2005 Supreme(SC) 1163

2005(6) Supreme 389
Supreme Court of India
(From Delhi High Court)
Ashok Bhan and S.B. Sinha, JJ.
Union of India —Appellant
versus
Pramod Gupta (D) by Lrs. and Ors. —Respondents
Civil Appeal Nos. 6825-6826 of 2003
With
Civil Appeal Nos. 6827-6832/2003, 950, 2661 of 2005
Civil Appeal Nos. 5566-5569 of 2005
(Arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 14383 of 2004, 17913, 17915, 17916 of 2005)
All Decided on 7-9-2005
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appellant : Amrendra Sharan, Additional Solicitor General, M.P.S. Tomar, S. Wasim A. Qadri, Mrs. Kiran Bhardwaj, Mrs. Rekha Pandey, Ms. Pareena Swarup, Mrs. Asha G. Nair, Mrs. Sunita Sharma, Mrs. Anil Katiyar, D.S. Mahra, Advocates.
For the Respondents : K. Ramamoorthy, K.N. Bhat, Sr. Advocates, Sriram J. Thalapathy, N.K. Arulmurugandham, Manish Vashisht, Ashok K. Mathur, Vishnu B. Saharya, Dhruv Mehta, Mohit Chaudhary, Harshvardhan Jha, Naresh Kaushik, Mrs. Lalita Kaushik, Parmanand Gaur, S.K. Rout, Naresh Kumar, Jagjit Singh Chhabra, S.K. Dhingra, Ms. Shefali Dingra, Dr. Ms. Aparana Bhardwaj, Rajesh Tyagi, Atishi Dipankar, Advocates.

Important Points
1. Market value of the acquired lands is required to be determined having regard to the largeness of area and the purpose for which they are acquired, namely, for the University and not for the development of the township of the residential colony wherefor different standards may have to be adopted.
2. A party who himself represents before the court of law that he would not claim interest with a view to obtain an order of stay which would be for his own benefit, could not be permitted to take advantage of his wrong.

Headnote:(i) Land Acquisition Act, 1894—Sections 4, 6, 18, 23, 25, 54—Land acquisition compensation claim—Determination of market value—Notifications dated 24-10-1961 and 23-1-1965—Acquisition of lands measuring 1105.04 bighas and 3895.07 bigha situated in village Masoodpur, Delhi for public purpose of planned development of Delhi, i.e. for construction of Jawahar Lal Nehru University—Awards passed dividing acquired lands in three categories—Reference u/s 18 of the Act filed by owners of lands—Reference Court by a judgment dated 28-7-1986 awarded compensation @Rs.18,000/- per bigha and Rs. 12,000/- per bigha respectively for the lands covered in two awards—Appeal against filed by Union of India—Respondents filed cross objections seeking enhancement of compensation both in respect of land as well as the mineral China Clay—High Court dismissed appeals holding that awards granting compensation for lands acquired in the neighbouring villages which were upheld in appeals would attract principle of res judicata —High Court allowed cross objections filed by respondents—Award of compensation fixed @ Rs. 56/- per sq. yd. and Rs. 30/- per sq. yd. respectively in relation to notification of 1961 and Rs. 98/- per sq. yd. and Rs. 72/- sq. yd. in relation to notification of 1965—Whether justified—(No)—Claim was made only for Rs. 25/- or Rs. 50/- per sq. yd. by the claimants—Applicability of bar under sub-section (2) of Section 25 of the Act.

       Held : It is not in dispute that in the proceeding giving rise to Award No. 2040 dated 2.12.1967 a claim was made by the Respondent - Smt. Pramod Gupta claiming compensation to the extent of 1/4th share in the entire land. It has also not been disputed before us that Section 25 contains a substantive provision of law and not a procedural one and, thus, the statutory provision as it existed prior to its amendment in the year 1984 shall apply. (Para 120)

