JUDGMENT

M. H. BEG, C.J.I. :— The case before us involves questions relating to basic human rights. On such questions I believe that multiplicity of views giving the approach of each member of this Court is not a disadvantage if it clarifies our not infrequently differing approaches. It should enable all interested to appreciate better the significance of our Constitution.

2. As I am in general agreement with my learned brethren Bhagwati and Krishna Iyer, I will endeavour to confine my observations to an indication of my own approach on some matters for consideration now before us. This seems to me to be particularly necessary as my learned brother Kailasam, who has also given us the benefit of his separate opinion, has a somewhat different approach. I have had the advantage of going through the opinions of each of my three learned brethren.

3. It seems to me that there can be little doubt that the right to travel and to go outside the country, which orders regulating issue, suspension or impounding, and cancellation of passports directly affect, must be included in rights to "personal liberty" on the strength of decisions of this Court giving a very wide ambit to the right to personal liberty (see : Satwant Singh Sawhney v. D. Ramarathnam, Assistant Passport Officer, Government of India, New Delhi (1967) 3 SCR 525, Kharak Singh v. State of U. P. (1964) 1 SCR 322.

4. Article 21 of the Constitution reads as follows :

"Protection of life and personal liberty - No Person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law."

5. It is evident that Article 21, though so framed as to appear as a shield operating negatively against executive encroachment over something covered by that shield, is the legal recognition of both the protection or the shield as well as of what it protects which lies beneath that shield. It has been so interpreted as long ago as in A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, 1950 SCR 88 where, as pointed out by me in Additional District Magistrate, Jabalpur v. S. S. Shukla (1976) Suppl. SCR 172 (at p. 327) with the help of quotations from judgments of Patanjli Sastri, J. (from pp. 195 to 196 of 1950 SCR); Mahajan J. (pp. 229-230 of SCR) I may add to the passages I cited there some from the judgment of Kania Chief Justice who also, while distinguishing the objects and natures of Articles 21 and 19, gave a wide enough scope to Art. 21.

6. Kania C. J. said (at pp. 106- 107)

"Deprivation (total loss) of personal liberty, which inter alia includes the right to eat or sleep when one likes or to work or not to work as and when one pleases and several such rights sought to be protected by the expression Personal liberty in Article 21, is quite different from restriction (which is only a partial control) of the right to move freely (which is relatively a minor right of a citizen) as safeguarded by article 19 (1) (d). Deprivation of personal liberty has not the same meaning as restriction of free movement in the territory of India. This is made clear when the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code in Chapter VIII relating to security of peace or maintenance of public order are read. Therefore article 19 (5) cannot apply to a substantive law depriving a citizen of personal liberty. I am unable to accept the contention that the word deprivation includes within its scope restriction when interpreting article 21. Article 22 envisages the law of preventive detention. So does article 246 read with Schedule Seven, List I, Entry 9, and List III, Entry 3. Therefore, when the subject of preventive detention is specifically dealt with in the Chapter on Fundamental Rights I do not think it is proper to consider a legislation permitting preventive detention as in conflict with the rights mentioned in article 19 (1). Article 19 (1) does not purport to cover all aspects of liberty or of personal liberty. In that article only certain phases of liberty are dealt with. Personal liberty would primarily