The main legal point established in the judgment is the distinction between heinous and serious offences and those of a predominantly civil character in determining whether to accept a compromise and quash criminal proceedings.

JUDGMENT

Anoop Chitkara, J. - The petitioners, arraigned as accused in the above captioned FIR, have come up before this Court under Section 482 CrPC for quashing of the FIR and all consequential proceedings based on a compromise with the aggrieved person.

2. During the pendency of the petition, the accused and the aggrieved person have compromised the matter, and its copy is annexed with this petition as Annexure P-3.

3. After that, the petitioners came up before this Court to quash the FIR, and in the quashing petition, the aggrieved person has been impleaded as respondent.

4. On 15-07-2022, the aggrieved person Nikhil Tyagi (R-2) appeared before the JMIC Karnal and stated that there would be no objection if the court quashes this FIR and consequent proceedings. As per the concerned court's report dated 15-07-2022, the parties consented to the quashing of FIR and consequent proceedings without any threat or coercion.

ANALYSIS & REASONING:

5. The State's counsel has severely opposed this compromise and seeks dismissal of the petition because of the heinous nature of the offence.

6. In the present case, the offence under section 307 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) is not compoundable under Section 320 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC). The parties have not mentioned any reason which led to settlement of dispute, how were their relations on the date of affidavit and statement, what social objective would be achieved by disrupting the motion of criminal prosecution. Thus, based on the nature of compromise papers and the contents of statement of the victim, where he stated that he would have no objection if the FIR is quashed, is not sufficient to accept the compromise.

7. A perusal of the reasons for settlement as mentioned in the compromise deed, Annexure P-3, is also formal, and no reasons for carving out an exception is made out for disruption of the criminal trial in a serious matter involving 307 IPC.

8. In Mahesh Chand v State of Rajasthan, 1990 SCC 781, Hon'ble Supreme Court holds as under:

[2]. The accused were acquitted by the trial court, but they were convicted by the High Court for the offence under section 307 Indian Penal Code This offence is not compoundable under law. The parties, however. want to treat it a special case, in view of the peculiar circumstances of the case. It is said and indeed not disputed that one of the accused is a lawyer practising in the lower court. There was a counter case arising out of the same transaction. It is said that this case has already been compromised. The decision of this Court in Suresh Babu v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 1987(2) JT 361, has been also referred to in support of the plea for permission to compound the offence.

9. In Dimpey Gujraj v Union Territory, (2013) 11 SCC 497, Supreme Court holds,

[5]. In light of the above observations of this court in Gian Singh v. State of Punjab and another, 2012(4) R.C.R.(Criminal) 543 : 2012(4) Recent Apex Judgments (R.A.J.) 549 : 2012(5) CTC 526 (SC) we feel that this is a case where the continuation of criminal proceedings would tantamount to abuse of process of law because the alleged offences are not heinous offences showing extreme depravity nor are they against the society. They are offences of a personal nature and burying them would bring about peace and amity between the two sides. In the circumstances of the case, FIR No. 163 dated 26/10/2006 registered under Section 147, 148, 149, 323, 307, 452 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code at Police Station Sector 3, Chandigarh and all consequential proceedings arising therefrom including the final report presented under Section 173 of the Code and charges framed by the trial court are hereby quashed.

10. In Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab, 2014 (6) SCC 4