       At this juncture, it would also be relevant to note that before the Reference Court the Respondents made their claim only on the basis of certain awards judgments made by the Reference Court High Court. Before the Reference Court in relation to the notification dated 24.10.1961 it was contended that the compensation at the rate of Rs.12,000/- per bigha should have been awarded by the Land Acquisition Collector. It is true that a faint argument was advanced before the Reference Court that the lands under acquisition were superior to those situated in Munirka and Ber Sarai. Even for the purpose of determination as regard superior quality of land under acquisition vis-a-vis the lands situated in the villages which were the subject matter of the other acquisition cases, it was obligatory on the part of the High Court to consider the contra plea raised by the Appellants herein. Furthermore, it was also obligatory on the part of the High Court to consider the question that a part of the lands consisted of hills and furthermore pits have been dug up while extracting minerals; the same may not be equated with the land, which had potential for building purposes. The High Court in its impugned judgment has not adverted to this aspect of the matter at all. (Para 131)

       Nothing has been shown before the High Court that the said findings of the Reference Court were unfounded. The High Court in its judgment has proceeded computing the amount of compensation on the basis of the circle rates without considering this aspect of the matter. (Para 133)(ii) Land Acquisition Act, 1894—Sections 4, 6, 18, 28 and 34—Interest—Waiver of right to claim—Notifications for acquisition of lands dated 24.10.1961 and 23.1.1965—Compensation claims—Proceedings between 17-1-1972 to 27-5-1980 remained stayed on representation of claimants that they would not be claiming interest at the enhanced amount of compensation, if any, during the period of stay—Appellant’s prayer that respondents were not entitled for interest for this period of stay—Whether High Court was justified in holding that Sections 28 and 34 being imperative in character, representation made on behalf of respondents would not amount to estoppel or waiver—(No)—High Court committed a manifest error in allowing interest for the said period—Evidence Act, 1872—Section 114.

       Held : It is, therefore, not correct to contend that there cannot be any waiver of the right to claim interest. Statutory provisions are made for payment of interest with a view to compensate a party who had suffered damages owing to a positive action or inaction of the other resulting in blockade of money which he would otherwise have received. A party who himself represents before the court of law that he would not claim interest with a view to obtain an order of stay which would be for his own benefit, in our opinion, could not be permitted to take advantage of his own wrong. (Para 116)

       (iii) Land Acquisition Act, 1894—Sections 4, 6, 23—Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954—Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957—Sections 4, 14—Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887—Sections 41, 42 and 60-C—Punjab Minor Minerals Rules, 1934—Compensation claims in respect of mineral rights—Acquisition of lands measuring 1105.04 bighas and 3895.07 bighas respectively situated in village Masoodpur for public purpose of planned development of Delhi—Nature of lands being ‘Gairmumkin Pahad’ and ‘Banjar Kadim’ as described in entries made in revenue record of rights —Respondents claimed their right, title and interest in lands from one Gulab Sundari who was said to be proprietor of M/s Kesri Pottery Works having a non-occupancy tenancy right therein—Several proceedings had been initiated before different forums by Gulab Sundari on one hand and the Gaon Sabha of the village and Union of India on the other after coming into force of Delhi Land Reforms Act—Gulab Sundari had allegedly been declared Bhumidar by the Deputy Commissioner of Delhi—Whether bhumidars were entitled to mineral right.

       Held : The lands in question indisputably were governed by the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887 and the Punjab Tenants (Security of Tenure) Act, 1950. The Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887 is still applicable save and except those provisions which are inconsistent with the provisions of the Delhi Land Reforms Act. The claim of the Respondents is stated in their counter-affidavit filed in this Court. The Respondents claimed themselves to be occupancy tenants. (Para 62)

       Interpretation of the provisions of the Delhi Land Reforms Act came up for consideration before this Court in Nathi (supra). It opined that the Act contemplates only bhumidhari or asami right of an agricultural land in a village subject of course to the right conferred upon them in terms of Section 8 of the Act. It was held that Gair mumkin pahar land is not a khudkasht land. (Para 73)

       The Act maintains a silence about the right of the land owners in respect of mines and minerals. In absence of the documents which would throw a light on the right of Smt. Gulab Sundari, we think that it would not be proper for us to determine the question finally and we must leave the matter at the hands of the High Court for the said purpose. We may, however, observe that such a question may have to be determined having regard to the provisions contained in Article 31A of the Constitution of India vis-a-vis the repeal of the Punjab Land Tenure Act on one hand and the Delhi Land Reforms Act, on the other. It is possible to hold that as by reason of the said provision only limited rights were conferred upon them, all other rights stood excluded. We, however, would clarify that as the said question has not been raised specifically before us and keeping in view of the fact that Smt. Gulab Sundari might not have any proprietary rights over mines and minerals, as had been claimed, having regard to the provisions of the Punjab Tenants (Security of Tenure) Act, we would refrain ourselves from determining the question at this stage. (Para 75)

