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2006 Supreme(Kar) 273

Karnataka High Court
Govind Krishnarao Deshpande - Appellant
Versus
Land Tribunal - Respondent
Decided On : 03-22-06
Writ Petition : 9283 of 2002

Advocates:
G.BALAKRISHNA SHASTRI, N.P.Vivek Mehta, Ramesh B.Anneppanavar, RAVISHANKAR SHASTRY

Headnote:Labour & Services -Termination of trainee employee -Termination of trainee employee -Employee terminated on the ground of non-performance and non-improvement of behaviour -Sustainability.

       Cases Referred: AIR 1988 SC 1291; AIR 1999 SC 983.

       Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 -Termination of trainee employee -Section 10(4A) -Termination of trainee employee -Employee terminated on the ground of non-performance and non-improvement of behaviour -Sustainability. [Anand Byrareddy, J]: The counsel would submit that cases, where, there is assessment by the employer of the performance of the employee who is a trainee and thereafter proceeded to terminate the period of training therein, is not stigmatic. Allegations with regard to the character and conduct, without being preceded by an enquiry, however, would certainly be stigmatic. In the present case, she would submit that the letter of termination clearly alludes to the character and conduct of the petitioner without indicating the instance or circumstance, which warranted such reference to the conduct or character and therefore she would submit that the order of termination is ,clearly stigmatic and hence warrants interference of the Court. Settled Principles: Whether an employee at the end of the probationary period automatically gets confirmation in the post or whether an order of confirmation or any specific act on the part of the employer confirming the employee is necessary, will depend upon the provisions in the relevant Service Rules relating to probation and confirmation. There are broadly two sets of authorities of the Court dealing with this question. In those cases where the Rules provide for a maximum period of probation beyond which probation cannot be extended, the Court has held that at the end of the maximum probationary period there will be a deemed confirmation of the employee unless Rules provide to the contrary. This is the line of cases starting with State of Punjab vs. Dharam Singh, (1968) 3 SCR 1: (AIR 1968 SC 1210); MK Agarwal vs. Gurgaon Gramin bank, 1987 Supp SCC 643 : (AIR 1988 SC 286); Om Prakash Maurya vs. UP Co-operative Sugar Factories Federation, Lucknow, 1986 Supp SCC 95; (AIR 1986 SC 1844); State of Gujarat vs. Akhilesh C. Bhargav, (1987) 4 SCC 482 : (AIR 1987 SC 2135). However, even when the Rules prescribe a maximum period of probation, if there is a further provision in the Rules for continuation of such probation beyond the maximum period, the Courts have made an exception and said that there will be no deemed confirmation in such cases and the probation period will be deemed to be extended. In this category of cases we can place Samsher Singh vs. State of Punjab, (1974)2 SCC 831 : (AIR 1974 SC 2192) which was the decision of a Bench of seven Judges where the principle of probation not going beyond the maximum period fixed was reiterated but on the basis of the Rules which were before the Court, the Court said that the probation was deemed to have been extended. A similar view was taken in the case of Municipal Corporation, Raipur vs. Ashok Kumar Misra, (1991) 3 SCC 325 : (1991 AIRSCW 1241). In Satya NarayanAthya vs. High Court of Madhya Pradesh, (1996) 1 SCC 560: (1996 AIR SCW 55), although the Rules prescribed that the probationary period should not exceed two years, and an order of confirmation was also necessary, the termination order was issued within the extended period of probation. Hence the termination was upheld (AIR 1998 SC 1291). We may advert to a few cases on the question of stigma. We shall refer initially to cases where a Special Rule relating to termination of probationer required a particular condition to be satisfied and where the said condition was referred to in the order of termination. In Hari Singh Mann vs. State of Punjab, (1975) 3 SCC 182: (AIR 1974 SC 2263), the probationer was governed by Rule 8(b) of the Punjab Service Rules, 1959 and the fact that the word unfit as required by the Rules was used, was held not to be a ground for quashing the order on the ground of stigma , for to hold that in amounted to stigma would amount to robbing the authority of the right under the rule. Similarly where a Rule required a show cause notice issued and an inquiry to be conducted before terminating probation, such as Rule 55-B of the