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1983 Supreme(SC) 101

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Y.V. CHANDRACHUD, CJI., V.D. TULZAPURKAR AND A. VARADARAJAN, JJ.
Sher Singh and others, Petitioners
Versus
State of Punjab, Respondent.
Writ Petns. Nos. 232 of 1983, D/- 24-3-1983.
Advocates appeared
Mr. M. S. Joshi Advocate Sr. Advocate, Mr. N. D. Garg, Mr. Rajiv Kumar Garg, Advocates with him for Petitioners; Mr. D. D. Sharma, Advocate, for Respondent.

Advocates:
D.D.SHARMA, M.S.Joshi, N.D.GARG, RAJIV K.GARG

Headnote:

Indian Penal Code, 1860 - Sections 302 r/w 34 - Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 32 - Criminal Produce Code, 1973 - Sections 432 and 433 – Offence of Murder – Convicted - Whether a delay exceeding two years in execution of a sentence of death must be considered sufficient for setting aside that sentence – Petitioners were convicted under section 302 read with Section 34 of Penal Code and were sentenced to death by learned Sessions Judge - By a judgment High Court of Punjab and Haryana reduced the sentence imposed upon Kuldip Singh to life imprisonment but upheld sentence of death imposed upon petitioners - High Court also imposed a sentence of fine of Rupees 5000/- on Kuldip Singh and a fine of Rs. 5000/- on each of petitioners - Held, Several instances can be cited, to which the record of this Court will bear testimony, in which petitions are pending before State Governments and Government of India for an inexplicably long period - Latest instance is to be found in Cri. Writ Petitions from which it would appear that petitions filed under Art. 161 of Constitution are pending before Governor of Jammu and Kashmir for anything between 5 to 8 years - A pernicious impression seems to be growing that whatever courts may decide, one can always turn to executive for defeating verdict of Court by resorting to delaying tactics Undoubtly, executive has power, in appropriate cases, to act under aforesaid provisions but, if we may remind, all exercise of power is preconditioned by duty to be fair and quick. Delay defeats justice - On question as to whether death sentence should not be allowed to be executed in this case, we shall pronounce later after hearing parties - In meanwhile, notice will go to Government of Punjab - Order accordingly.

Judgment

CHANDRACHUD, CJI. :- An important question arises for consideration in these two writ petitions. That question is whether a delay exceeding two years in the execution of a sentence of death must be considered sufficient for setting aside that sentence. Learned counsel who appears on behalf of the petitioners relies upon a decision of this Court in T. V. Vatheeswaran v. State of Tamil Nadu, Special Leave Petn. (Crl.) No. 1276 of 1978 and Writ Petition (Cri.) No. 17 of 1982 : reported in 1983 (1) Scale 115 and contends that since more than two years have passed since the petitioners were sentenced to death by the Trial Court, they are entitled to demand that the said sentence should be quashed and substituted by the sentence of life imprisonment.

2. The petitioners, Sher Singh and Surjit Singh, and one Kuldip Singh were convicted under section 302 read with Section 34 of the Penal Code and were sentenced to death by the learned Sessions Judge, Sangrur, on November 26, 1977. By a judgment dated July 18, 1978 the High Court of Punjab and Haryana reduced the sentence imposed upon Kuldip Singh to life imprisonment but upheld the sentence of death imposed upon the petitioners. The High Court also imposed a sentence of fine of Rupees 5000/- on Kuldip Singh and a fine of Rs. 5000/- on each of the petitioners. Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 1711 of 1978 which was filed by the petitioners against the judgment of the High Court was dismissed by this Court on March 5, 1979. The petitioners then filed a writ petition in this Court challenging the validity of Section 302 of the Penal Code. That petition was dismissed on January 20, 1981. Review Petition No. 99 of 1981 filed by the petitioners against the dismissal of their S. L. P. was dismissed by this court on March 27, 1981. The petitioners filed yet another petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution, this time challenging the validity of Section 34 of the Penal Code. That petition was dismissed on August 24, 1981. After failing in these seemingly inexhaustible series of proceedings, the petitioners filed these two writ petitions on March 2, 1983, basing themselves on the decision rendered by Justice Chinnappa Reddy and Justice R. B. Misra on February 16, 1983, in Vatheeswaran.

3. The question which arose for consideration in Vatheeswaran (AIR 1983 SC 361 (2)) is formulated by Chinnappa Reddy, J., who spoke for the Court, in these terms (para 1) :-

"But the question is whether in a case where after the sentence of death is given, the accused person is made to undergo inhuman and degrading punishment or where the execution of the sentence is endlessly delayed and the accused is made to suffer the most excruciating agony and anguish, is it not open to a Court of appeal or a Court exercising writ jurisdiction, in an appropriate proceeding, to take note of the circumstance when it is brought to its notice and give relief where necessary?" This question arose on the following facts as stated in the judgment of Brother Chinnappa Reddy :

(1) The prisoner was rightly sentenced to death.

(2) He was the arch-villain of a villainous piece and the brain behind a cruel conspiracy to impersonate Customs Officers, pretend to question unsuspecting visitors to the city of Madras, abduct them on the pretext of interrogating them, administer sleeping pills to the unsuspecting victims, steal their cash and jewels and finally murder them. The plan was ingeniously fiendish and the appellant was its architect.

(3) Since January 19, 1975, when the Sessions Judge Pronounced the sentence of death, the prisoner was kept in solitary confinement contrary to the decision of this Court in Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration (1979) 1 SCR 392 Before that, he was a prisoner under remand for two years.

4. On these facts, the argument advanced in this Court on behalf of the prisoner was that taking away his life after keeping him in jail for ten years, eight of which were spent in illegal solitary confinement, is a gros































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