Inordinate delay of 17 years in filing a writ petition can preclude relief under Article 226, emphasizing the principle that delay defeats equity.

JUDGMENT :

Sushrut Arvind Dharmadhikari, J.

Heard finally with the consent of both the parties.

2. The present writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been led challenging the Ext.P3 order dated 22.08.2023 passed by the Armed Forces Tribunal (AFT), Regional Bench, Kochi in O.A.No .236 of 2021.

3. The brief facts of the case are that the petitioner was an Ex Sepoy with No .2591079 N, who was recruited in the Army on 13.06.1986. He was declared as a deserter on 29.10.1993 and disciplinary proceedings were initiated against him. He was dismissed from service on 20.04.2004 for his absence from service. Being aggrieved, the wife of the petitioner had made a correspondence praying for grant of disability pension which was rejected by the respondents.

4. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that though the petitioner was in a low medical category, the Medical Board was not convinced because he had been declared a deserter. The learned counsel for the petitioner further stated that no procedure was adopted as per Rule 17 of the ARMY RULES , therefore, the dismissal of the petitioner was vitiated by procedural irregularities. In such circumstances, the petitioner had prayed for reinstatement in service at least provisionally subject to the outcome of the Medical Board. The petitioner had rendered 7 years 4 months and 17 days of qualifying service. Subsequently, he was dismissed from service with e ect from 20.04.2004, as he had been a deserter for more than 10 years. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the dismissal of the petitioner was e ected without following the due procedure of law and therefore, prayed that the writ petition be allowed and the petitioner be reinstated in service.

5. Per contra the learned Central Government Counsel appearing for the respondents vehemently opposed the afore prayer and submitted that the learned Tribunal ought not to have gone into the merits of the case, since the petitioner was dismissed from service on 20.04.2004. Thereafter he did not choose to le a representation or approach the learned Tribunal for the last 17 years. The wife of the petitioner had preferred a representation which was dismissed. Thereafter the petitioner approached the Tribunal in the year 2021 by ling the Original Application. On perusal of the Original Application, no reasons have been shown for the inordinate delay of 17 years in approaching the Tribunal. The learned Tribunal apart from considering the merits of the case, dismissed the Original Application on the ground of inordinate delay of 17 years. The Hon’ble Apex Court has clearly held that preferring representation after a long gap of time and that having been considered by the authorities, would not bring the case within limitation. Therefore, no interference is called for in the order passed by the learned Tribunal. He, therefore, prayed that this writ petition be dismissed.

6. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the records.

7. In the present case, the petitioner had approached the learned Tribunal after a period of 17 years for which no plausible explanation has been put forth for such a huge delay. Therefore, the Original Application as well as this writ petition su ers from inordinate delay and laches. The learned Tribunal has rightly dismissed the Original Application on the ground of delay.

8. We would not like to dwell upon the merits of the case as done by the learned Tribunal; however, we would like to deal with the preliminary objections with regard to delay and laches. The crux of the matter is that the service of the petitioner was terminated in the year 2004 and the petitioner had approached the Tribunal after 17 years as well as this Court after 20 long years. It is well established principle of law that delay de