Central Civil Services (CCA) Rules, there would be no question of characterising the simple order of termination as one founded on the allegations which were the subject of the inquiry. That was because, in such a case, the purpose of the inquiry was to find out if the officer was to be continued in service and not to find out if he was guilty. State of Orissa vs. Ram Narayan Das, AIR 1961 SC 177; Ranendra Chandra vs. Union of India, AIR 1963 SC 1552. In State of Gujarat vs Akhilesh C. Bhargav, (1987) 4 SCC 482: (AIR 1987 SC 2135), the termination order merely referred to Rules 12(bb) of the Indian Police Service (Probationer) Rules, 1959. It was contended that the reference to the said Rule 12 (bb) itself amounted to a stigma but this was rejected following Ram Narayan Das case (AIR 1961 SC 177). Court adverted to some more cases and to particular words employed while passing orders of termination of probationers. In State of Bihar vs. Gopi Kishore Prasad, AIR 1960 SC 6889, a show cause notice was given seeking a reply to the allegation regarding the officers bad reputation and in regard to certain perverse decisions given by him in his judicial functions during the period of probation. The termination order stated that certain facts were brought to the notice of the Government about his unsatisfactory work and conduct and that grave doubts had arisen about his integrity which indicated that he was a corrupt and an unreliable office!: It was also said that confidential inquiries revealed that he was a corrupt officer and that annual confidential reports of his superior officer referred to his bad reputation and therefore his work during the period of probation was not satisfactory. The Constitution Bench of the Court held that it was a clear case of stigma and the matter indeed required a full fledged departmental inquiry under Rule 55 of the CCS (CCA) Rules. In Jagdish Mitter vs. Union of India, AIR 1964 SC 449 the use of the words "undesirable to be continued" in service was held by the Constitution Bench to amount to stigma. This case was followed in State of U.P. vs. Madan Mohan Nagar, AIR 1967 SC 1260 where the order said that the officer had outlived his utility and such an order was held to amount to a stigma. Jadish Mitter, (AIR 1964 SC 449) was approved by the Seven Judge Bench in Samsher Singh s case (AIR 1974 SC 2192) on this point. But in Kanwar Arun Kumar vs. U.P. Hill Electronics Corporation, (1997) 2 SCC 191, the termination order used the word unsatisfactory and the same was upheld as it did not amount to stigma. In two cases arising under industrial law, one in Chandu Lal vs. Pan American World Airways, (1985) 2 SCC 727: (AIR 1985 SC 1128) and Kamal Kishore Lakshman vs. Pan American Land Ways Inc., (1987) 1 SCC 146: (AIR 1987 SC 229) where the termination order used the word loss of confidence: the said orders were held to contain stigma and therefore punitive. In Jagdish Prasad vs. Sachiv, Zila Gaon Committee, (1986) 2 SCC 338: (AIR 1986 SC 1108), the termination order stated that the officer had concealed certain facts relating to his removal from an earlier service on charge of corruption and therefore not suitable for appointment. This was held to amount to stigma. But in Union of India vs. R.S. Dhabe, (1969) 3 SCC 603, where the order merely said found unsuitable , it was held not to amount to stigma. In Allahabad Bank Officers Association vs. Allahabad Bank,. (1996) 4 SCC 504: (1996 AIR SCW 2432), the order was one of compulsory retirement and said that a Special Committee had unanimously recommended for the officers compulsory retirement, that the Chairman and Managing Director agreed with the Committee s views regarding want of application to Bank s work and lack of potential and that the officer was also found to be not dependable . The Court after referring to a number of cases explained that the words not dependable were used, in the context of the facts of the case and not as an aspersion on his reputation but in relation to his work and were to be understood in that sense in the setting of the words want of application and or lack of potential . It was observed: "Any person reading the letter on the order of compulsory retirement would not be led to believe that there was something wrong with Appellate order as regards his conduct or character. They would only indicate that he had ceased to be useful to the Bank in his capacity as a Manager. "Again in High Court of Judicature of Patna vs. Pandey Madan Mohan Prasad Sinha, (1997) 10 SCC 409 it was held that termination of probationer on basis of un communicated adverse remarks, was valid (AIR 1999 SC 983).

