JUDGMENT :

RAVINDRA V. GHUGE, J.

1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith and heard finally by the consent of the respective parties.

2. The Petitioner has put forth prayer clauses (b), (c), (d) and (e), which read as under:

“(b) Call for the records and proceedings related to the Petitioner with Respondents.

(c) Quash and set-aside impugned orders No MH/AB/83952 dated 23/09/2021; Certificate under Section 8 of the Act; dated 05/04/2022, Notice dated 29/11/2023 of Recovery Officer.

(d) Stay to the Impugned Orders No. MH/AB/83952 dated 23/9/2021; Certificate under Section 8 of the Act, dated 05/04/2022, Notice dated 29/11/2023 of Recovery Officer.

(e) The Respondent be directed stay the Recovery proceeding initiated against the Petitioner during pendency of the Petition.”

3. The Respondent Authority conducted the inquiry of the Petitioner/factory under Section 7(A) of the Employees’ Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the 1952 Act’) for the non-payment of the PF contributions and non-submission of records, for the period from 05/2016 to 05/2019, on the basis of the Area Enforcement Officer’s interim report dated 03/05/2019. There were several complaints by the employees of the factory as regards the deductions of the employees contributions from their salaries and failure to deposit the same alongwith the Employer’s share, with the Provident Fund Department.

4. Having considered the submissions of the learned Advocates for the respective sides in the light of the pleadings in the Petition memo and the affidavit-in-reply, the issue turns upon the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Assistant Commissioner (CT) LTU, Kakinada and Others vs. Glaxo Smith Kline Consumer Health Care Limited, (2020) 19 SCC 681, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court concluded that, when extraordinary jurisdiction cannot be exercised even by the Hon’ble Supreme Court under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, the High Court cannot deal with a case under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, when the cause of action cannot be raised on account of the expiry of the limitation period.

5. In paragraph Nos. 18 to 26 of Assistant Commissioner (CT) LTU, Kakinada and Others vs. Glaxo Smith Kline Consumer Health Care Limited (supra), it has been concluded by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, as under:

“18. A priori, we have no hesitation in taking the view that what this Court cannot do in exercise of its plenary powers under Article 142 of the Constitution, it is unfathomable as to how the High Court can take a different approach in the matter in reference to Article 226 of the Constitution. The principle underlying the rejection of such argument by this Court would apply on all fours to the exercise of power by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.

19. We may now revert to the Full Bench decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Electronics Corporation of India Ltd. which had adopted the view taken by the Full Bench of the Gujarat High Court in Panoli Intermediate (India) (P) Ltd. vs. Union of India and also of the Karnataka High Court in Phoenix Plasts Co. vs. CCE. The logic applied in these decisions proceeds on fallacious premise. For, these decisions are premised on the logic that provision such as Section 31 of the 2005 Act, cannot curtail the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. This approach is faulty. It is not a matter of taking away the jurisdiction of the High Court. In a given case, the assessee may approach the High Court before the statutory period of appeal expires to challenge the assessment order by way of writ petition on the ground that the same is without jurisdiction or passed in excess of jurisdiction - by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction including in flagrant disregard of law and rules of procedure or in violation