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SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
T.S. THAKUR, ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, R. BANUMATHI, JJ.
RAMDEV FOOD PRODUCTS PRIVATE LIMITED – APPELLANT
VERSUS
STATE OF GUJARAT – RESPONDENT
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.600 OF 2007
Decided on: 16-03-2015
(2004) 7 SCC 338 – Referred
(b) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 156(3) and 202 – While prompt registration of FIR is mandatory, checks and balances on power of police are equally important – Existence of power and its exercise are different – Exercise of power u/s 156(3) requires application of mind – Provision is attracted when credible information is available to straightway issue direction u/s 156(3) – In a proceeding u/s 202 procedures u/s 157 or 173 not intended to be followed – U/s 202 Magistrate takes cognizance and postpones issuance of process – These are cases where the Magistrate has yet to determine “existence of sufficient ground to proceed” – FIR may not be warranted to be registered without enquiry in case of commercial offences. (Para 19, 20, 22)
(2014) 2 SCC 1; (2013) 10 SCC 705 – Relied upon
(1979) 1 GLR 17; (1929) 31 BOMLR 84; (2009) 2 GLR 1647; 121 (2005) DLT 301 (DB) – Approved
AIR (1938) Sind 113; AIR (1953) Assam 1 – Overruled
1997 (2) GLR 1572 – Referred
(c) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 202 – Power to arrest – Not available u/s 202 – Maxim – ‘Expressio unius est exclusion alterious’ (express mention of one thing excludes others) – Valuable servant but dangerous master – Police of its own cannot exercise its power of arrest in the course of making its report in pursuance of direction under Section 202. (Para 23, 25)
(1999) 5 SCC 209 – Relied upon
(d) Indian Evidence Act, 1872 – Section 27 – Power of arrest – Source of such power governed by provisions other than section 27 – If exercise of power of arrest is not otherwise warranted, admissibility of confession under Section 27 cannot facilitate such exercise. (Para 25)
(e) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1873 – Section 156 and 202 – Complaint primarily of civil nature – Accused alleged to have forged partnership – Questions as to whether such forgery actually took place, whether it caused any loss to the complainant and whether there is requisite mens rea – Yet to be determined – Giving colour of criminal case to purely commercial transactions – Court repeatedly cautioning against – Instantly, report under Section 202 was the right course instead of direction under Section 156(3) – A direction under Section 156(3) was not warranted – Police may not be justified in exercising power of arrest in the course of submitting report under Section 202.
(2006) 6 SCC 736; (1998) 5 SCC 749 – Relied upon
(1976) 3 SCC 736; AIR (1960) SC 1113; (1992) 2 SCC 213; (2012) 10 SCC 517; (2009) 2 SCC 363; (1964) 1 SCR 639; (1976) 3 SCC 252; (2013) 2 SCC 488; (2013) 5 SCC 615; (2010) 4 SCC 185; (1955) 1 SCR 1150 – Referred
Facts of the case:
The appellant-complainant is running business of food products and had permitted M/s. New Ramdev Masala Factory, wherein accused No.1 Mr. Jasvantbhai Somabhai Patel was one of the partners, to use the trademark “Ramdev” for seven years under agreement dated 4th June, 1990. However, M/s. New Ramdev Masala Factory was closed on 30th May, 1994. Accused No.1 executed forged partnership documents with the help of other accused and thereby committed the alleged offences.
The appellant sought direction for investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code.
However, the Magistrate instead of directing investigation as prayed, thought it fit to conduct further inquiry under Section 202 and sought report of the Police Sub Inspector within thirty days.
The High Court did not accept the stand of the appellant on ground of delay.
Finding of the Court:
There is no infirmity in the impugned judgment.
Result: Appeal dismissed.
This judgment pertains to the scope and exercise of investigative powers by the police and Magistrates under specific sections of the criminal procedure code. The Court clarifies that the power to investigate under Section 156(3) is to be exercised only when there is a prima facie case of a cognizable offence, requiring application of judicial mind by the Magistrate before directing investigation. It emphasizes that mere allegations are insufficient for such a direction, especially in cases of civil or commercial disputes, where a detailed inquiry or civil proceedings may suffice (!) (!) (!) .
