IMPORTANT POINT
The judgment emphasizes the requirement of sufficient cause for condoning delay, as per Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, and established legal principles from relevant judgments.

JUDGMENT :

Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.

Notices have been issued upon respondent nos. 5 and 6, which has been received by the Clerk of the institution concerned but they have chosen not to appear.

2. This Court considering the notice to be validly served and as such with the consent of learned counsel for the parties, the matter is being heard on the delay condonation application first before entering into the merit of the issue.

3. The instant intra-court appeal, under clause 10 of the Letters Patent, is directed against the order/judgment dated 24.08.2018 passed by learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P. (S) No. 3005 of 2010 whereby and whereunder the writ petition has been dismissed by declining to pass positive direction for regularization of services of the petitioner in the scale of Assistant Teacher w.e.f. 01.05.1993 and refused to quash order dated 29.03.2009 passed by Director, Secondary Education rejecting the representation of the petitioner for regularization of his service.

I.A. No. 1321 of 2020

4. The instant appeal is admittedly barred by limitation since there is delay of 586 days in preferring the appeal, therefore, an application being I.A. No. 1321 of 2020 has been filed for condoning such delay.

3. This Court, after taking into consideration the fact that the instant intra-court appeal has been field after inordinate delay of 586 days, deems it fit and proper, to first consider the delay condonation application before going into the legality and propriety of the impugned order on merit

4. Learned counsel for the applicant-petitioner has submitted that delay in preferring the appeal may be condoned by allowing the Interlocutory Application on the basis of grounds shown in the Interlocutory Application treating the same to be sufficient.

5. The learned counsel for the appellant-petitioner has submitted that impugned order although was passed on 24.08.2018 but due to conviction of the learned counsel representing the writ petitioner, he was not in a position to know about the fate of his case, as would appear from such statement made at paragraph 4 and 8 of the Interlocutory Application. It has further been stated that the arguing counsel was released on provisional bail on 24.01.2020 and handed over the file to appellant on 25.01.2020 and thereafter the memo of appeal was filed.

6. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant on delay condonation application and before considering the same, this Court, deems it fit and proper to refer certain legal proposition as has been propounded by the Hon’ble Apex Court with respect to the approach of the Court in condoning the inordinate delay.

7. There is no dispute about the fact that generally the lis is not to be rejected on the technical ground of limitation but certainly if the filing of appeal suffers from inordinate delay, then the duty of the Court to consider the application to condone the delay before entering into the merit of the lis.

8. It requires to refer herein that the Law of limitation is enshrined in the legal maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties, rather the idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time, as has been held in the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Brijesh Kumar & Ors. Vrs. State of Haryana & Ors., (2014) 11 SCC 351.

The Privy Council in General Accident Fire and Life Assurance Corpn. Ltd. v. Janmahomed Abdul Rahim, (1939-40) 67 IA 416, relied upon the writings of Mr. Mitra in Tagore Law Lecturers, 1932, wherein, it has been said that:

“A Law of limitation and prescription may appear to operate harshly and unjustly in a particular case, but if the law provides for a limitation, it is to be enforced even at the risk of hardship to a particular party as the Judge cannot, on equitable grounds, enlarge the time allowed by the law, postpone its o