JUDGMENT

Umesh Chandra Sharma, J.

Heard Dr. C.P. Upadhyay, learned counsel for the applicant, Sri Pankaj Kumar Tripathi, learned A.G.A. for the State and perused the material available on record.

2. At the time of hearing of argument an objection regarding maintainability of this petition, has been raised by the learned A.G.A that since the order dated 25.11.2022, by which 19-B Discharge application has been rejected, has been challenged which is a final order, hence a revision can be preferred against such order and a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is not maintainable. Contrary to that learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the entire proceeding of the aforesaid case has also been challenged, hence this petition under 482 Cr.P.C is maintainable. In support of the argument learned counsel for the applicant has relied on following citations.

3. In Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander and others, para 19 and 20, following principles have been laid down:-

"19. Having discussed the scope of jurisdiction under these two provisions, i.e., Section 397 and Section 482 of the Code and the fine line of jurisdictional distinction, now it will be appropriate for us to enlist the principles with reference to which the courts should exercise such jurisdiction. However, it is not only difficult but is inherently impossible to state with precision such principles. At best and upon objective analysis of various judgments of this Court, we are able to cull out some of the principles to be considered for proper exercise of jurisdiction, particularly, with regard to quashing of charge either in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 397 or Section 482 of the Code or together, as the case may be :

1) Though there are no limits of the powers of the Court under Section 482 of the Code but the more the power, the more due care and caution is to be exercised in invoking these powers. The power of quashing criminal proceedings, particularly, the charge framed in terms of Section 228 of the Code should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases.

2) The Court should apply the test as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made from the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith prima facie establish the offence or not. If the allegations are so patently absurd and inherently improbable that no prudent person can ever reach such a conclusion and where the basic ingredients of a criminal offence are not satisfied then the Court may interfere.

3) The High Court should not unduly interfere. No meticulous examination of the evidence is needed for considering whether the case would end in conviction or not at the stage of framing of charge or quashing of charge.

4) Where the exercise of such power is absolutely essential to prevent patent miscarriage of justice and for correcting some grave error that might be committed by the subordinate courts even in such cases, the High Court should be loathe to interfere, at the threshold, to throttle the prosecution in exercise of its inherent powers.

5) Where there is an express legal bar enacted in any of the provisions of the Code or any specific law in force to the very initiation or institution and continuance of such criminal proceedings, such a bar is intended to provide specific protection to an accused.

6) The Court has a duty to balance the freedom of a person and the right of the complainant or prosecution to investigate and prosecute the offender.

7) The process of the Court cannot be permitted to be used for an oblique or ultimate/ulterior purpose.

8) Where the allegations made and as they appeared from the record and documents annexed there