1999 Supreme(SC) 793

1999(6) Supreme 425
Supreme Court of India
(Under Article 32 of the Constitution)
S. Saghir Ahmad, K. Venkataswami & S. Rajendra Babu, JJ.
Common Cause, A Registered Society —Petitioner
versus
Union of India & Ors. —Respondents
Review Petition (C) No. 98 of 1997
In
Writ Petition (C) No. 26 of 1995
Decided on 3-8-1999
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appearing Parties : K. Parasaran, (Gopal Subramnium) Sr. Advocate (A.C), P.P. Rao, S.B. Sanyal, S.C. Maheshwari, Sr. Advocates, K.C. Kaushik, P.R. Tiwari, Arun Bharadwaj, R. Reghunath, Ms. Bina Madhuvan, Ms. Ruchi Khurana, Ms. Indu Verma, P.H. Parekh, Navin Pra­kash, M.P. Shorawala, Ms. Anil Katiyar, (H.D. Shourie) Advocate (RR-in-person) (NP), Anupam Gupta, Ashok K. Mahajan, Ms. Sandhya Goswami, B.S. Chahar (Ashok Mathur) for State of H.P., Ms. Beena Prakash, G. Prakash, (Sunil Kumar Jain, Vijay Hansaria, J.K. Bhatia,) for M/s. Jain Hansaria & Co. S. Goswami, J.B. Singh, P.K. Chakravarti, Advocates.

Very Important Points
1. An order issued by a Minister of Government in the name of the President of India would remain as an order of the Minister and the immunity available to the President under Article 361 of the Constitution cannot be extended to the orders passed in the name of the President under Article 77(1) or Article 77(2) of the Constitution.
2. Mere fact that an act of Minister was not taken up and debated and scrutinised on the floor of the House of Parliament would not render the same immune from judicial scrutiny by the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution.
3. In jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 32 of the Constitution of India the Courts have power to award compensation.
4. Where public functionaries are involved and matter relates to the violation of Fundamental Rights or the enforcement of public duties etc., the remedy would lie, at the option of the petitioner, under the public law notwithstanding that damages are also claimed in those proceedings.
5. For torts officers of the Govt. would also be liable in damages for their wrongful acts provided the act does not fall within the purview of “act of the State.
6. In case of torts committed by public servant unless there is an identi­fiable plaintiff, there cannot be any order for compensation or damages to redress the loss caused to that plaintiff.
7. In awarding punitive or exemplary dam­ages, the emphasis is not on the plaintiff and the injury caused to him, but on the defendant and his conduct.
8. In an action for tort where the plaintiff is found entitled to damages, the matter should not be stretched too far to punish the defendant by awarding exemplary damages except when their con­duct, specially those of the Govt. and its officers, is found to be oppressive, obnoxious and arbitrary and is, sometimes, coupled with malice.
9. Where action is taken on basis of torts of misfeasance in public office, if the power has been exercised bona fide and honestly, there cannot be any occasion for exemplary damages being awarded notwith­standing that unintended injury was caused to someone.
10. The State itself cannot claim the right of being compensated in damages against its officers on the ground that they had contravened or violated the fundamental rights of a citizen. The State cannot legally claim that since one of its Ministers or Officers had violated the funda­mental rights of a citizen or had acted arbitrarily, it should be compensated by awarding exemplary damages against that officer or Minister.
11. Doctrine of Public Trust cannot be invoked in fixing the criminal liability under Sections 405 and 409 of IPC and the criminal liability has to be strictly construed and offence can be said to have been committed only when all the ingredients of that offence as defined in the Statute are found to have been satisfied.
12. A trust contemplated by Section 405 would arise only when there is an entrustment of property or dominion over property. There has, therefore, to be a property belonging to someone which is entrusted to the person accused of the offence under Section 405.
13. The word “property”, used in Section 409, IPC means the property which can be entrusted or over which dominion may be exercised.
14. Mere exercise of “power to allot”, it is rightly contended, cannot, be treated as “property”, within the meaning of Section 405, capable of being mis-utilised or mis-appropriated.
15. Direction for investigation can be given only if an offence is, prima facie, found to have been committed or a person’s involvement is prima facie established, but a direction to the C.B.I. to investigate whether any person has committed an offence or not cannot be legally given. Such a direction would be contrary to the concept and philosophy of “LIFE” and “LIBERTY” guaranteed to a person under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.