       Cases Referred: AIR 1988 SC 1291; AIR 1999 SC 983.

       Labour & Services -Termination of trainee employee -Termination of trainee employee -Employee terminated on the ground of non-performance and non-improvement of behaviour -Sustainability.

       Cases Referred: AIR 1988 SC 1291; AIR 1999 SC 983.

       Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 -Termination of trainee employee -Section 10(4A) -Termination of trainee employee -Employee terminated on the ground of non-performance and non-improvement of behaviour -Sustainability. [Anand Byrareddy, J]: The counsel would submit that cases, where, there is assessment by the employer of the performance of the employee who is a trainee and thereafter proceeded to terminate the period of training therein, is not stigmatic. Allegations with regard to the character and conduct, without being preceded by an enquiry, however, would certainly be stigmatic. In the present case, she would submit that the letter of termination clearly alludes to the character and conduct of the petitioner without indicating the instance or circumstance, which warranted such reference to the conduct or character and therefore she would submit that the order of termination is ,clearly stigmatic and hence warrants interference of the Court. Settled Principles: Whether an employee at the end of the probationary period automatically gets confirmation in the post or whether an order of confirmation or any specific act on the part of the employer confirming the employee is necessary, will depend upon the provisions in the relevant Service Rules relating to probation and confirmation. There are broadly two sets of authorities of the Court dealing with this question. In those cases where the Rules provide for a maximum period of probation beyond which probation cannot be extended, the Court has held that at the end of the maximum probationary period there will be a deemed confirmation of the employee unless Rules provide to the contrary. This is the line of cases starting with State of Punjab vs. Dharam Singh, (1968) 3 SCR 1: (AIR 1968 SC 1210); MK Agarwal vs. Gurgaon Gramin bank, 1987 Supp SCC 643 : (AIR 1988 SC 286); Om Prakash Maurya vs. UP Co-operative Sugar Factories Federation, Lucknow, 1986 Supp SCC 95; (AIR 1986 SC 1844); State of Gujarat vs. Akhilesh C. Bhargav, (1987) 4 SCC 482 : (AIR 1987 SC 2135). However, even when the Rules prescribe a maximum period of probation, if there is a further provision in the Rules for continuation of such probation beyond the maximum period, the Courts have made an exception and said that there will be no deemed confirmation in such cases and the probation period will be deemed to be extended. In this category of cases we can place Samsher Singh vs. State of Punjab, (1974)2 SCC 831 : (AIR 1974 SC 2192) which was the decision of a Bench of seven Judges where the principle of probation not going beyond the maximum period fixed was reiterated but on the basis of the Rules which were before the Court, the Court said that the probation was deemed to have been extended. A similar view was taken in the case of Municipal Corporation, Raipur vs. Ashok Kumar Misra, (1991) 3 SCC 325 : (1991 AIRSCW 1241). In Satya NarayanAthya vs. High Court of Madhya Pradesh, (1996) 1 SCC 560: (1996 AIR SCW 55), although the Rules prescribed that the probationary period should not exceed two years, and an order of confirmation was also necessary, the termination order was issued within the extended period of probation. Hence the termination was upheld (AIR 1998 SC 1291). We may advert to a few cases on the question of stigma. We shall refer initially to cases where a Special Rule relating to termination of probationer required a particular condition to be satisfied and where the said condition was referred to in the order of termination. In Hari Singh Mann vs. State of Punjab, (1975) 3 SCC 182: (AIR 1974 SC 2263), the probationer was governed by Rule 8(b) of the Punjab Service Rules, 1959 and the fact that the word unfit as required by the Rules was used, was held not to be a ground for quashing the order on the ground of stigma , for to hold that in amounted to stigma would amount to robbing the authority of the right under the rule. Similarly where a Rule required a show cause notice issued and an inquiry to be conducted before terminating probation, such as Rule 55-B of the Central Civil Services (CCA) Rules, there would be no question of characterising the simple order of termination as one founded on