2004 Supreme(Raj) 460
Rajasthan High Court, Jaipur Bench
Honble ANIL DEV SINGH, CJ. & S.K. KESHOTE, J.
Ram Chandra Kasliwal - Appellant
Versus
State of Rajasthan & Others - Respondents
D.B. Civil Special Appeal (Writ) No. 576 of 2003
Decided On : May 07, 2004
Bajrang Lal Sharma, Senior Advocate, with S. Kasliwal, A. Kasliwal, Krishna Verma, Babulal Sharma, Suruchi Kasliwal, Ram Naresh Vijay and Vaibhav Kasliwal, for Appellants in SAW No. 576/2003 (D) Manish Bhandari, for Appellant in SAW No. 689/2003(D) Mohd.
Headnote:Land Acquisition Act, 1894, Sec. 4; Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 1959, Sec. 82 and Jaipur Development Authority Act, Sec. 45 – Acquisition of land for widening of the road – Condition of seeking permission from Municipal Corporation for widening of Road – Held – The acquisition for the public purpose of widening of the road is different from approval for actual widening of the road – It is not necessary to seek permission from Jaipur Municipal Corporation for widening of the road outside the walled city – Acquisition is valid if it is for public purposes. (Para 69)
No fault can be found with the issuance of the Notification under Section 4 of the land Acquisition Act by the State Government for the purpose of widening of the road. The acquisition for the public purpose of widening of the road is different from seeking approval for actual widening of the road. Acquisition can precede actual grant of permission to widen the road. Just because there may not be actual permission by the Jaipur Municipal Corporation to widen the road, is no ground to hold the Notification under Section 4 of the LA Act to be invalid. Having said that, we hasten to add that it is not necessary at all to seek permission from the Jaipur Municipal Corporation for widening of the road outside the walled city. Acquisition is valid if it is for public purpose. The State is empowered to acquire any land for public purpose and keep the same in reserve for execution of that public purpose or for any other public purpose, in case exigencies of a situation require. The State can even freeze the land by acquiring it, so that it is available to it for further use for a public purpose. They plenary power of the State under Section 4 of the LA Act cannot be controlled either by Section 82 of the RM Act or Section 45 of the JDA Act which provisions deal with acquisition of property. Thus, we do not find any force in the submission of the learned counsel for the appellants that Notification under Section 4 of the LA Act for widening the road/street can be issued only at the instance and request of the Jaipur Municipal Corporation. The plea is accordingly rejected. (Para 69)
(2). The brief facts leading to the filing of these two appeals are as follows:
On July 10, 2002, twenty feet wide strip of land on either side of Bhawani Singh Road between Indira Circle and Ram Bagh Circle for the purposes of widening the road was notified by the State under Section 4 of the LA Act. The Notification was published in the Official Gazette. It was also published on July 27, 2002 in two daily newspapers, having circulation in the locality. Besides, on August 29, 2002, the District Collector, Jaipur caused public notice of the substance of the Notification in the locality Pursuant to the Notification under Section 4 of the LA Act, persons interested in the land including the appellant submitted their objections to the Land Acquisition Officer (Collector) on August 21, 2002. By a notice dated September 16, 2002 (Annexure-6 to the writ petition), the Land Acquisition Officer (Collector) invited persons interested in the land to produce oral or documentary evidence in support of their objections. For those persons interested in the land, who had not availed of the earlier opportunity to file objections, the notice invited them to file objections to the acquisition under Section 4 of the LA Act by October 16, 2002. While inquiry under Section 5-A of the LA Act was pending, a Notification under Section 17(4) of the LA Act was issued on November 02, 2002 (Annexure-8 to the writ petition) dispensing with the provision of Section 5-A of the LA Act in view of the urgency for the acquisition of the land. Thereafter on November 03, 2002, the Land Acquisition Officer (Collector) issued a notice under Section 9 of the LA Act whereby the Government expressed its intention to take possession of the land and required the persons having interest therein to prefer their claims for compensation. The appellants being aggrieved by the issuance of the notifications under Section-4 and Section 17(4) of the LA Act in respect of the land in question, challenged the acquisition proceedings on various grounds. The learned Single Judge by his judgment & order dated January 10, 2003, partially allowed the writ petition and quashed the Notification dated November 02, 2002 (Annexure-8 to the writ petition), issued under Section 17(4) of the LA Act. At the same time, the learned Single Judge rejected the challenge to the notification dated July 10, 2002 of the State Government issued under Section 4 of the LA Act and gave liberty to the State to continue the inquiry under Section 5-A of the LA Act was inter alia based on the contention that the land acquisition proceedings were initiated by the Appropriate Government at the instance of the Jaipur Development Authority (for short ``JDA), which was not competent to deal with the public street/road and it was the Jaipur Municipal Corporation (for short ``Municipal Corporation), which was empowered under Article 243 W of the Constitution of India, read with Section 82 of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 1959 (hereinafter to be referred as ``the RM Act) to initiate proceedings for acquisition of land for construction of roads within the municipal areas. Since the Municipal Corporation had not felt the necessity to widen the road in question and had not requested the State to acquire the land, the initiation of proceedings for acquisition of the land were illegal. Another challenge, which was mounted by the appellants on the allegation that no survey was undertaken by the state with regard to the question of necessity for widening of the road, was rejected by the learned Single Judge. Since the acquisition proceedings as a whole were not qua