JUDGMENT :

SHARAD KUMAR SHARMA, J.

1. Before entering into the actual controversy which has been sought to be raised by the petitioner in the present writ petition, which is in the light of the amendment which has been brought into effect in the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act,2015, (hereinafter to be referred as "the Act of 2015") and reference to it is for the purpose to derive the impact of it on the instant proceedings which has already culminated upto the stage contemplated under Articles 161 and 72(1)(c) of the Constitution of India, much prior in time than from the enforcements of the Act of 2015, whether it becomes relevant? After Article 161 which provides with the special executive powers to the Governor to grant pardon or to suspend, remit or conjoin a sentence in certain cases. Similarly, after culmination of proceedings under Article 72(1)(c) of the Constitution of India before the President of India, who exercises his executive powers to grant pardon etc. or suspend remit or commute a sentence, over and above the determination made after the Courts of law have concluded its proceedings of conviction.

2. This issue, it has been settled in Joy's case Narayan Dutt and Others v. State of Punjab and others, (2011) 4 SCC 353, that the stage at which the Governor exercises the powers under Article 161 for pardoning a convict for commission of offence is a stage where the convict has already been determined and sentenced to undergo a punishment imposed by the "Court" competent under law, its at that stage that the provision contained under Article 161 is pleaded before the Governor to plead mercy from the punishment imposed on the convict by the Courts is invoked. Hence it has been held that it is exclusive administrative/executive power which could be exercised by Governor over or against, any law of the land contemplating a conviction of convict, after being sentenced by the Courts upto the level of Hon'ble Apex Court. Thus scope of judicial review after the stage under Article 161 or under Article 72(1)(c) of the Constitution of India is very limited.

"Article 161 - Power of Governor to grant pardons, etc., and to suspend, remit or commute sentences in certain cases The Governor of a State shall have the power to grant pardons, reprieves, respites or remissions of punishment or to suspend, remit or commute the sentence of any person convicted of any offence against any law relating to a matter to which the executive power of the State extends."

Relevant paragraphs of the said judgment reads as follow:-

"25. The Bench having regard to the nature of the power of the President under Article 72, stated that the President under Article 72 could scrutinize the evidence on record of a criminal case and come to a different conclusion from that of the court. In doing so, "the President does not amend or modify or supersede the judicial record. The judicial record remains intact, and undisturbed. The President acts in a wholly different plane from that in which the Court acted. He acts under a constitutional power, the nature of which is entirely different from the judicial power and cannot be regarded as an extension of it.

22. In Kehar Singh (supra) this Court observed that the order of the President under Article 72 could not be subjected to judicial review on merits except within the strict limitations defined in Maru Ram (supra). Therefore, on the ambit of judicial review, Kehar Singh (supra) concurred with Maru Ram (supra).

27. In Epuru Sudhakar and Anr. v. Government of A.P. and Ors., (2006) AIR SC 3385 this Court observed that it was well settled that the exercise or non-exercise of the power of pardon by the President or Governor was not immune from judicial review and limited judicial review was available in certain cases.

31. From the abovementioned judicial decisions it is clear that there is limited scope of judicial review on the exercise of power by the Governor under Article 161. Keeping the afores