the allegations which were the subject of the inquiry. That was because, in such a case, the purpose of the inquiry was to find out if the officer was to be continued in service and not to find out if he was guilty. State of Orissa vs. Ram Narayan Das, AIR 1961 SC 177; Ranendra Chandra vs. Union of India, AIR 1963 SC 1552. In State of Gujarat vs Akhilesh C. Bhargav, (1987) 4 SCC 482: (AIR 1987 SC 2135), the termination order merely referred to Rules 12(bb) of the Indian Police Service (Probationer) Rules, 1959. It was contended that the reference to the said Rule 12 (bb) itself amounted to a stigma but this was rejected following Ram Narayan Das case (AIR 1961 SC 177). Court adverted to some more cases and to particular words employed while passing orders of termination of probationers. In State of Bihar vs. Gopi Kishore Prasad, AIR 1960 SC 6889, a show cause notice was given seeking a reply to the allegation regarding the officers bad reputation and in regard to certain perverse decisions given by him in his judicial functions during the period of probation. The termination order stated that certain facts were brought to the notice of the Government about his unsatisfactory work and conduct and that grave doubts had arisen about his integrity which indicated that he was a corrupt and an unreliable office!: It was also said that confidential inquiries revealed that he was a corrupt officer and that annual confidential reports of his superior officer referred to his bad reputation and therefore his work during the period of probation was not satisfactory. The Constitution Bench of the Court held that it was a clear case of stigma and the matter indeed required a full fledged departmental inquiry under Rule 55 of the CCS (CCA) Rules. In Jagdish Mitter vs. Union of India, AIR 1964 SC 449 the use of the words "undesirable to be continued" in service was held by the Constitution Bench to amount to stigma. This case was followed in State of U.P. vs. Madan Mohan Nagar, AIR 1967 SC 1260 where the order said that the officer had outlived his utility and such an order was held to amount to a stigma. Jadish Mitter, (AIR 1964 SC 449) was approved by the Seven Judge Bench in Samsher Singh s case (AIR 1974 SC 2192) on this point. But in Kanwar Arun Kumar vs. U.P. Hill Electronics Corporation, (1997) 2 SCC 191, the termination order used the word unsatisfactory and the same was upheld as it did not amount to stigma. In two cases arising under industrial law, one in Chandu Lal vs. Pan American World Airways, (1985) 2 SCC 727: (AIR 1985 SC 1128) and Kamal Kishore Lakshman vs. Pan American Land Ways Inc., (1987) 1 SCC 146: (AIR 1987 SC 229) where the termination order used the word loss of confidence: the said orders were held to contain stigma and therefore punitive. In Jagdish Prasad vs. Sachiv, Zila Gaon Committee, (1986) 2 SCC 338: (AIR 1986 SC 1108), the termination order stated that the officer had concealed certain facts relating to his removal from an earlier service on charge of corruption and therefore not suitable for appointment. This was held to amount to stigma. But in Union of India vs. R.S. Dhabe, (1969) 3 SCC 603, where the order merely said found unsuitable , it was held not to amount to stigma. In Allahabad Bank Officers Association vs. Allahabad Bank,. (1996) 4 SCC 504: (1996 AIR SCW 2432), the order was one of compulsory retirement and said that a Special Committee had unanimously recommended for the officers compulsory retirement, that the Chairman and Managing Director agreed with the Committee s views regarding want of application to Bank s work and lack of potential and that the officer was also found to be not dependable . The Court after referring to a number of cases explained that the words not dependable were used, in the context of the facts of the case and not as an aspersion on his reputation but in relation to his work and were to be understood in that sense in the setting of the words want of application and or lack of potential . It was observed: "Any person reading the letter on the order of compulsory retirement would not be led to believe that there was something wrong with Appellate order as regards his conduct or character. They would only indicate that he had ceased to be useful to the Bank in his capacity as a Manager. "Again in High Court of Judicature of Patna vs. Pandey Madan Mohan Prasad Sinha, (1997) 10 SCC 409 it was held that termination of probationer on basis of un communicated adverse remarks, was valid [AIR 1999 SC 983].

