The court emphasized the importance of considering the relevant circulars in determining the validity of termination and the entitlement to compassionate appointment.

JUDGMENT :

ANUBHA RAWAT CHOUDHARY, J.

1. This appeal has been filed against the judgment dated 21.12.2021 passed in W.P. (S) No. 1181 of 2017, whereby the writ petition filed by the appellant has been dismissed.

2. The appellant had filed the writ petition with a prayer for quashing the order dated 29.01.2016, so far it related to the late husband of the appellant, whose name appeared at S. No. 64 of the said order, by which the services of the late husband of the appellant was terminated by the State of Bihar after his death. The appellant had further prayed in the writ petition for a direction upon the respondents to appoint her son on compassionate ground as per the recommendation made by the establishment committee on 30.07.2016.

3. Before the learned writ Court, the appellant had raised various points including the point regarding passing of order of dismissal after death of her husband and that the State of Bihar had no jurisdiction to pass the order of termination when the husband of the appellant was lastly posted in the State of Jharkhand and continued to be in the State of Jharkhand till his death on 06.01.2016 and died while working at Primary Veterinary Hospital, Piska More, Ranchi. However, all the points as raised by the appellant was rejected by the learned writ Court. The learned writ Court also rejected the contention of the appellant that the Regional Director was fully empowered for appoint in view of the various judgments passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and the High Courts. The learned writ Court also took into consideration that the decision to terminate the services of the husband of the appellant with similarly situated persons was taken way back in the year 1998 itself and that the husband of the appellant along with others had moved the High Court challenging the action and the husband of the appellant continued to be in service by virtue of interim order passed in the writ petition being CWJC No. 2909 of 2000 and ultimately the writ petition was withdrawn on 10.11.2014 as no cause of action had arisen because no formal letter of removal or dismissal was ever passed. The learned writ Court was also of the view that the son of the appellant was not entitled for compassionate appointment as the initial appointment of the husband of the appellant was illegal and since the services of late husband of the appellant stood dismissed the question of compassionate appointment did not arise. The learned writ Court was of the view that the recommendation of the Committee was malice in law as well as on fact and even on the ground that one son of the deceased-employee was already in government employment.

4. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, while assailing the impugned order passed by the learned writ Court, has submitted that the husband of the appellant was appointed as Chaukidar as back as on 21.06.1978 and thereafter he was appointed as peon on 21.08.1980 and his services were made permanent as peon on 23.03.1982. It has been submitted that it was only on 01.02.1988 the husband of the appellant was granted promotion to the post of Technical Assistant by the Revisional Director, Animal Husbandry Department and it was the order of promotion to the post of Technical Assistant which was subject matter of consideration in the various judgments passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and the High Courts on the ground that the Regional Director did not have the power to make appointment or grant promotion. The learned counsel has submitted that even if the promotion granted to the husband of the appellant on 01.02.1988 is taken to be illegal/void-ab-initio then also his appointment as a peon on 21.08.1980 and confirmed on 23.03.1982 cannot be disturbed and the husband of the appellant was required to be reverted back to the post he was already holding prior to the promotion to the post of Technical Assistant and, accordingly, the husband of the appellant can at best be said to have died on 06.01.2