Headnote:(i) Constitution of India—Article 77 read with Article 32—Order issued by Minister in name of President remains order of Minister—Order carries with it no immunity—Immunity available to President under Article 361 cannot be extended to orders passed in name of President under Article 77(1) or 77(2)—Such an order is amenable to judicial review.

       Held : Though an order is issued in the name of the President, it does not become an order of the President passed by him personally, but remains, basical­ly and essentially, the order of the Minister on whose advice the President had acted and passed that order. Moreover, as required by Article 77(1), all executive actions of the Govt. of India have to be expressed in the name of the President; but this would not make that order an order passed by the President personally. That being so, the order carries with it no immunity. Being essentially an order of the Govt. of India, passed in exercise of its Executive functions, it would be amenable to judicial scrutiny and, therefore, can constitute a valid basis for exercise of power of judicial review by this Court. The authenticity, validity and correctness of such an order can be examined by this Court in spite of the order having been expressed in the name of the President. The immunity available to the President under Article 361 of the Constitution cannot be extended to the orders passed in the name of the President under Article 77(1) or Article 77(2) of the Constitution. (Para 15)

       (ii) Constitution of India—Article 75(3) read with Article 32—Actions of Minister—Amenability to judicial review—Mere fact issue was not raised on floor of House of Parliament cannot make an action of a Minister immune from judicial scrutiny.

       Held : The concept of “collective responsibility” is essentially a polit­ical concept. The country is governed by the party in power on the basis of the policies adopted and laid down by it in the Cabinet Meeting. “Collective Responsibility” has two meanings : The first meaning which can legitimately be ascribed to it is that all members of a Govt. are unanimous in support of its policies and would exhibit that unanimity on public occasions although while formulating the policies, they might have expressed a different view in the meeting of the Cabinet. The other meaning is that Ministers, who had an opportu­nity to speak for or against the policies in the Cabinet are thereby personally and morally responsible for its success and failure. (Para 19)

       In spite of the fact that the Council of Ministers is collectively responsible to the House of the People, there may be an occasion where the conduct of a Minister may be censured if he or his subordinates have blundered and have acted contrary to law. No doubt it was open to the House of the People (Lok Sabha) to take up the issue of the abuse of discretionary quota by the petition­er in his capacity as the Minister of State for Petroleum, and his conduct could have been debated and scrutinised on the floor of the House, but the mere fact that this was not done would not mean that the allotments of petroleum outlets by him were immune from judicial scrutiny by this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution. There­fore, even if the matter was not raised on the floor of the Lok Sabha, it would be amenable to the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution. (Paras 21 & 22)

       (iii) Constitution of India—Arti­cle 32—Writ jurisdiction—Scope of power of Court—Power to award compensation.

       Held : Under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court has been given the power and jurisdiction to issue appropriate Writs in the nature of Mandamus, Certiorari, Prohibition, Quo-warranto and Habeas Corpus for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights or for any other purpose. Thus, the High Court has jurisdiction not only to grant relief for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights but also for “any other purpose” which would include the enforcement of public duties by public bodies. So also, the Supreme Court under Article 32 has the jurisdiction to issue prerogative Writs for the enforcement of Funda­mental Rights guaranteed to a citizen under the Constitution. (Para 26)

       Essentially, under public law, it is the dispute between the citizen or a group of citizens on the one hand and the State or other public bodies on the other, which is resolved. This is done to main­tain the rule of law and to prevent the State or the public bodies from acting in an arbitrary manner or in violation of that rule. The exercise of constitutional powers by the High Court and the Supreme Court under Article 226 and 32 has been categorised as power of “judicial review”. Every executive or administrative action of the State or other statutory or public bodies is open to judicial scrutiny and the High Court or the Supreme Court can, in exercise of the power of judicial review under the Constitution, quash the executive action or decision which is contrary to law or is violative of Fundamental Rights guaranteed by the Constitution. With the expanding horizon of Article 14 read with other Articles dealing with Fundamental Rights, every executive action of the Govt. or other public bodies, including Instrumentalities of the Govt., or those which can be legally treated as “Authority” within the meaning of Article 12, if arbitrary, unrea­sonable or contrary to law, is now amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32 or the High Courts under Article 226 and can be validly scrutinised on the touchstone of the Constitutional mandates. (Para 27)