       Cases Referred: AIR 1988 SC 1291; AIR 1999 SC 983.

       Labour & Services -Termination of trainee employee -Termination of trainee employee -Employee terminated on the ground of non-performance and non-improvement of behaviour -Sustainability.

       Cases Referred: AIR 1988 SC 1291; AIR 1999 SC 983.

GURURAJAN, J.

( 1 ) THE petitioner-Govind Krishnarao is knocking the doors of this Court for the purpose of setting aside the order of the Land Tribunal, Dharwad dated 26-4-1979 in this Writ Petition. Sy. No. 54 measures 3 acres 6 guntas. It is situated in Lakamanahalli Village, Dharwad Taluk. The said land was taken by the Court of wards when the petitioner was a minor due to the insanity of the father of the petitioner. The District Judge, Dharwad appointed the Deputy Commissioner as court of wards. The property was under the management of the Court of wards. Thereafter, the court discharged the management of wards.

( 2 ) THE 3rd respondent filed Form No. 7 seeking occupancy rights. In Form No. 7, he has shown one Sri. Ananth Venkatesh Deshpande, Ganapathrao V Deshpande and the petitioner as the landlord in respect of Sy. No. 24. Sri Ganapath Rao and Anath Venkatesh Deshpande are the brothers of the petitioner's grandfather Sri. Anantrao Venkatesh Deshpande had died on 30-4- 1958 Sri Ganapath Rao Venkatarao Deshpande died on 13-8-1969. Dead persons are shown as landlords. The petitioner was also impleaded as a party in the said proceedings. According to the petitioner, he was not notified and without notification, an order was passed ordering occupancy rights in favour of the contesting respondent. The petitioner states that he was unaware of the orders. The petitioner came to know of this order only when the 3rd respondent objected to the proceedings being continued in respect of the petition lands in terms of the averments made in para 5. The petitioner wants an interference on the facts of this case.

( 3 ) NOTICE was issued. The contesting respondent entered appearance. Records are made available to the Court. Sri. Ravi Shankar Shastry, Learned Counsel argues that there is violation of rules of natural justice in the case on hand. He points out that no notice was served and even otherwise the proceedings are in violation of well accepted rules of natural justice. He wants an opportunity.

( 4 ) PER contra, Sri Vivek Mehta, Learned Counsel says that factually the petitioner did receive notice and that therefore this Court should not interfere in a matter like this. He further argues that the Judgment comes in the way of the petitioner's request. He relies on the judgment of the supreme Court in 1996 (6) SCC 445.

( 5 ) AFTER hearing, I have carefully perused the material on record. The petitioner specifically has pleaded that he was served with no notice by the Tribunal. The same was disputed. In the light of the dispute, I sought for the original records and the original records are made available to the Court. From the original records, it is seen that the cover sent to the petitioner returned unserved in terms of the proceedings. Therefore, the contention of service of notice of the petitioner is totally untenable. The petitioner is deprived of an opportunity by the Tribunal in the matter of occupancy rights in the case on hand. I am satisfied that the petitioner is right in his submission with regard to no notice on the facts of this case. I have also gone through the order of the Land Tribunal. It is seen that two dead persons are made parties. Evidence was rendered by the tenant but there was no cross-examination and possibly there could be no cross- examination by a dead person and a person who has not received notice. The order to say the least in the given circumstances certainly requires interference as otherwise injustice would be starting all the time to come. In these circumstances, I deem it proper to set aside the impugned order on the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case.

( 6 ) IN so far as delay argument is concerned, I am of the view that when judicial conscious is pricking on account of irregularity and illegality of an order, the Court cannot shut its eyes and reject the petition on the ground of delay only. There is some explanation available with regard to delay. But the said explanation is not



















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