The Court further explains that investigations initiated under Section 202 are of a different nature, primarily meant to ascertain whether there are sufficient grounds to proceed further. Such investigations are limited to a preliminary inquiry and do not automatically authorize police to arrest without specific warrant or legal basis. The power of arrest is governed by other provisions and cannot be exercised solely based on the admissibility of confessions or the existence of a report under Section 202 (!) (!) (!) (!) .
The Court underscores the importance of balancing police powers with individual liberties, highlighting that registration of FIRs is mandatory when a cognizable offence is disclosed, but arrests are not mandatory immediately upon FIR registration. The decision to arrest must be based on reasonable grounds and proper investigation, not on suspicion alone (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) .
It also discusses the discretion available to Magistrates in choosing between directing investigation under Section 156(3) or conducting a preliminary inquiry under Section 202, depending on the nature of the case and the adequacy of evidence. The Court stresses that investigations should not be conducted mechanically and that the procedural safeguards aim to prevent misuse of criminal proceedings, especially in civil or commercial disputes where criminalization may be inappropriate or abused (!) (!) (!) .
Ultimately, the Court dismisses the appeal, reaffirming that the Magistrate's decision to proceed under Section 202 rather than Section 156(3) was appropriate given the civil nature of the dispute and the lack of sufficient grounds to warrant immediate investigation or arrest. The judgment emphasizes the necessity of judicial oversight and careful exercise of investigative powers to protect individual rights while ensuring effective law enforcement (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!)
Judgment
Adarsh Kumar Goel, J.
1. This appeal by special leave has been preferred against the Judgment and Order dated 17th February, 2006 of the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad in Special Criminal Application No.1821 of 2005.
2. The High Court declined to interfere with the Order dated 16th August, 2005, of the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Sanand on a complaint filed by the appellant against fourteen accused for alleged commission of offences under Sections 409, 420, 406, 467, 468, 471 read with Section 120-B and 114 of the Indian Penal Code directing the Police Sub-Inspector, Sanand, to give a report to the Court within thirty days under Section 202(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short “the Code”) instead of directing investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code, as sought by the appellant.
3. The case of the appellant-complainant in complaint filed by it before the Magistrate is that it is running business of food products and had permitted M/s. New Ramdev Masala Factory, wherein accused No.1 Mr. Jasvantbhai Somabhai Patel was one of the partners, to use the trademark “Ramdev” for seven years under agreement dated 4th June, 1990. However, M/s. New Ramdev Masala Factory was closed on 30th May, 1994. Accused No.1 executed forged partnership documents with the help of other accused and thereby committed the alleged offences.
4. The appellant sought direction for investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code. However, the Magistrate instead of directing investigation as prayed, thought it fit to conduct further inquiry under Section 202 and sought report of the Police Sub Inspector within thirty days. Grievance of the appellant before the High Court was that in view of the allegation that documents had been forged with a view to usurp the trademark, which documents were in possession of the accused and were required to be seized, investigation ought to have been ordered under Section 156(3) instead of conducting further inquiry under Section 202. Thus, there was non application of mind by the Magistrate. It is also submitted in the alternative, that even in the course of investigation for giving report under Section 202, police is entitled to arrest the accused as arrest is part of ‘investigation’ but the police failed to effect the arrest.
5. The High Court did not accept the stand of the appellant. It was observed that the appellant had approached the High Court against the Order of the Magistrate after delay of four months from the date of the Order which itself disentitled it to a direction under Section 156(3). It was further observed that the Magistrate had given reasons for declining to direct investigation under Section 156(3) and the said Order did not call for any interference. The reasons given by the Magistrate, inter alia, are that the Police had refused to register a case. There was civil litigation which had gone up to the Supreme Court and thus the case was of civil nature. The fact whether the documents in question were forged or not could be ascertained in civil proceedings by getting the opinion of the hand writing expert. Scope of inquiry under Section 202 was limited to find out whether a case was made out for issue of process. Suppression of material fact of pendency of civil dispute by the complainant also justified the order of the Magistrate to proceed under Section 202 instead of Section 156(3). It was further observed that a Magistrate is not justified in ordering police investigation in mechanical manner as laid down by the Gujarat High Court in Arvindbhai Ravjibhai Patel vs. Dhirubhai Shambhubhai Kakadiya, 1997 (2) GLR 1572.
6. We have heard learned counsel for the parties. When the matter came up for hearing on 11th April, 2007, this Court framed the question as follows:
“The question involved in the instant Special Leave Petition is as to the extent of power that may be exercised by a police officer while making an inquiry under Section 202(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure
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