       In a broad sense, therefore, it may be said that those branches of law which deal with the rights/duties and privileges of the public authorities and their relationship with the individual citizens of the State, pertain to “public law”, such as Constitutional and Administra­tive Law, in contradistinction to “private law” fields which are those branches of law which deal with the rights and liabilities of private individuals in relation to one another. (Para 28)

       Where public functionaries are involved and matter relates to the violation of Fundamental Rights or the enforcement of public duties etc., the remedy would lie, at the option of the petitioner, under the public law notwithstanding that damages are also claimed in those proceedings. (Para 34)

       Not much of a difference between the powers of the court exercised here in this country under Article 32 or 226 and those exercised in England for judicial Review. Public law reme­dies are available in both the countries and the courts can award damages against public authorities to compensate for the loss or injury caused to the plaintiff/petitioner, provided the case involves, in this country, the violation of fundamental rights by the Govt. or other public authorities or that their action was wholly arbitrary or oppressive in violation of Article 14 or in breach of statutory duty and is not a purely private matter directed against a private indi­vidual. (Para 44)

       Right to access to this Court under Article 32 of the Constitu­tion is a fundamental right. The Court has been given the power to issue directions or orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo-warranto and certiorari, whichever may be appropriate, for the enforcement of the fundamental rights. Obviously, the fundamental rights would be enforced against the Govt. or its executive or administrative officers or other public bodies. It is in the matter of enforcement of fundamental rights that the Court has the right to award damages to compensate the loss caused to a person on account of violation of his fundamental rights. (Para 109)

       (iv) Constitution of India—Article 73 read with Article 32—Acts of Minis­ter—Cannot be treated as acts of State or Sovereign Act—Actions of Minister is not immune from Civil or Criminal action including action in Tort.

       Held : The maxim that the “King can do no wrong” on the basis of which Common Law rule that “Crown was not answerable for the torts committed by its servants” was generated, has not been applied here in this country. (Para 47)

       In the instant case it was that allotment of Petrol outlets by the petitioner would, in law, be treated as “act of the State” or “Sovereign act” and, therefore, it would be immune from civil or criminal action including action in Tort. Rejecting the argument, the Court held that the allot­ment of petrol outlets by the petitioner cannot be treated as “act of the State” and the rule of immunity invoked cannot be accepted. (Paras 45 to 57)

       (v) Torts—Torts of misfeasance in public office—Liability of public servants—Exemplary damage, when can be awarded—In an action for tort where plaintiff is found entitled to damage, the matter should not be stretched too far to punish defendant by awarding exemplary damage except when their conduct, specially those of Govt. and its officers is found to be oppressive, obnoxious and arbitrary and is coupled with malice.

       Held : Apart from tort which may be committed by a private individual, the officers of the Govt. would also be liable in damages for their wrongful acts provided the act does not fall within the purview of “act of the State.” So also, the administrative bodies or authorities, which deal in administrative matters and take decisions specially for the implementation of the Govt. policies, have to act fairly and objectively and may in some cases also be required to follow the principles of natural justice. It is the basic principle of Administrative Law that if the authorities are conferred certain power, then that power must be exercised in good faith and the administrative decision must be made after taking into account all matters relevant for the exercise of that power. The authority must not be influenced by irrelevant matters and if the order is likely to prejudicially affect the rights, or, even the reasonable expectation of a person, the principles of natural justice must be followed and the person likely to be affected must be given an opportunity of hearing. Thus, the decision of an administrative authority can be challenged on the grounds, inter alia, of illegality, irrationality and procedural impropriety. (Para 60)

