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2010 Supreme(SC) 834

2010 (6) Supreme
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
S.H. Kapadia, CJI., K.S. Radhakrishnan and Swatanter Kumar, JJ.
Competition Commission of India — Appellant
versus
Steel Authority of India Ltd. & Anr. — Respondents
Civil Appeal No.7779 of 2010
[D.No.12247 of 2010]
Decided on : 9-9-2010

Advocates:
Advocate Appeared:
For the Appellants : Gopal Subramaniam, SG, Tarun Gulati, Suhail Nathani, Neil Hildreth, Samir Gandhim, Rahul Rai, Sparsh Bhargava, Kishore Kunal, Rony John, Praveen Kumar, Shahi Mathews, Advs., with him for the Appellants.
For the Respondents:H.N. Salve, R.F. Nariman, Jagdeep Dhankhar, Sr. Advs., Ms. P.S. Shroff, Ms. Ruchi A. Mahajan, Harman Singh Sandhu, Jai Mohan, Ms. Chetna Rai (for M/s. Suresh A. Shroff & Co.), Sunil Kumar Jain, Aneesh Mittal, K.P.S. Channi, Advs., with them for the Respondents.

IMPORTANT POINTS
Competition Commission would be a necessary or proper party in any appeal before the Tribunal.
Direction under Section 26(1) is an administrative direction without entering upon any adjudicatory process.
Court’s function is jus dicere, not jus dare.
In an appeal against the final order, grounds to challenge the interim orders/directions can always be taken up.
Power to invite cannot be equated with requirement of statutory notice or hearing.
Reasoned judgment is basic rule of law and a mandatory requirement of the procedural law.
Ex parte restraint orders should be passed in exceptional circumstances.



Headnote:(a) Competition Act, 2002 – Sections 7, 19 and 26 – Information can be received by the Commission from anybody u/s 7 or from Government agencies or on its own u/s 19 – No notice is required even to the informant but the Commission may seek assistance from any quarter – Upon such information the Commission should satisfy itself and express its opinion that a prima facie case exists – It can then direct the Director General to cause an investigation to be made into the matter – The matter may, however be closed u/s 26 if no prima-facie case is made out. (Paras 9 and 10)

        (b) Competition Act, 2002 – Section 53A(1)(a) – Appeal shall lie only against such directions, decisions or orders passed by the Commission before the Tribunal which have been specifically stated u/s 53A(1)(a) – Other orders, cannot be treated appealable by implication – Thus taking a prima facie view and issuing a direction to the Director General for investigation would not be an order appealable under Section 53A. (Para 17)

        (c) Competition Act, 2002 – Section 26(1) – Neither the Commission is duty bound to issue notice or grant hearing, nor any party can claim notice and/or hearing at the stage of formation of opinion that a prima facie case exists for issuance of a direction to the Director General to cause an investigation to be made into the matter. (Para 17)

        (d) Competition Act, 2002 – Section 53B r/w section 53T r/w Order I Rule 10, C.P.C. – Necessary Party – Expanded meaning should be given to the term ‘persons’ entitled to appeal – Non-joinder of necessary parties may prove fatal – Non-joinder of proper parties may not be fatal but would certainly adversely affect interest of justice – In the proceedings initiated by the Commission suo moto, it shall be dominus litis and therefore necessary party – In other cases, the Commission being a regulatory body would be a proper party. (Para 17, 60, 62, 64, 66 and 68)

        AIR 1963 SC 786; (1992) 2 SCC 524; (2005) 2 SCC 431 – Relied upon

        (e) Competition Act, 2002 – Section 33 – Power under Section 33 to pass temporary restraint order can only be exercised by the Commission when it has formed prima facie opinion and directed investigation in terms of Section 26(1). (Para 17)

        (f) Administrative jurisprudence – Commission is expected to record at least some reason even while forming a prima facie view. (Para 17)

       (g) Competition Act, 2002 – Section 26(1) and (2) – Direction under Section 26(1) is a direction simpliciter to cause an investigation into the matter – It is an administrative direction without entering upon any adjudicatory process – It does not effectively determine any right or obligation of the parties to the lis – It does not entail any civil consequences – It is therefore not appealable – Closure of the case u/s 26(2), on the other hand, is a final order adjudicating the lis – Hence it is appealable u/s 53A. (Paras 20 and 21)

        (1990) ECR II-00367 – Relied upon

        (h) Competition Act, 2002 – Section 53A – Legislature opting to specifically state unambiguously the order, direction and decision, which would be appealable – It will not be permissible to include other directions or orders by implication and make them appealable. (Para 22)

        (i) Interpretation of Statutes – ‘And’ and ‘Or’ – The words `or’ and `and’ may be read as vice versa but not normally – It is always expected of the Court to apply plain rule of construction rather than trying to read the words into the statute which have been specifically omitted by the legislature (Paras 23 and 24)

        (1928) 1 KB 561; (1888) 13 AC 595; (1980) 1 SCC 158; (2009)10 SCC 531 – Relied upon

