it does not, the Court cannot itself examine the material on record to come to a conclusion as to whether the candidate does, or does not, suffer from the concerned ailment, as that would amount to sitting in appeal over the decision of the Medical Boards, which is not permissible in law.

(iv) The situations in which a Court can legitimately interfere with the final outcome of the examination of the candidate by the Medical Board or the Review Medical Board are limited, but well-defined. Some of these may be enumerated as under:

(a) A breach of the prescribed procedure that is required to be followed during examination constitutes a legitimate ground for interference. If the examination of the candidate has not taken place in the manner in which the applicable Guidelines or prescribed procedure requires it to be undertaken, the examination, and its results, would ipso facto stand vitiated. [This follows from the well-established principle, enunciated in Taylor v. Taylor, (L.R.) 1 Ch. 426 and subsequently followed by the Privy Council in Nazir Ahmed v. King Emperor, AIR 1936 PC 253 and by the Supreme Court in a catena of cases including State of U.P. v. Singhara Singh, AIR 1964 SC 358 that, where the statute, or the law, requires an act to be done in a particular manner, that act has to be d