       There has to be an iden­tifiable plaintiff or claimant whose interest was damaged by the public officer maliciously or with the knowledge that the im­pugned action was likely to injure the interest of that person. It is in favour of that specific identifiable plaintiff or claimant that the relief could have been granted and damages awarded to him as the whole gamut of the Law of Tort is compensa­tory in nature and damages are awarded to compensate the losses caused on account of violation of the interest of one person by another. In other words, obtaining compensation for a tortiously inflicted loss is generally perceived as the aim of the law of tort by the plaintiff. Judgment in favour of the plaintiff can be given and the loss suffered by him can be redressed only when a finding of a breach of an obligation by the tort-feasor is recorded. It is the compensatory function of tort which is in­voked by the plaintiff in a Court and unless there is an identi­fiable plaintiff, there cannot be any order for compensation or damages to redress the loss caused to that plaintiff. (Para 84)

       So far as malice is concerned, while actual malice, if proved, would render the defendant’s action both ultra vires and tortious, it would not be necessary to establish actual malice in every claim for misfeasance in public office. (Para 67)

       The primary object of award of damages is to compensate the plaintiff for the harm done to him, while the secon­dary object is to punish the defendant for his conduct in inflicting the harm. The secondary object can also be achieved in awarding, in addition to normal compensatory damages, damages which are variously called as exemplary damages, punitive damages, vindictive damages or retributory damages. They are awarded whenever the defendant’s conduct is found to be sufficiently outrageous to merit punishment, for exam­ple, where the conduct discloses malice, cruelty, insolence or the like. (Para 94)

       In awarding punitive or exemplary dam­ages, the emphasis is not on the plaintiff and the injury caused to him, but on the defendant and his conduct. (Para 95)

       If the power has been exercised bona fide and honestly, there cannot be any occasion for exemplary damages being awarded notwith­standing that unintended injury was caused to someone. (Para 106)

       In an action for tort where the plaintiff is found entitled to damages, the matter should not be stretched too far to punish the defendant by awarding exemplary damages except when their con­duct, specially those of the Govt. and its officers, is found to be oppressive, obnoxious and arbitrary and is, sometimes, coupled with malice. (Para 102)

       Executive, under the Constitution, consists of Prime Minister, Cabinet Ministers, Ministers of State and Civil Services comprising of high administrative officers on the top down to the clerical level. They have as important a role to play in the governance of the country as the Judiciary or Legislature. The Executive, in running the administration of the country, should not be cowed down and should be allowed to have full confidence in its own existence so that its decision-making process is not, in any way, affec­ted. They must feel independent and keep themselves in an excellent frame of mind so that the administrative files are cleared in time and the Officers dealing with those files are not hesitant even in taking bold decisions which have sometimes to be taken in the interest of administration. It is true that the fear of being proceeded against in a court of law for tort of misfeasance in public office may keep them on the right path and they may not falter, but there is already the fear of departmen­tal action or proceedings being initiated against them departmen­tally which itself is a safeguard for proper administration. Depart­men­tally, they are answerable for their lapses; Ministers, or, for that matter, even the Government is answerable to Parliament. If they were constantly under the fear or threat of being proceeded against in a court of law for even slightest of lapse or under con­stant fear of exemplary damages being awarded against them, they will develop a defensive attitude which would not be in the interest of adminis­tration. (Para 104)

       (vi) Torts—Torts of misfeasance in public office—Who is eligible to claim damage—Unless there is an identifiable plaintiff there cannot be an order for compensation or damage to redress.

       Held : The petitioner before the Court was “Common Cause”. It was a registered Society. It was not one of the applicants for allot­ment of petrol outlet. Had the “Common Cause” approached the Civil Court for damages on account of tort of misfeasance in public office, its suit would have been dismissed on the ground that it was not one of the applicants for a petrol outlet; its own interest was not injured in any way nor had the petitioner made allotment in favour of one of the applicants maliciously or with the knowledge that the allotment would ultimately harm the “Common Cause”. How could then a finding of commission of mis­feasance in public office by the petitioner be recorded in pro­ceedings under Article 32 and that too, at the instance of “Common Cause” on the basis of a Press report? “Common Cause” not being an applicant for allotment of a Petrol outlet could not have obtained a finding in the Civil Suit that the petitioner had com­mitted the Tort of Misfeasance in Public Office. (Para 83)

       (vii) Torts—Torts of misfeasance in public office—Minister allotting petrol outlet out of his discretionary quota to persons who applied for—No rival applicants/claimants—Exercise of discretion found to be moti­vated, arbitrary and for extraneous considerations—However act of Minister falls short of ‘misfeas­ance in public office since it could not be said that Minister made allotment of petrol outlet in favour of applicant with knowledge that such allotment was likely to injure interest of any other person—Order of exemplary damage awarded re­called.