        (j) Judicial Review – Right to appeal is a creation of statute – Requires application of rule of plain construction – An appeal to be maintainable must have its genesis in the authority of law – Such provision should neither be construed too strictly nor too liberally – Court would keep in mind that its function is jus dicere, not jus dare. (Paras 26and 27)

        (1979) 1 SCC 92; (1983) 3 SCC 75; (1999) 4 SCC 468; (1999) 3 SCC 722; 2008 AIR SC 1749; (2003) 6 SCC 659 – Relied upon

        (k) Competition Act, 2002 – Section 53A and section 100, C.P.C. – The expression ‘any’, in fact, qualifies each of the three expressions ‘direction issued or decision made or order passed’ – It cannot be said that it signifies any one of them and, particularly, only ‘direction issued’ – Legislature specifically making orders u/s 26(2) and 26(6) appealable – Not open to Court to make orders u/s 26(1) and 26(7) appealable. (Paras 31 and 32)

        (l) Maxim – Expressum facit cessare tacitum – Express mention of one thing implies exclusion of other – Expression precludes implication. (Para 33)

        AIR 1985 SC 1416; AIR 1992 SC 1277; AIR 2002 SC 1334 – Relied upon

        (m) Maxim – Est boni judicis ampliare justiciam, non-Jurisdictionem – No other direction, decision or order of the Commission is appealable except those expressly stated in Section 53A(1)(a). (Para 34)

        AIR 2002 SC 1334 – Relied upon

        (n) Competition Act, 2002 – Section 53A r/e Order XLIII, rule 1A, C.P.C. – In an appeal against the final order, grounds to challenge the interim orders/directions can always be taken up. (Paras 35 and 38)

        (o) Natural justice – Audi alteram partem – Doctrine specifically includes in its purview, the right to notice and requirement of reasoned orders – Concept of exclusion of the principles of natural justice is also equally known – Legislature has the competence to enact laws which specifically exclude the application of principles of natural justice - Where the order entails civil consequences, adherence to the principles of natural justice is imperative – Adherence to or exclusion of the these principles would also depend on the functions of the authority. (Paras 40, 49, 51 and 52)

        (1863), 14 C.B. (N.S.) 180; (1935) 1 KB 249; AIR 1985 SC 1416; (1991) Supp1 SCC 600; (1993) Supp 4 SCC 260; (1978) 1 SCC 48; AIR 1980 SC 319; (1982) 3 SCC 338; (2003) 4 SCC 557 – Relied upon

        (p) Competition Act, 2002 – Section 26(1)r/w Reg. 14(7) – Notice expressly excluded – No compelling reason to read the requirement of notice in Section 26(1). (Para 42)

        (q) Competition Commission of India (General) Regulations, 2009 – Regulation 17(2) – Power to invite cannot be equated with requirement of statutory notice or hearing. (Para 44)

        (r) Competition Commission of India (General) Regulations, 2009 – Regulation 21(8), 22, 33(4), 48 and 52 – Contemplates notice to any person – Includes Government agencies, experts and even the informant – However section 26(1) of the Competition Act, 2002 vests discretion into the Commission to issue notice. (Paras 44, 45 and 48)

        (s) Competition Act, 2002 – Section 26(1) – Functions of the Commission u/s 26(1) is either adjudicatory nor regulatory – It is inquisitorial and in the nature of preparatory measures in contrast to the decision making process – Not necessary to issue notice to informant before forming opinion as to prima facie case – Commission may, however, invite assistance of any person under Regulation 17(2) of the Competition Commission of India (General) Regulations, 2009. (Para 52 to 55)

        (1992) 4 SCC 605; (1972) ECR 0933 – Relied upon

        (t) Administrative Law – Recording reasons – Imperative that administrative authorities and tribunals should record explicit reasons in support of the order made by them – Reasoned judgment is basic rule of law and a mandatory requirement of the procedural law. (Para 56)

        JT 2010 (4) SC 35; (1979) 2 SCC 368; 1974 ICR 120 – Relied upon

        (u) Competition Act, 2002 – Section 33 r/w Regulation 18(2) and 31(2), Competition Commission of India (General) Regulations, 2009 – An ‘inquiry’ is commenced when the Commission issues a direction to the Director General – Enquiry and investigation are quite distinguishable – Powers under section 33 can be exercised only after enquiry has commenced – Ex parte restraint orders, having far reaching consequences, should be passed in exceptional circumstances. (Paras 70 and 74)

        (1994) 4 SCC 225 – Relied upon

        (v) Competition Act, 2002 – Section 33, 27(d) and 31(3) r/w Order XXXIX, Rules 3 and 3A, C.P.C. – Delay in disposal of cases and undue continuation of interim restraint orders – Not desirable – Directions issued. (Paras 75, 76, 79, 80 and 81)

       Facts of the case:

        1. Jindal Steel & Powers Ltd. invoked the provisions of Section 19 r/w Section 26(1) of the Act by providing information to the Commission alleging that M/s. Steel Authority of India Ltd. had, inter alia, entered into an exclusive supply agreement with Indian Railways for supply of rails. The SAIL, thus, was alleged to have abused its dominant position in the market and deprived others of fair competition and therefore, acted contrary to Section 3(4) and Section 4(1) of the Act.

