The main legal point established in the judgment is that when a statute provides a detailed remedy for redressal of the grievance, interference by the High Court is not warranted, especially when an alternative remedy is available.

Rajendra Menon, J.

1. Petitioner a registered trade union has filed this writ petition challenging the orders dated 20-10-10 and 19-10-10 issued by the Respondents proposing to make recovery of salary for the period employees of the Petitioners' union remained on strike and, the further proposal to recover 8 days salary by virtue of the powers conferred on the Respondents under Section 9(2) of the Payments of Wages Act, 1936.

2. Inter alia contending that the Payments of the Wages Act, 1936 does not apply on the members of the Petitioner's union as they are drawing salary more than Rs. 10,000/- (Rupees Ten thousand only) and further contending that the deduction of salary is illegal, Petitioner seeks interference into the matter.

3. As the proposed action for recovery is in accordance with the provisions contemplated under Section 9(2) of the Payment of Wages Act on the ground that the deduction is illegal and contrary to the provisions of Payment of Wages Act and as it is the case of the Petitioner's union that various members are drawing salary beyond the limit stipulated and, therefore, the Payment of Wages Act is not applicable, the Petitioners have a remedy to challenge the aforesaid action by resorting to the remedy available under Section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act and, thereafter, to the remedy by filing of appeal under Section 17. As a statutory remedy for challenging the impugned action is available under the Payment of Wages Act itself, when this Court posed the question to the learned Counsel as to why the petition be not dismissed. Learned Counsel placing reliance on a decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Panther Power Kamgar Sanghatana and Ors. v. Jhalani Y.C. and Ors. 1998 (I) LLJ 884, contends that the writ petition is maintainable. Further, reliance is placed on a judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of Tyre Retreading Shop Committee, Hyderabad v. A.P.S.R.T.C., Hyderabad and Ors. reported in 2002 (I) LLJ 438. Attention is also invited to an order passed by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Chhattisgarh Khadan Karkhana Mazdoor Union, Bilaspur v. Union of India and Ors. 1997 MPLSR 265, to contend that when the recovery itself is illegal, interference can be made by this Court directly in a writ petition.

4. Having heard learned Counsel for the Petitioner and on consideration of the facts that have come on record, I am of the considered view that the principle laid down by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Chhattisgarh Khadan Karkhana Mazdoor Union, Bilaspur (supra), will not apply as that was a case where the question of availability of alternating remedy is not decided. It was a case where the Union was granted liberty to show cause to the notice and take all the defence. The question involved in the present writ petition is as to whether interference can be made in this writ petition when the statute itself provides for a remedy under the Payment of Wages Act. If an illegal deduction is made contrary to the provisions of Section 15, the section itself contemplates a remedy to challenge the action before the Competent Authority and in the State of Madhya Pradesh, the Labour Courts have been notified as the Competent Authorities for exercising powers under Section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act. Thereafter, against the order passed by the Labour Court, Petitioners have a further remedy by way of filing a further appeal to the Industrial Court, which is the notified Appellate Authority under Section 17. The Supreme Court in various cases has laid down the principle that when the statute itself contemplates a detailed remedy for redressal of the grievance, interference by exercising the extra ordinary jurisdiction of the High Court is not warranted.

5. Supreme Court in the case of U.P. State Spinning Co. Ltd. v. R.S. Pandey and Anr. (2005) 8 SCC 264, has considered the question of interference in a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution when a