       Held : The whole proceedings were initiated on the basis of a Press report which was brought to the notice of the Court by Mr. H.D. Shourie, Director, Common Cause whose Writ Petition was already pending and it was on that basis in that pending Writ Petition that the Court took cognizance of the matter. The allotments were made by the petitioner in his capacity as Minister of State for Petroleum and Natural Gas as and when an application was made by separate and individual persons. There was none to compete with that person. The individual concerned would approach the petitioner and the petitioner, perhaps, on being satisfied with the contents of the application, as also the need for a petrol outlet in the area, make the allotment. Had there been any other applicant for the same petrol outlet for which an application was made to the Minister, the question that he deliberately made the allotment in favour of one so as to injure the other person would then have positively arisen. The petitioner cannot be said to have made the allotment in favour of one out of malice towards the other as there was none else, to contest or compete with the claim of the person who made the application for allotment. Nor could it be said that the petitioner made the allotment of petrol outlet in favour of the applicant with the knowledge that such allotment was likely to injure the interest of any other person. Mere allotment of Petrol outlets would not constitute “Mis­feasance” unless other essential elements were present. (Paras 82 & 85)

       The conduct of the petitioner in making allotments of petrol outlets was atrocious, specially those made in favour of the Members, Oil Selection Board or their son, etc.; and reflects a wanton exercise of power by the petitioner. This Court has already used judicial vituperatives in respect of such allotments and we need not strain our vocabulary any further in that regard. Suffice it to say that though the conduct of the petitioner was wholly unjustified, it falls short of “mis­feasance in public office” which is a specific tort and the ingredients of that tort are not wholly met in the case. That being so, there was no occasion to award exemplary damages. (Para 88)

       (viii) Constitution of India—Arti­cle 32—Compensation for violation of fundamental rights — Whether com­pensation can be awarded in favour of state for violation of fundamental rights by Minister or Officers?

       Held : The State itself cannot claim the right of being compensated in damages against its officers on the ground that they had contravened or violated the fundamental rights of a citizen. Petitioner, as Minister of State for Petroleum and Natural Gas, was part of the Central Govt. By directing petitioner to pay a sum of Rs. 50 lakhs to the Govt. the Court has awarded damages in favour of the Govt. of India in proceedings under Article 32 of the Constitu­tion which is not permissible as the Court cannot direct the Govt. to pay the exemplary damages to itself. The whole thing has to be examined in the context of Article 32 of the Constitution under which relief to a person or citizen can be granted only against Union of India or the State or their Instrumentalities but the State cannot legally claim that since one of its Ministers or Officers had violated the funda­mental rights of a citizen or had acted arbitrarily, it should be compensated by awarding exemplary damages against that officer or Minister. (Paras 109, 110 & 111)

       (ix) Indian Penal Code, 1860—Sections 405 and 409—Criminal breach of trust by public servant—Minister of Central Government making allot­ment of petrol outlet to applicants out of his discretionary quota—Court found allotment arbitrary and ordering CBI enquiry invok­ing doctrine of public trust—Not justified—Whether offence of criminal breach of trust has been committed by a person has to be determined strictly on basis of definition of offence set out in Penal Code—Doctrine of public trust cannot be invoked—Mere exercise of power to allot cannot be treated as property within meaning of Section 405—No case made out—Direction to CBI to investigate wholly errone­ous—Order recalled.