        2. The Commission directed the Director General for investigation and granted liberty to SAIL to file its reply before the Director General.

        3. Legality of this order was questioned before the Tribunal by SAIL

        4. Commission’s order was set aside by the Tribunal.

       Finding of the Court:

        Commission may not really record detailed reasons, but must express its mind in no uncertain terms that it is of the view that prima facie case exists, requiring issuance of direction for investigation to the Director General.

       Result : Appeal partially allowed.

       

Judgement Key Points

Key Points: - A direction under Section 26(1) of the Competition Act, 2002, to the Director General for investigation is an administrative direction and not an appealable order under Section 53A (!) (!) . - The Competition Commission is a necessary or proper party in proceedings before the Competition Appellate Tribunal (!) (!) . - At the stage of forming a prima facie opinion under Section 26(1), neither the Commission is duty-bound to issue notice or grant a hearing, nor can any party claim it as a right (!) (!) (!) . - The Commission is expected to record at least some reason even while forming a prima facie view (!) (!) . - The power under Section 33 to pass temporary restraint orders can only be exercised after a prima facie opinion has been formed and investigation directed under Section 26(1) (!) (!) (!) . - Ex parte restraint orders should be passed in exceptional circumstances and with a higher degree of satisfaction than a prima facie view (!) (!) (!) . - The Competition Commission must record reasons for its decisions and orders, especially when they determine the rights of parties (!) (!) . - The Competition Act, 2002, specifically lists the directions, decisions, or orders that are appealable before the Tribunal; other orders cannot be treated as appealable by implication (!) (!) (!) . - The Commission's function under Section 26(1) is inquisitorial and preparatory, not adjudicatory, and does not require notice or hearing at that stage (!) (!) . - Investigations and inquiries under the Act should be completed expeditiously, with specific timeframes suggested for various stages (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) .

What is the appealability of a direction issued by the Competition Commission under Section 26(1) of the Competition Act, 2002?

What is the scope of the Competition Commission's power under Section 26(1) of the Competition Act, 2002, regarding notice and hearing at the prima facie stage?

What is the role of the Competition Commission as a party in proceedings before the Competition Appellate Tribunal?


JUDGMENT

Swatanter Kumar, J. —

The application for leave to appeal is allowed. Civil appeal is admitted.

2. The decision of the Government of India to liberalize its economy with the intention of removing controls persuaded the Indian Parliament to enact laws providing for checks and balances in the free economy. The laws were required to be enacted, primarily, for the objective of taking measures to avoid anti-competitive agreements and abuse of dominance as well as to regulate mergers and takeovers which result in distortion of the market. The earlier Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969 was not only found to be inadequate but also obsolete in certain respects, particularly, in the light of international economic developments relating to competition law. Most countries in the world have enacted competition laws to protect their free market economies- an economic system in which the allocation of resources is determined solely by supply and demand. The rationale of free market economy is that the competitive offers of different suppliers allow the buyers to make the best purchase. The motivation of each participant in a free market economy is to maximize self-interest but the result is favourable to society. As Adam Smith observed: “there is an invisible hand at work to take care of this”.

3. As far as American law is concerned, it is said that the Sherman Act, 1890, is the first codification of recognized common law principles of competition law. With the progress of time, even there the competition law has attained new dimensions with the enactment of subsequent laws, like the Clayton Act, 1914, the Federal Trade Commission Act, 1914 and the Robinson-Patman Act, 1936. The United Kingdom, on the other hand, introduced the considerably less stringent Restrictive Practices Act, 1956, but later on more elaborate legislations like the Competition Act, 1998 and the Enterprise Act, 2002 were introduced. Australia introduced its current Trade Practices Act in 1974.

4. The overall intention of competition law policy has not changed markedly over the past century. Its intent is to limit the role of market power that might result from substantial concentration in a particular industry. The major concern with monopoly and similar kinds of concentration is not that being big is necessarily undesirable. However, because of the control exerted by a monopoly over price, there are economic efficiency losses to society and product quality and diversity may also be affected. Thus, there is a need to protect competition. The primary purpose of competition law is to remedy some of those situations where the activities of one firm or two lead to the breakdown of the free market system, or, to prevent such a breakdown by laying down rules by which rival businesses can compete with each other. The model of perfect competition is the ‘economic model’ that usually comes to an economist’s mind when thinking about the competitive markets.

5. As far as the objectives of competition laws are concerned, they vary from country to country and even within a country they seem to change and evolve over the time. However, it will be useful to refer to some of the common objectives of competition law. The main objective of competition law is to promote economic efficiency using competition as one of the means of assisting the creation of market responsive to consumer preferences. The advantages of perfect competition are three- fold: allocative efficiency, which ensures the effective allocation of resources, productive efficiency, which ensures that costs of production are kept at a minimum and dynamic efficiency, which promotes innovative practices. These factors by and large have been accepted all over the world as the guiding principles for effective implementation of competition law.

6. In India, a High Level Committee on Competition Policy and Law was constituted to examine its various aspects and make suggestions keeping in view the compet

















































































































































































































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