IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
Sanjay Dwivedi, J.
Madhur Baghrecha – Appellant
Versus
State of Madhya Pradesh – Respondent
MCRC No. 11456/2020
Decided On : 14-01-2022
| Table of Content |
|---|
| 1. factual background of the petition and fir. (Para 1 , 2) |
| 2. arguments about the consensual nature of the relationship. (Para 4 , 5 , 6 , 8 , 9) |
| 3. examination of consent in the context of sexual relations. (Para 11 , 12 , 20) |
| 4. ratio decidendi regarding the definition of rape and consent. (Para 13 , 22 , 24) |
| 5. conclusion on quashing the fir. (Para 16 , 17) |
JUDGMENT
1. This petition has been filed by the petitioner under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing the FIR No. 62/2020 registered at Police Station Waraseoni, District Balaghat on 05.02.2020 for the offences punishable under Sections 376 and 506 of the INDIAN PENAL CODE and Section 3(2)(v) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989.
2. As per the case of the prosecution, a written complaint was made in the police station by the prosecutrix alleging therein that she knows the petitioner since a long time as she used to visit his shop to purchase clothes. She has stated in the complaint that frequent visit to the shop of the petitioner developed intimacy and attracted her towards the petitioner and she fell in love with the petitioner and as such they were in relation. It is alleged by the prosecutrix that the petitioner had given assurance of marriage and developed physical relation with her. As per the prosecutrix, the petitioner used to visit her house very often and they were in physical relation since long. It is alleged that as a consequence of physical relation, the prosecutrix conceived and got pregnant on 22.11.2019. After knowing about the fact of pregnancy of the prosecutrix, the petitioner advised her to abort the child and refused to marry saying that there was caste difference between them, as she belonged to lower caste and he belonged to Jain community, which is a higher caste and, therefore, it was impossible for him to get married with her. Consequently, the impugned FIR has been lodged and offence has been registered by the police against the petitioner.
3. From perusal of the record, it is clear that after filing the present petition, some development took place and owing to which the prosecutrix has filed an affidavit before this Court stating that now her marriage has been settled with some other boy and, therefore, she does not want to prosecute the matter any further, because, if ultimately the case continues, there is every possibility that her new married life would be disorganized.
4. Learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner has carried this Court to the fact that this petition for quashing the FIR is not on the point that the matter has been compromised between the parties, but is on the point that if overall circumstances of the case and the contents of FIR are gathered, the offence under Section 376 of IPC is not made out against the petitioner because the physical relation developed between the parties was nothing but a consensual sexual relation between the major persons and as such offence under Section 376 of IPC is not made out.
5. Learned counsel for the respondent-State has opposed the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner and relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 2019 SC 1296-State of Madhya Pradesh v. Laxmi Narayan and others in which the Supreme Court has observed that merely because the matter has been settled between the parties and compromise has taken place, the same is not enough for quashing the proceedings under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. She has also placed reliance on a judgment of Delhi High Court rendered in the case of Pawan Gaur vs. State (NCT of Delhi) decided on 26th March, 2021 and submitted that in the said case the Delhi High Court has dismissed the petition filed under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. taking into consideration the observations made by the Supreme Court in the case of Laxmi Narayan and others (supra) and several other cases. She has further submitted that the
Anurag Soni vs. State of Chhattisgarh
Arjan Ram Naurata Ram vs. State AIR 1960 P&H 303 : 1960 CrLJ 849
Deepak Gulati vs. State of Haryana
Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar vs. State of Maharashtra
Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar vs. State of Maharashtra
Dr. Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar vs. State of Maharashtra and others
H.P. vs. Mango Ram (2000) 7 SCC 224 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 1331
Hari Majhi vs. State 1990 CrLJ 650 (Cal)
Kaini Rajan vs. State of Kerala
Mir Wali Mohd. vs. State of Bihar (1990 BBCJ 530)
Pramod Suryabhan Pawar vs. State of Maharashtra
Pramod Suryabhan Pawar vs. State of Maharashtra and another
The distinction between consensual relations and rape lies in the perception and intention behind consent; the breach of a promise to marry does not equate to misconception if the relationship is con....
Consent obtained under a misconception of fact does not constitute valid consent under Section 90 IPC; a consensual relationship does not amount to rape.
Consent obtained under a false promise of marriage is vitiated and does not constitute valid consent under Section 90 of IPC.
The distinction between a false promise to marry and a mere breach of promise, and the need for active and reasoned deliberation towards the proposed act to establish whether the consent was vitiated....
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