The absence of express prohibition in the Paddy Land Act allows for late appeals to be considered under reasonable circumstances, ensuring access to justice.

JUDGMENT :

Ziyad Rahman A.A., J.

The petitioner is the owner in possession of property having an extent of 26.65 Ares of land comprised in Re.Sy.No.342/12 and 342/3 in Block No.032 of Vembayam Village in Nedumangad Taluk in Thiruvananthapuram District. The grievance of the petitioner is that, even though the said property stood reclaimed before the enactment of the Kerala Conservation of Paddy Land and Wetland Act, 2008 Act (hereinafter referred to as the Paddy Land Act), the same is described as “paddy land” in the revenue records. In such circumstances, the petitioner submitted an application in Form 7, as evidenced by Ext.P3, before the 2nd respondent. As per Ext.P4, the 2nd respondent rejected the said application. Aggrieved the same, the petitioner submitted Ext P5 appeal under Sec.27B of the Kerala Conservation of Paddy Land and Wetland Act, 2008.

2. The case of the petitioner is that Ext.P5 appeal is not being considered because, the appeal was filed beyond the period contemplated in Sec.27B. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that, there were valid reasons that prevented the petitioner from invoking the remedy of appeal as contemplated under Sec.27B within the period prescribed. It is also pointed out that, as per statutory provisions, there is no absolute prohibition against entertaining appeals after the period stipulated.

3. After hearing Sri.Jomy K. Jose, the learned counsel for the petitioner and Smt Deepa V, the learned Government Pleader, I find merits in the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner. An appeal is contemplated under Section 27B of the Paddy Land Act and sub-section (1) of Sec. 27B reads as follows:-

“Any person aggrieved by an order of the Revenue Divisional Officer under sub-section (2) of Section 27A may prefer an appeal to the District Collector within thirty days from the date of receipt of the order.”

4. The crucial aspect to be noticed is that, nowhere in Sec.27B, there is an absolute prohibition for the District Collector to entertain the application beyond the period stipulated therein. The relevant words used in the said provision are, “Any person aggrieved …………. may prefer an appeal…………. within thirty days…….” . It is an enabling provision to file an appeal before the authority concerned within a specified period. The said provision does not contain any negative words prohibiting the authority concerned from entertaining the appeal after the period stipulated. When the statute does not provide for express prohibition, it is to be understood as permissible. This principle has been enunciated by the Court in Narsingh Das V. Mangal Dubey, ILR (1883) 5 All 163, Para 6

“Courts are not to act upon the principle that every procedure is to be taken as prohibited unless it is expressly provided for by the Code, but on the converse principle that every procedure is to be understood as permissible till it is shown to be prohibited by the law. As a matter of general principle prohibition cannot be presumed.”

5. The above view was followed by a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Raj Narain Saxena v. Bhim Sen, AIR 1966 All 84, and has been subsequently affirmed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Rajendra Prasad Gupta v. Prakash Chandra Mishra (2011) 2 SCC 705, where it was held that the provision has to be interpreted to mean that every procedure is permitted to the court for doing justice unless expressly prohibited, and not that every procedure is prohibited unless expressly permitted.

6. Thus, in the light of the above principles, the only conclusion possible is that, a reasonable opportunity has to be granted to the aggrieved parties to avail the next layer of the dispute redressal mechanism, in cases where, they could not invoke the remedies, due to reasons beyond their control or other valid reasons.

7. Of course, it is true that there is also no enabling provision in the Paddy Land Act for the appellate authority to accept the appeal after the period specified in subsec