JUDGMENT :

[Rajesh Bindal, CJ.]

1. In the present petition, the issue sought to be raised by the petitioner is that he is entitled to receive the compensation on account of acquisition of land by the State for use by National Highways Authority of India. In support of his claim, he has referred to a compromise decree passed in Original Suit No. 844 of 1968 (Narendra Prakash v. Prakash Chand), whereby the title of the property was conferred upon the petitioner.

2. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent No. 5 submitted that subsequent thereto, petitioner filed a suit, being Original Suit No. 658 of 1992 (Prakash Chand @ Prakashi v. State of U.P. and others) for declaration claiming himself to be the owner of the property. The same was dismissed by Trial Court on August 14, 1995. The appeal filed by the petitioner, being Civil Appeal No. 207 of 1995, was dismissed on April 17, 1996, where against Second Appeal No. 654 of 2004 is pending before this Court.

3. The aforesaid facts have been concealed by the petitioner in the present petition.

4. As there is material concealment of facts in the present petition, the same deserves to be dismissed.

5. As to how a litigant who conceals material facts from the Court, has to be dealt with, has been gone through by Hon'ble the Supreme Court time and again and the consistent opinion is that he is not entitled even to be heard on merits.

6. In Abhyudya Sanstha v. Union of India, (2011) 6 SCC 145, Hon'ble the Supreme Court, while declining relief to the petitioners therein, who did not approach the Court with clean hands, opined as under:

''18. ... In our view, the appellants deserve to be non suited because they have not approached the Court with clean hands. The plea of inadvertent mistake put forward by the learned senior counsel for the appellants and their submission that the Court may take lenient view and order regularisation of the admissions already made sounds attractive but does not merit acceptance. Each of the appellants consciously made a statement that it had been granted recognition by the NCTE, which necessarily implies that recognition was granted in terms of Section 14 of the Act read with Regulations 7 and 8 of the 2007 Regulations. Those managing the affairs of the appellants do not belong to the category of innocent, illiterate/uneducated persons, who are not conversant with the relevant statutory provisions and the Court process. The very fact that each of the appellants had submitted application in terms of Regulation 7 and made itself available for inspection by the team constituted by WRC, Bhopal shows that they were fully aware of the fact that they can get recognition only after fulfilling the conditions specified in the Act and the Regulations and that WRC, Bhopal had not granted recognition to them. Notwithstanding this, they made bold statement that they had been granted recognition by the competent authority and thereby succeeded in persuading this Court to entertain the special leave petitions and pass interim orders. The minimum, which can be said about the appellants is that they have not approached the Court with clean hands and succeeded in polluting the stream of justice by making patently false statement. Therefore, they are not entitled to relief under Article 136 of the Constitution. This view finds support from plethora of precedents.

19. In Hari Narain v. Badri Das, AIR 1963 SC 1558, G. Narayanaswamy Reddy v. Government of Karnataka, (1991) 3 SCC 261 and large number of other cases, this Court denied relief to the petitioner/appellant on the ground that he had not approached the Court with clean hands. In Hari Narain v. Badri Das (supra), the Court revoked the leave granted to the appellant and observed:

''It is of utmost importance that in making material statements and setting forth grounds in applications for special leave made under Article 136 of the Constitution, care must be taken not to make any statements which are inaccurate,