Disciplinary actions under the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace Act require adherence to procedural safeguards, including establishing malicious intent before penalties are imposed.

JUDGMENT :

HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE ANUBHA RAWAT CHOUDHARY

Learned counsels for the parties are present.

2. The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the petitioner never made any complaint in the Committee Against Sexual Harassment (CASH). Only a complaint was lodged with the police and a copy of the same was forwarded to the Director who suo-moto referred the matter to CASH. The learned counsel has also referred to page no. 13 of I.A. No. 5183 of 2023 which is a letter dated 30.07.2014 and submits that it has been specifically mentioned therein that although no written or verbal complaint has been given by the petitioner regarding sexual harassment by the private respondent to the Administration Department, but several newspapers had reported that the complaint was filed by the petitioner against the private respondent in Kotwali Police Station. Because of the same, a recommendation was made to the sexual harassment committee of IIM Ranchi to investigate the matter and give its report to the Director, IIM Ranchi at the earliest.

3. Learned counsel further submits that when notices were issued by CASH, the petitioner had strongly objected to the constitution of the Committee in as much as she alleged that two members of the Committee had overheard the altercation between the petitioner and the private respondent. The learned counsel has referred to page no. 26 of the said interlocutory application whereby the objection was raised. The learned counsel has also submitted that in the said letter the petitioner had also stated that she was forced to state although she never wanted to do so because she had already objected to the constitution of the CASH Committee.

4. The learned counsel further submits that the CASH Committee recorded in the report that the petitioner could not substantiate the allegation made against the private respondent and also that the allegation was incorrect but the same by itself would not have called for any disciplinary proceeding against the petitioner in as much as an inquiry in terms of section 14 of the Sexual Harassment of the Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition & Redressal) Act 2013 was required to be done. He has submitted that as per the 1st proviso of section 14(1), it has been made clear that mere inability to substantiate a complaint or provide adequate proof need not attract action against the complainant under section 14 for it. The learned counsel also submits that to proceed under section 14, the second proviso to section 14 (1) provides further that malicious intent on the part of the complainant shall be established after an inquiry by the procedure prescribed before any action is recommended. The learned counsel submits that no exercise in terms of the second proviso to section 14 has been undertaken. This is apparent from the fact that the CASH report itself had recommended action against the petitioner. The learned counsel has submitted that the inquiry in terms of the second proviso is a condition precedent for taking any action against the complainant to find out if the complaint was malicious or the complainant knew it to be false or the aggrieved woman or any person making the complaint had produced any forged or misleading document. The learned counsel has submitted that it was a simple case where the petitioner could not substantiate her allegation against the private respondent and accordingly, the entire proceeding initiated against the petitioner is vitiated and is void ab initio. He has reiterated that the proceeding is contrary to the procedure prescribed under section 9 as well as the procedure prescribed under section 14. This is over and above the fact that an allegation of bias was made against the committee constituted under CASH. The learned counsel has raised the following grounds for consideration: -

“1. That having regard to the fact that the petitioner had not made any complaint in terms of section 9(1) of the Act of 2013 to the Internal Committee