Language of Rule 8(1)(ii) is mandatory.

The Honourable Chief Justice:

This writ appeal has been filed against the impugned order of the learned single Judge passed in Writ Petition No.8567 of 2003 dated 19.3.2003.

2. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.

3. It appears that a lease deed dated 26.9.2001 was executed between the Government of Tamil Nadu and the appellant, by which, lease of certain lands were granted to the appellant for the period from 1.4.1998 to 31.3.2003.

4. Since the lease deed was executed only on 26.9.2001 and registered on 23.10.2001, the appellant filed the writ petition praying for extension of the period of lease alleging that it should be deemed to have commenced from the date of execution of the lease deed. Since the lease deed was executed on 26.9.2001 his prayer was that it should be treated to continue for another five years from 26.9.2001 i.e. upto 26.9.2006.

5. The learned single Judge in his impugned order has directed that the lease shall continue till 7.10.2003 subject to payment of 40% extra lease amount. The learned single Judge has treated the lease deed as having been executed on 8.10.1998 although the lease deed produced before us shows that it was executed on 26.9.2001. Learned Senior Counsel for the appellant relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in V. Karnal Durai v. District Collector, Tuticorin (1999) 1 SCC 475 and also the decision in Beg Raj Singh vs. State of U.P. (2003) 1 SCC 726.

6. A Division Bench of this Court in Director General of Foreign Trade, Ministry of Commerce, New Delhi vs. M/s. R.B. & Sons., Chennai and another (Writ Appeal No.3891 of 2004 decided on 7.12.2004) has already distinguished the decision of the Supreme Court in Beg Raj Singh's case cited supra. The Division Bench held that a Court cannot direct extension of the period of a licence, lease or other grant where it is for a fixed period and the Court must maintain judicial restraint in this connection. If the licensee or lessee was prevented to operate for a part of the period of the licence or lease, then his remedy is to get refund of proportionate amount of licence or lease fee or compensation for any damage he might have suffered, but the period of licence or lease cannot be extended by the Court. Courts must exercise self restraint and should not encroach into the domain of the Executive or the Legislature, as held by this Court in Rama Muthuramalingam v. Dy. S.P., AIR 2005 Mad.1.

7. No doubt, if there are statutory rules, then of course, the matter will be covered by the statute, because it is well settled that the statute will override the contract. In the present case, there are statutory rules contained in Rule 8 of the Tamil Nadu Minor Mineral Concession Rules,1959 (hereinafter referred to as the "Rules"). Clause (i) of Rule 8 of the Rules states:

" The date of commencement of the period of lease granted under this Rule shall be the date on which the lease deed is executed."

Learned Senior Counsel for the appellant has emphasised on Rule 8(i) of the Rules which states that the date of commencement of the period of lease granted under this Rule shall be the date on which the lease deed is executed. Since the lease deed was executed on 26.9.2001 he has contended that it will continue till 26.9.2006. We do not agree.

8. Clause (ii) of Rule 8(1) of Rules states:-

"the lease shall expire on the date specified in the lease deed and in no case extension of the period of lease shall be made."

9. Clause (ii) of Rule 8 of the Rules specifically states that the lease shall expire on the date specified in the lease deed. It further states that in no case extension of the period of lease shall be made.

10. The language of clause (ii) of Rule 8 (1) of the Rules is mandatory and peremptory. A perusal of the lease deed shows that it has been specifically mentioned in Clause 4 that the said premises shall be held by the lessee from the 1st day of April 98 to the 31st day of March 2003 which shall however be determina