IMPORTANT POINTS
The scheme of the Rent Control Act and the rules framed thereunder envisages speedy disposal of the cases pending before it- If the legislature intended to exclude the provisions of the Limitation Act, being conscious of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, could have expressly excluded the said provision. Having not done so, application of the Limitation Act has to be inferred.

JUDGMENT :

A.M. SHAFFIQUE, J.

1. The correctness of judgment in Ratheesh vs. A.M. Chacko and Another, 2018 (5) KHC 35, has been referred for consideration before us.

2. In Ratheesh’s case (supra), a Division Bench of this Court held that S.5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, is not applicable to proceedings before the Rent Control Court under the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Rent Control Act’).

3. In the reference order Faisal vs. Vikas Chacko, 2019 (3) KLT 760, the Division Bench doubted the correctness of Ratheesh’s case (supra) and opined that the same needs a deeper scrutiny and accordingly, the matter was placed before us for consideration.

4. We have heard the learned counsel appearing on either side. The controversy had arisen when applications were filed before the Rent Control Court to set aside ex-parte orders, after the period of limitation specified under the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Rules, 1979 (hereinafter referred as the ‘1979 Rules’). As per Section 23(1)(h) of the Act, the Rent Control Court is vested with all the powers of a Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 while trying a suit in respect of matters provided under clauses (a) to (k) and clause (h) indicates “setting aside ex-parte orders.” Under S.31(1) of the Rent Control Act, the Government can frame rules for setting aside ex-parte orders. The 1979 Rules had been framed to regulate the procedure to be followed by the authorities under the Act. Rule 13(3) specifies a time-limit of fifteen days from the date of receipt of the order to enable a tenant or a landlord to apply to the Rent Control Court in order to set aside the ex-parte order. In Ratheesh’s case (supra), this Court held that the date of receipt of the order appearing under Rule 13(3) would mean date of knowledge of the order. However, the Rule does not provide for any extension of time.

5. S.29(2) of the Limitation Act reads as under:-

“29. Savings (1) xxx xxx xxx

(2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law.”

The Rent Control Act being a special and a local law does not expressly exclude the provisions of Limitation Act. Therefore, under normal circumstances, Section 5 of the Limitation Act would apply to proceedings under the Rent Control Act, if the Rent Control Court is a Court.

6. In Mukri Gopalan vs. Cheppilat Puthanpurayil Aboobacker, (1995) 5 SCC 5, the Apex Court had occasion to consider whether the appellate authority under S.18 of the Rent Control Act has the power to condone delay in filing appeal after the expiry of period of limitation or rather whether S.29(2) of the Limitation Act would apply to such proceedings. After referring to the notification by which the District Judges having jurisdiction over the areas within which the provisions of the area have been extended were given the power of the Appellate Authorities for the purpose of the Rent Control Act and having found that the Appellate Authority is not a persona designata, the Apex Court held that “it becomes obvious that it functions as a court.” Paragraph 8 is relevant, which reads as under:-

“8. Once it is held that the appellate authority functioning under Section 18 of the Rent Act is not a persona designata, it becomes obvious that it functions as a court. In the present case all the District Judges having jurisdiction over the areas within which the provisions of the Rent Act have been extended are constituted as appellate authori