JUDGMENT

Manjari Nehru Kaul, J.

The petitioner-accused (hereinafter referred to as 'accused') has invoked the inherent jurisdiction of this Court under section 482 of the Cr.P.C., 1973 for quashing of Complaint No.COMA/1126/2022 dated 11.04.2022 titled as 'Surindra Milk Chilling Centre v. Rana Milk Food' under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (for short, 'the NI Act'), pending in the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Bathinda along with all consequential proceedings arising therefrom, including the summoning order dated 11.04.2022.

2. The brief facts of the complainant company may be noticed as thus.

The respondent-complainant company (hereinafter referred to as 'complainant') was engaged in the manufacture of desi ghee and other milk products at its own manufacturing units. The accused placed an order with the complainant for desi ghee, which was then supplied to her. In order to discharge its legal liability towards the purchase of desi ghee, the accused issued cheques bearing No.645368 dated 30.12.2021, No.645369 dated 30.01.2022 and No.645370 dated 28.02.2022 in the sum of Rs.8 lakhs, Rs.9 lakhs and Rs.9 lakhs respectively drawn on Punjab National Bank, Branch Khanna in favour of the complainant as part payment of dues. On presentation of the cheques, they were returned with remarks "payment stopped vide memo dated 02.03.2022 by the banker of the accused to the banker of complainant". Resultantly, the complaint in question was filed, which led to the summoning of the accused vide impugned order dated 11.04.2022 passed by learned Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Bathinda.

3. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has submitted that the petitioner was simply a non-executive director in Rana Milk Food Private Limited (hereinafter referred to as 'the company'). The cheques in question had not been issued by the petitioner but by her husband, Prem Singh Rana, who was also the Managing Director of the company. Learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that every person associated with the company could not automatically be held liable as the liability under section 141 of the NI Act would arise only if the accused was shown to be in overall control of the day to day affairs and business of the company. While drawing the attention of this Court to the complaint in question (Annexure P-1), learned counsel has further vehemently argued that totally vague and false allegations have been levelled against the petitioner, only because she happened to be the wife of Prem Singh Rana, who had allegedly issued the cheques in question. Learned counsel has further invited the attention of this Court to Form No.DIR12 (Annexure P-4) wherein it stands reflected that the petitioner is a non-executive director of the company. Learned counsel has thus vehemently contended that since the petitioner was just a non-executive director of the company, hence evidently she was neither at the helm of affairs of the company nor was responsible for issuance of the cheques in question. Therefore, the complaint in question was liable to be quashed moreso, when it was a matter of record that the petitioner had not even signed any of the cheques, in question, which were the subject matter of the complaint in question. In support, he has placed reliance upon Pooja Ravinder Devidasani v. State of Maharashtra and another : (2014) 16 SCC 1; National Small Industries Corporation Limited v. Harmeet Singh Paintal and another : (2010) 3 SCC 330; Sabitha Ramamurthy and another v. R.B.S. Channabasavaradhya : (2006) SCC 581; Sunita Palta and others v. M/s Kit Marketing Pvt. Ltd. : 2020(2) RCR (Criminal) 36