IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
K.Vinod Chandran, C. Jayachandran, JJ.
Francis @ Cheechi Panchi S/O.Thomas – Petitioner
Versus
State Of Kerala, Represented By Public Prosecutor – Respondent
Crl.Appeal Nos.191 of 2015, 211 of 2015, 765 of 2015, 802 of 2015, 1286 of 2015, 449 of 2016, 783 of 2016, 955 of 2016, 1215 of 2016 & Crl.M.C 2437 of 2014
Decided On : 05-07-2022
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 - Section 219 (1), 218, 220, 218 (1), 219 to 223, 427 (1), (2) – Indian Penal Code, 1973 - Sections 366, A, 342, 375 and 376, (2)(g), 34 - Evidence Act, 1872 - Section114A – Protection Of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 - Minor Child - Sexual Abuse - sScene of occurrence - A minor child was subjected to repeated sexual abuse over a period of time by a group of persons who were close acquaintances – The defence is also of consent, for reason of the child being above sixteen, a permissible legal ground, as Indian Penal Code stood at that point of time - there can be no leniency shown to accused committing offences against children, especially considering the objective of that Act. The offences alleged here are prior to POCSO Act, but the depravity of offence alleged, is neither lessened by absence of a special enactment to prevent atrocities against children nor aggravated by its mere enactment. The society cannot tolerate such offences and it is this societal conscience that led to POCSO Act. The Courts cannot offer mitigation to such offenders. But we make it clear that in the case of Rajeev, the sentences shall run concurrently. (Para 12)
Finding of the court: Court cannot find allegation of kidnapping in car to have been proved - True rape occurred in house, which was in possession of accused, but that cannot necessarily prove that victim was taken there, or enticed to go there - Specific case of prosecution that she was taken to crime scene, in a particular car, in ownership of accused, has not been established - Victim could have voluntarily gone there, in which event her testimony should be to that effect, with additional evidence of her voluntary act being in wake of a threat or enticement; which is not urged – Court acquit accused of charges under S.342 and S.366A – Court confirm conviction under S.375 and uphold sentence imposed under S.376 - As far as mitigation is concerned; though in wake of Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012, Hon'ble Supreme Court has recently, in Nawabuddin v. State Of Uttarakhand (2022) held that there can be no leniency shown to accused committing offences against children, especially considering objective of that Act - Offences alleged here are prior to POCSO Act, but depravity of offence alleged, is neither lessened by absence of a special enactment to prevent atrocities against children nor aggravated by its mere enactment - Society cannot tolerate such offences and it is this societal conscience that led to POCSO Act
Result: Ordered accordingly.
JUDGMENT :
Vinod Chandran, J.
Abject failure of the prosecution is the bane of criminal judicial administration and the instant case is a classic example. A minor child was subjected to repeated sexual abuse over a period of time by a group of persons who were close acquaintances. The defence is also of consent, for reason of the child being above sixteen, a permissible legal ground, as the Indian Penal Code stood at that point of time. The Court split up the trial of the offences, looking at Section 219 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.PC), with over emphasis on the period of one year, within which three offences of the same kind could be clubbed together; without paying attention to the fact that Sections 218 to 220 speaks of the offences committed by one single person and not different accused, as also ignoring the definition of offences of the same kind as available in sub-section (2) of Section 219.
2. The accused, numbering seven, arrayed in a single final report was charged separately of some offences and others, charged together. The offences were committed by different accused, in the course of almost two years. The Final Report of the police itself split up the offences as committed prior to and later to 28.11.2006; the date divined by the police and not the victim. Prejudice was raised as a preliminary ground in one of the appeals, by A1 in the Final Report (F.R), on the ground that there should have been a joint trial of all the offences alleged in the F.R, of the single crime registered. However, no such application was filed under the proviso to Section 218 (1) Cr.P.C before the trial Court, at least with respect to the offences charged against him. The request was made in a Crl.M.C filed before this Court. It is admitted that the same was withdrawn by the petitioner and then a separate Crl.M.C was filed by the very same person joining with other five accused, which is still pending before this Court and placed before us along with these appeals; which obviously has become infructuous.
3. S.218 mandates, for every distinct offence of which any person is accused, a separate charge, tried separately; with the proviso that an accused, all the same, could make an application for joint trial which could also be permitted, if the Court opines that there would be no prejudice caused to the accused. Sub-section (2) saves the operation of Ss.219 to 223 from the rigour of S. 218(1). S.219 permits three offences of the same kind to be clubbed together, if the allegation is of those offences having been committed within the space of twelve months from the first to the last of such offences and S.220 any number of such offences, if the acts alleged constitute the same transaction; but again that committed by a single person.
4. Crime No.216/2008 of Puthenvelikara Police station led to the F.R filed by the C.I of Police, Vadakkekara, alleging commission of offences under Sections 366A and 376(2)(g) read with 34 IPC against seven accused. The incidents forming the basis of the allegations; as decipherable from the original charge sheet prepared by the trial Court, were ten in number. First, that, 'for about 11 months prior to 28.11.2006', the 1st accused Rajeev (A1) repeatedly raped the prosecutrix/victim, a girl of 16 years in the house rented out by him, when the victim went to that house to watch T.V. Secondly, it was alleged that during the same period 'a day after Onam', A2 (Sinoj) and A3 (Aji) friends and acquaintance of A1 raped the victim from the very same house. The third charge was that after 'five months of the aforesaid period, of 11 months before 28.11.2006', A4 (Lijith), friend of A1 raped the victim in the house of A1. Fourth charge was that, 'on a day after 28.11.2006', A1 kidnapped the victim in a Tempo Trax vehicle bearing Reg.No.KL-07J-3191, from the lawful guardianship of her father and took her to th
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Section 218 provides that separate trials shall be conducted for distinct offences alleged to be committed by a person. Similarly, Under Section 223, a joint trial may be held for persons charged wit....
Consent in sexual offenses remains a complex issue, impacted by victim's age, circumstances of the case, and the necessity for clarity in procedural applications regarding trial conduct.
The court established that the victim's age and circumstances negate any claim of consent, reinforcing strict liability for sexual crimes against minors under Indian law.
Point of Law : Since said finding of Sessions Judge's Court is now proved to be erroneous and since prosecution has proved the alleged guilt of the accused for all the alleged offences beyond reason....
If rape had been committed by even one, all the accused will be guilty irrespective of the fact that she had been raped by one or more of them and it is not necessary for the prosecution to adduce ev....
The reliability of victim testimony and the presumption of absence of consent in rape cases are crucial legal principles established in the judgment.
The conviction of the appellant for sexual offences under IPC and the Goa Children's Act was upheld based on consistent testimony of the victim, emphasizing the necessity of protecting child victims ....
The main legal point established in the judgment is that 'consent' in the context of rape requires voluntary participation in the act, and mere submission does not amount to consent.
Point of Law : All the factum have been discussed and dealt by the trial court in its judgment. There is no ambiguity and illegality in the judgment of the trial court.
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