JUDGMENT

Sanjeev Narula, J. - Aggrieved with the levy of ''property tax'' on structures erected for the affixing of hoardings thereon (which are used for display of advertisements), the Petitioners, by way of the present petitions, impugn the power of the South Delhi Municipal Corporation (''SDMC'') to impose the tax, by contending inter-alia that Bye-Laws 9(m) and 14 of Delhi Municipal Corporation (Property Taxes) Bye-Laws, 2004 (''2004 Bye-Laws''), whereby the levy has been imposed, are ultra vires the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 (''DMC Act''). They also seek consequential relief in the nature of writ of mandamus for quashing of notices and the demands raised by the Respondent under the impugned 2004 Bye-Laws. Since the grounds of challenge and nature of reliefs sought in both the petitions are identical, and common questions of law arise therein, we proceeded to hear both the petitions together, and the same are now being decided by way of this common judgment.

Foreword explaining the conundrum & the scope of challenge

2. Petitioner''S quandary arose with the Respondent, exercising its power conferred under Section 481 of the DMC Act, framed the 2004 Bye-Laws whereby it has levied building tax on the structures and ''hoardings'' used for display of advertisements. The Petitioners attack the levy on several grounds that can be broadly summarized as follows:

(a) Impugned Bye-Laws are in violation of Article 265 of the Constitution of India. It is argued that the parent statute, i.e. the DMC Act nowhere provides for impost of property tax on ''hoardings''.

(b) To buttress this point, Petitioners rely upon the definition of the word ''building'' as found in the Act and are quick to point out that the same does not include ''hoardings''. Then, relying upon the principle of casus omissus, it is argued that the legislature never intended to include ''hoardings'' in the definition of ''building'';

(c) Hoardings are moveable structures and cannot be accommodated in the definition of ''building'';

(d) Relying upon the principle of noscitur a sociis, it is contended that the words ''any other structure'', found in the definition of ''building'' should be interpreted in accordance with the words surrounding it and would include only those structures which have a roof, or at least constructed with a motive to a lay roof over them in future, and, those which are capable of holding a roof; Section 116E(1) of the Act provides for determination of the annual value of the covered space of a building for levy of building tax. The explanation to the said provision defines ''covered space'' in relation to a building, and does not include ''hoardings''. Bye-Law 14 provides that in addition to the covered space specified in the explanation to section 116E(1), the covered space in relation to a building shall include "hoardings erected on the surface, or top, or any other open space of a building". Petitioners argue that on a conjoint reading of the aforesaid provisions, that Respondents have no jurisdiction or authority under law to impose property tax on ''hoardings'' as there is no such authority vested in them under the DMC Act. Property tax in the form of building tax is leviable on the covered area of the building, and that Respondents, by virtue of Bye-Law 14, cannot widen the scope of section 116E(1) to bring ''hoardings'' within its ambit by broadening the scope of the explanation to section 116E(1);

(e) The DMC Act provides for a clear, detailed and separate scheme for charging advertisement tax on the advertisements being displayed on or upon land or buildings under