ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
O. H. Mootham, C. J. , N. U. Beg and S. S. Dhavan, JJ.
RAM SARUP - Appellant
Versus
SHIKHAR CHAND - Respondents
Special Appeal 212 Of 1956
Decided On : 09/13/1960
( 1 ) I had the advantage of reading the judgment prepared by Beg, J. but regret that I am unable to agree with the conclusion at which he has arrived,
( 2 ) THE essential facts are not in dispute. The District Magistrate refused to grant permission to the appellants to file a suit for the ejectment or the respondents from the premises occupied by them as tenants of the appellants. This order was made under Sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the u. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act as it stood prior to its amendment by U. P. Act No. XVII of 1954. The appellants then applied to the Commissioner under Sub-section (2) of that section to revise the order. The Commissioner by an order dated the 28th December, 1953, allowed the application, set aside the order of the District" Magistrate and granted the requisite permission. The validity of the Commissioners order is questioned on the ground that as the commissioner did not find that the District Magistrate had acted illegally or with material irregularity he had no jurisdiction to set aside the latters order.
( 3 ) THE powers of the Commissioner in revision are to be found in Sub-section (3 ). This sub-section says that the. Commissioner may confirm or set aside the order of the District magistrate if he is satisfied (a) that the District Magistrate has acted illegally or (b) that the district Magistrate has wrongly refused to act. In my opinion there can be no reasonable doubt (if I may say so with all respect) that the District Magistrate in the present case has acted. He had made a specific order, and it was that order which was the subject of the application in revision. I think therefore that the Commissioner could set aside that order only if he was satisfied that the district Magistrate had in making it acted illegally or with material irregularity.
( 4 ) I find great difficulty in construing the words "wrongly refused to act" as meaning, or including, the making of an order refusing to grant a landlord permission to file a suit. If that construction be given to these words then the result will be that whereas an order of a District magistrate granting permission to file a suit can be revised only if in the opinion of the commissioner the District Magistrate has acted illegally or with material irregularity, an order refusing permission can be set aside notwithstanding the fact that the District Magistrate has acted neither illegally nor with material irregularity. I can see no sufficient reason for thinking that this was the intention of the legislature.
( 5 ) THE plain meaning of the words refused to act is that the District Magistrate has refused to take any action on an application presented to him under Sub-section (1); and it may well be that the legislature introduced the words "or has wrongly refused to act" in Sub-section (3) for the purpose of providing the aggrieved party with a remedy to such a case. If that however was its intention the legislature has, in my opinion, failed to give effect: to it. The Commissioner can exercise his powers of revision under Sub-section (3) only when an application is presented to him under Sub-section (2); and an application can be made under that sub-section only when the District Magistrate had made an order granting or refusing to grant permission to file a suit. There is no provision for an application being made to the commissioner against the refusal to act; if the District Magistrate refuses to act the remedy is by way of a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. A District Magistrate acts just as much when he makes an order refusing permission to sue as when he makes an order granting permission. If therefore the words wrongly refused to act are construed as meaning wrongly refused to grant permission they are redundant, for that situation is covered by earlier part of the sub-section: on the other hand if the words are given their plain meaning they serve no purpose for the commissioner in s
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