FIR under Section 307 IPC not quashable on compromise if charge-sheet evidences grievous life-endangering injuries from deadly weapons, establishing prima facie heinous offence against society.

JUDGMENT :

Rakesh Kainthla, J.

The present petition has been filed for quashing of FIR No. 42 of 2022 dated 28.01.2022, registered for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 307, 341, 451, 325, 323, 506 and 504 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) at Police Station Balh, District Mandi, H.P. based on the compromise effected between the parties.

2. It has been asserted that the petitioner and respondents No. 2 to 4 have amicably settled the matter amongst themselves with the help of respectable persons of the locality. Respondents No.2 to 4 do not want to pursue their case because of the compromise between the parties.

3. I have heard Mr G.R. Palsra, learned counsel for the petitioners and Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General, for respondent No.1/State.

4. Mr G.R. Palsra, learned Counsel for the petitioners, submitted that the parties have entered into a compromise voluntarily without any influence from any person. Mere mention of Section 307 of the IPC is not sufficient to bar the jurisdiction of the Court to quash the F.I.R. based on the compromise. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the F.I.R. be ordered to be quashed. He relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Naushey Ali v. State of U.P. , (2025) 4 SCC 78, in support of his submission.

5. Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondent No.1/State, submitted that the allegations against the petitioners are heinous in nature. An offence punishable under Section 307 of the IPC cannot be quashed based on the compromise effected between the parties. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed.

6. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

7. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Gian Singh v. State of Punjab (2012) 10 SCC 303: 2012 SCC OnLine SC 769 that the power to quash the proceedings under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. based on the compromise is different from the power of compounding under Section 320 of CrPC. It was observed:

“57. Quashing of offence or criminal proceedings on the ground of settlement between an offender and victim is not the same thing as compounding of offence. They are different and not interchangeable. Strictly speaking, the power of compounding offences given to a court under Section 320 is materially different from the quashing of criminal proceedings by the High Court in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction. In compounding of offences, the power of a criminal court is circumscribed by the provisions contained in , and the court is guided solely and squarely thereby while, on the other hand, the formation of opinion by the High Court for quashing a criminal offence or criminal proceeding or criminal complaint is guided by the material on record as to whether the ends of justice would justify such exercise of power although the ultimate consequence may be acquittal or dismissal of indictment.

58. Where the High Court quashes a criminal proceeding having regard to the fact that the dispute between the offender and the victim has been settled although the offences are not compoundable, it does so as, in its opinion, a continuation of criminal proceedings will be an exercise in futility and justice in the case demands that the dispute between the parties is put to an end and peace is restored; securing the ends of justice being the ultimate guiding factor. No doubt, crimes are acts that have harmful effects on the public and consist of wrongdoing that seriously endangers and threatens t