IMPORTANT POINT
The court emphasized that sufficient cause must be shown for condoning delay in filing appeals, with negligence and inaction being critical factors.

JUDGMENT :

Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.

1. The instant intra-court appeal, under clause 10 of the Letters Patent, is directed against the order/judgment dated 13.12.2022 passed by learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P. (S) No. 4918 of 2017 by which the writ petition has been dismissed.

I.A. No. 7710 of 2023

2. The instant appeal is admittedly barred by limitation since there is delay of 219 days in preferring the appeal, therefore, an application being I.A. No. 7710 of 2023 has been filed for condoning such delay.

3. This Court, after taking into consideration the fact that the instant intra-court appeal has been field after inordinate delay of 219 days, deems it fit and proper, to first consider the delay condonation application before going into the legality and propriety of the impugned order on merit.

4. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that delay in preferring the appeal may be condoned by allowing the instant Interlocutory Application on the basis of grounds shown therein treating the same to be sufficient.

5. The grounds for condoning the delay in preferring the appeal, as has been mentioned in the interlocutory application is that the appellant-writ petitioner was having no knowledge about the disposal of the case and when he has tried to ascertain the position of the case, it has come to his knowledge that his case has already been dismissed on 13.12.2022.

6. Thereafter, immediately on 27.07.2023, the appellant has applied for certified copy of the order dated 13.12.2022 and the learned counsel for the writ petitioner in W.P.(S) No.4918 of 2017 has not informed the petitioner about the dismissal of the case due to which delay of 219 days has occurred in fling the instant appeal.

7. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant on delay condonation application and before considering the same, this Court, deems it fit and proper to refer certain legal proposition as has been propounded by the Hon’ble Apex Court with respect to the approach of the Court in condoning the inordinate delay.

8. There is no dispute about the fact that generally the lis is not to be rejected on the technical ground of limitation but certainly if the filing of appeal suffers from inordinate delay, then the duty of the Court to consider the application to condone the delay before entering into the merit of the lis.

9. It requires to refer herein that the Law of limitation is enshrined in the legal maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties, rather the idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time, as has been held in the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Brijesh Kumar & Ors. Vrs. State of Haryana & Ors., (2014) 11 SCC 351.

10. The Privy Council in General Accident Fire and Life Assurance Corpn. Ltd. v. Janmahomed Abdul Rahim, (1939-40) 67 IA 416, relied upon the writings of Mr. Mitra in Tagore Law Lecturers, 1932, wherein, it has been said that:

“A Law of limitation and prescription may appear to operate harshly and unjustly in a particular case, but if the law provides for a limitation, it is to be enforced even at the risk of hardship to a particular party as the Judge cannot, on equitable grounds, enlarge the time allowed by the law, postpone its operation, or introduce exceptions not recognized by law.”

11. In P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala, (1997) 7 SCC 556, the Apex Court while considering a case of condonation of delay of 565 days, wherein no explanation much less a reasonable or satisfactory explanation for condonation of delay had been given, held at paragraph-6 as under:

“6. Law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes and the courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds.”

12. While considering the similar i