       We are not suggesting, as at present advised, that mineral rights or rights over minerals can in no situation remain in the hands of the private individuals. They may be cases where having regard to the statutory provisions, the mineral rights may continue to remain in the hands of the private owners. But while examining the question of computing the quantum of compensation, the Courts are required to bear in mind the extent of such rights and in particular the statutory provisions which prohibit carrying out mining operations without obtaining appropriate mining lease, prospective licence or permits. The Courts must also bear in mind that even in a case where owners are entitled to the minerals having regard to the provisions contained in the Punjab Minor Mineral Rules, 1934, the amount of compensation would be much less and with the acquisition of land the right to use the minerals would come to an end. Compensation for such minerals may not be computed on the basis of the profits earned by a mining lessee having a valid mining lease therefor. Furthermore, a person having a right to use mines and minerals for his personal use and not for sale will still have to obtain an appropriate permit in terms of the statutory provisions. It may not be out of place to notice that right to receive royalty is a mineral right. (Para 77)

       (iv) Land Acquisition Act, 1894—Sections 4, 6 and 23—Compensation—Modes of computing the market value—Comparable sales method—Reference Court has to apply the comparable sales method as also situation of the land—Lands sought to be compared must be similar in potentiality and nature.

       Held : The High Court, as has been noticed hereinbefore, without assigning any reason discarded the method of valuation adopted by the reference court. Before the reference court, the Respondents herein only relied upon the judgments and awards granting compensation for acquisition of similar lands. The High Court while allowing an application for adduction of additional evidence referred only to certain notifications issued by the Union of India in the year 1965 which were meant for the residential plots whereby allegedly the market value was stated to be 150 per sq. yd. for lands situated at Vasant Vihar wherefor certain deductions were made @ 12 p.a. therefrom in respect of the lands acquired under the notification dated 24.10.1961. We fail to understand as to how or on what basis, the High Court took recourse to the said method wholly ignoring the other materials on records. (Paras 92 and 93)

       Having noticed the legal principles, we are of the opinion that this case merited a different treatment at the hands of the High Court. The land in question was acquired for a University. The University was constructed in a large area. By reason of the two notifications in question alone, about 5000 bighas of lands were acquired. Out of the said 5000 bighas, the lands needed for actual construction of the building may be a few bighas only. A large portion of the land must have been kept vacant for future development as also for other purposes e.g. sport and other activities. The area consisting of stones might not have been utilized for the purpose of raising any construction. A portion of land admittedly contained minerals. A number of minerals were said to be deposited in the land in question, namely, mica, berill quards and china clay. The Respondents, however, having regard to the materials on records confined their claim only to China clay. 19 of the total minerals bearing land is said to have been exploited. How far these minerals bearing land were suitable for raising construction is a matter of guess. As per the evidence on record the minerals can be found upto a depth of 60 ft. It is not necessary for us to go into this question in details as the High Court did not advert thereto. But suffice it to say that for the purpose of carrying out mining operation, the Respondents were required to comply with the safety provisions contained in the Mines Act, 1952 and the rules and regulations framed thereunder. The Reference Court and the High Court unfortunately did not consider the question as to what amount was required to be expended for bringing the said area back to the normal so as to enable the University authorities to raise construction thereon. Minerals were evidently taken out by taking recourse to the quarry method, but there is no evidence adduced by the Respondents to show that the pits caused by such mining activities have already been filled up. (Paras 99 and 100)

       In fact the Reference Court or the High Court did not address themselves on the question that the market value of the acquired lands was required to be determined having regard to the largeness of area and the purpose for which they are required, namely, for the University and not for the development of the township or the residential colony wherefor different standards may have to be adopted. The Reference Court and the High Court should have also taken into consideration the fact that the lands in question being of different categories would fetch different prices and same price might not have been available for all types of lands. Recourse taken by the High Court to the circulars issued for the lands acquired for residential purpose only therefore will have no application in the facts and circumstances of the present case. (Para 102)