The Court emphasized the need to balance the fundamental right to life and liberty with the statutory obligations imposed by the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015, in cases involving minors seeking protection from alleged threats to their life and liberty. The Court held that the right to life and liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution is sacrosanct, but it must be balanced with the need to protect the interests of minors and ensure that their decisions are made in their best interest.

JUDGMENT

Vinod S. Bhardwaj. J. - The present appeal has been filed raising a challenge to the judgment and order dated 05.07.2019 passed by Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Tarn Taran whereby the accused-respondent has been acquitted from the charge under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.

FACTS:

2. Before proceeding further in the matter certain facts as pleaded by appellant and as are necessary for just and proper appreciation of the Appeal are referred to hereinbelow:-

i) That the appellant/complainant claimed that the accused-respondent was having family relations with him and that she had borrowed a sum of Rs.2,40,000/- from the appellant on 13th June, 2016, in the presence of one Priya Kapoor and Vinod Kumar. The loan in question was advanced for a period of one year to enable her to repair her house and the respondent is stated to have promised to return the said amount on or before August 2017.

ii) An agreement is also stated to be executed in this regard, whereby, the accused-respondent admitted to having received the loan of Rs.2,40,000/- as aforesaid.

iii) When the appellant-complainant approached respondent-accused for repayment of the same, the respondent issued cheque No.150422 dated 05.08.2017 from her bank account with Allahabad Bank. The said cheque was however returned by the bank with memo dated 09.08.2017 with remarks 'insufficient funds'.

iv) The appellant, thereafter, sent a legal notice raising a demand for the amount, however, upon failure on the part of the respondent to pay the amount despite demand, the complaint was instituted under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act.

v) The appellant appeared as CW-1 and did not lead any further evidence. No evidence was also led by the accused-respondent apart from cross-examination of the appellant.

vi) Upon consideration of the same, the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Tarn Taran held that the complainant has failed to prove any legal debt or liability against the respondent and hence in absence of any legally enforceable debt, there was no occasion for respondent to execute any instrument towards discharge of the same. It was accordingly held that the version of the appellant/complainant was improbable and hence acquitted the respondent/accused of the charges framed.

Arguments of the Petitioner:

3. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant has argued that the judgment of the Trial Court suffers from infirmity and perversity. There has been non-application of judicious mind towards appreciation of evidence adduced by the appellant. It was contended that there is no denial of the signature on the cheque and as such there was a presumption against the accused. The burden could not have been shifted by the Court upon the appellant/complainant to establish that any amount was due once the signatures on the cheque was not in dispute. It is also contended by the appellant that as per the case pleaded by respondent- accused, she had handed over the cheque in question to one Priya Kapoor, hence the burden lies upon the accused to examine Priya Kapoor in her defence and that inability on her part to lead such evidence should be read against her. The fact that she has chosen not to examine Priya Kapoor, an adverse inference ought to be drawn against the accused-respondent. It is vehemently argued that the respondent is a signatory to the cheque and that the said cheque was dishonored for want of 'sufficient funds'. The respondent has chosen not to offer any valid explanation to the circumstances under which the cheque in question had been issued and also choose not to respond to the legal notice sent by the appellant to the respondent. It is contended that the presumption as envisaged under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act has been mis-interpreted and that there was no further obligation to cast upon the appellant/complainant. In support of his contention learned counsel has made reference to the judgment of this Court in the matter of Sukhji