The Court has the discretion to condone the delay in filing an appeal, but the burden is on the appellant to provide a genuine and satisfactory explanation for the delay.

ORDER :

P. Naveen Rao, J.

Heard learned counsel for appellants Sri C V Rajeev Reddy and learned counsel for respondents Sri C.N Murthy.

2. Appellants and the respondents entered into contract, where under, appellants were awarded the work of “Rehabilitation of track between 22/8 kilo metres and 20/4 on UP line between Malkhaid Road and Chittapur Stations and provision of the wall and pitching Bridge Nos.21 and 22, for a value of Rs.1,16,20,492. Disputes arose thereon. Respondent sought to refer the disputes to arbitration. The competent authority constituted Arbitral Tribunal comprising of three Arbitrators. The respondent made 15 claims before the Arbitral Tribunal. The Arbitral Tribunal passed an award on 15.07.2008 by awarding claim Nos.2(a), 2(b), 4(a), 5(a), 5(b), 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 and 15, and rejected claim Nos.1, 3, 6, 7 and 8. Challenging the said award, the petitioners/appellants preferred A.O.P.No.301 of 2008 to the Court of XII Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Secunderabad, to set aside the award passed by the Arbitral Tribunal. A.O.P.No.301 of 2008 was dismissed by order dated 20.09.2016. This appeal is preferred challenging the said order of the Civil Court with a delay of 1335 days.

3. Scope of Section 5 of the Limitation Act and scope of power of Court to condone the delay in filing an appeal was subject of consideration in plethora of precedent decisions of this Court and the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Suffice to note few land mark decisions to understand the concept of sufficient cause.

4. In Ramlal Vs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd, AIR 1962 SC 361 the Hon’ble Supreme Court while interpreting Section 5 of the Limitation Act, laid down the following proposition.

“7. In construing Section 5 (of the Limitation Act) it is relevant to bear in mind two important considerations. The first consideration is that the expiration of the period of limitation prescribed for making an appeal gives rise to a right in favour of the decree-holder to treat the decree as binding between the parties. In other words, when the period of limitation prescribed has expired the decree-holder has obtained a benefit under the law of limitation to treat the decree as beyond challenge, and this legal right which has accrued to the decree-holder by lapse of time should not be light-heartedly disturbed.

The other consideration which cannot be ignored is that if sufficient cause for excusing delay is shown discretion is given to the court to condone delay and admit the appeal.

This discretion has been deliberately conferred on the court in order that judicial power and discretion in that behalf should be exercised to advance substantial justice.”

5. In N. Balakrishnan Vs. M. Krishnamurthy, (1998) 7 SCC 123 the Hon’ble Supreme Court went a step further and made the following observations.

“9. It is axiomatic that condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the court. Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say that such discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. Length of delay is no matter, acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. Sometimes delay of the shortest range may be uncondonable due to a want of acceptable explanation whereas in certain other cases, delay of a very long range can be condoned as the explanation thereof is satisfactory.

Once the court accepts the explanation as sufficient, it is the result of positive exercise of discretion and normally the superior court should not disturb such finding, much less in revisional jurisdiction, unless the exercise of discretion was on wholly untenable grounds or arbitrary or perverse. But it is a different matter when the first court refuses to condone the delay. In such cases, the superior court would be free to consider the cause shown for the delay afresh and it is open to such superior court to come to its own finding even untrammelled by the conclusion of the lower court.

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11. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties