ORDER :

1. In wake of instant surge in COVID-19 cases and spread of its highly infectious Omicron variant, abundant caution is being maintained, while hearing the matters in Court, for the safety of all concerned.

2. The revision petition has been preferred claiming the following reliefs:-

“It is, therefore, most humbly and respectfully prayed that this revision petition may kindly be accepted and judgment dated 5.4.2000 passed by the learned appellate court may kindly be quashed and set aside and the judgment dated 24.5.97 passed by the learned trial court may kindly be restored and the accused Non-Petitioner No.2 may kindly be punished suitably.”

3. The complainant and the accused both are government doctors. The dispute is regarding the disbursement of pay.

4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Anupgarh in Criminal Case No.619/96 vide the impugned order dated 24.05.1997 whereby the respondent No.2 was convicted for the offence under Section 409 IPC and sentenced to undergo three years rigorous imprisonment undergo with a fine of Rs.5000/-, in default of which, he was to further undergo three months simple imprisonment. And that, the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Anupgarh in Criminal Appeal No.46/98 vide order dated 05.04.2000, deviated from the settled principles of law and reversed the judgment of the learned trial court.

5. Learned counsel for the respondents has relied upon the precedent law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Amal Kumar Jha Vs. State of Rajasthan & Anr., reported in 2016 Cr.L.R. (SC) 441.

“5. It is apparent from the facts of the instant case that the allegation against the Appellant is of omission in discharge of official duty in not providing Government vehicle for shifting the patient from Primary Health Centre to District Hospital, Raigad; whereas he himself travelled in the vehicle in question for attending the monthly official meeting at the District Headquarters. In our considered opinion, it was an act or omission in discharge of the official duty. The sanction to prosecute was necessary. In this case, the accused was acting in discharge of his official duty when he refused to provide the official vehicle. The refusal is directly and reasonably connected with his official duty, thus sanction is required for prosecution as provided Under Section 197(1) Code of Criminal Procedure. It is not disputed that no ambulance was provided to the Primary Health Centre. The question arises whether omission to provide the official jeep which was not meant for patients, would constitute an omission in discharge of his duty. Though public servant is not entitled to indulge in criminal activities in the course of his duty but the act in question had relation to discharge of official duty of the accused. It was clearly connected to the performance of his official duty. When such is the case, sanction is required. This Court in Shreekantiah Ramayya Munipalli v. The State of Bombay, 1955 (1) SCR 1177 has observed thus:

Now it is obvious that if Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is construed too narrowly it can never be applied, for of course it is no part of an official's duty to commit an offence and never can be. But it is not the duty we have to examine so much as the act, because an official act can be performed in the discharge of official duty as well as in dereliction of it. The Section has content and its language must be given meaning. What it says is -

“when any public servant ..... is accused of any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty...…”

We have therefore first to concentrate on the word 'offence'. Now an offence seldom consists of a single act. It is usually composed of several elements and, as a rule, a whole series of acts must be proved before it can be established. In the present case, the elements alleged against the second accused are, first, t