       Held : The observations of the Court in ordering registration of case and CBI enquiry indicate that the Court was of the opinion that a person on being elected by the people and on becoming a Minis­ter holds a sacred trust on behalf of the people. This, we may venture to say, is a philosophical concept and reflects the image of virtue in its highest conceivable perfection. This philosophy cannot be employed for determination of the offence of “criminal breach of trust” which is defined in the Indian Penal Code. Whether the offence of “criminal breach of trust” has been committed by a person has to be determined strictly on the basis of the definition of that offence set out in the Penal Code to which we would advert a little later. The Court also appears to have invoked the ‘Doctrine of Public Trust’ which is a doctrine of environmental law under which the natu­ral resources such as air, water, forest, lakes, rivers and wild life are public properties “entrusted’ to the Government for their safe and proper use and proper protection. Public Trust Law recognises that some types of natural resources are held in trust by the Government for the benefit of the public. The ‘Doctrine of Public Trust’ has been evolved so as to prevent unfair dealing with or dissipation of all natural resources. This Doctrine is an ancient and somewhat obscure creation of Roman and British law which has been discovered recently by environmental lawyers in search of a theory broadly applicable to environmental litigation. The Doctrine enjoins upon the Govt. to protect the resources for the enjoyment of the general public rather than to permit their use for private ownership or commercial purposes. But this Doctrine cannot be invoked in fixing the criminal liability and the whole matter will have to be decided on the principles of criminal jurisprudence, one of which is that the criminal liability has to be strictly construed and offence can be said to have been committed only when all the ingredients of that offence as defined in the Statute are found to have been satisfied. (Paras 116 to 118)

       The matter may be examined from another angle. Election to the State Legislature or the House of the People are held under the Constitution on the basis of adult suffrage. On being elect­ed as a Member of the Parliament, the petitioner was inducted as Minister of State. The Department of Petroleum and Natural Gas was allocated to him. Under the allo­cation of business rules, made by the President of India, the distribution of petro­leum products, inter alia, came to be allocated to the petitioner. This allocation of business under the Constitution is done for smooth and better administration and for more convenient transaction of business of Government of India. In this way, neither a “trust”’ as ordinarily understood or as defined under the Trust Act, was created in favour of the petitioner nor did he become a “trustee” in that sense. (Para 119)

       The petitioner does not, on becoming the Minister of State for Petroleum and Natural Gas, assume the role of a “trustee” in the real sense nor does a “trust” come into existence in respect of the Government properties. (Para 122)

       A trust contemplated by Section 405 would arise only when there is an entrustment of property or dominion over property. There has, therefore, to be a property belonging to someone which is entrusted to the person accused of the offence under Section 405. The entrust­ment of property creates a trust which is only an obligation annexed to the ownership of the property and arises out of a confidence reposed and accepted by the owner. The word “property”, used in Section 409, IPC means the property which can be entrusted or over which dominion may be exercised. Mere exercise of “power to allot”, it is rightly contended, cannot, be treated as “property”, within the meaning of Section 405, capable of being mis-utilised or mis-appropriated. (Paras 124, 126 & 127)

       (x) CBI Enquiry—Order by Court to enquire that whether a person has committed any offence—Con­dition precedent — Finding that prima facie offence committed or person prima facie involved in commission of offence is a must—Otherwise it would amount to violation of Article 21 of Constitution.

       Held : Direction for investigation can be given only if an offence is, prima facie, found to have been committed or a person’s involvement is prima facie established, but a direction to the C.B.I. to investigate whether any person has committed an offence or not cannot be legally given. Such a direction would be contrary to the concept and philosophy of “LIFE” and “LIBERTY” guaranteed to a person under Article 21 of the Constitution. This direction is in complete negation of various decisions of this Court in which the concept of “LIFE” has been explained in a manner which has infused “LIFE” into the letters of Article 21. (Para 129)

       A man has, therefore, to be left alone to enjoy “LIFE” without fetters. He cannot be hounded out by the Police or C.B.I. merely to find out whether he has committed any offence or is living as a law-abiding citizen. Even under Article 142 of the Constitution, such a direction cannot be issued. While passing an order under Article 142 of the Constitution, this Court cannot ignore the substantive provi­sion of law much less the constitutional rights available to a person. (Para 131)

       We may say that we maintain the rule of accountability and li­ability of the Executive including public servants in administrative matters and confirm that there should be transparency in all what they do, specially where grant of largesse is concerned. But, the present case is being decided on its own peculiar facts and features in which, the finding as to the commission of tort of misfeasance recorded by this Court or the award of exemplary damages as also direction for investigation by the C.B.I., cannot be sustained on account of errors apparent on the face of the record. (Para 133)

       The direction for a case being registered by the C.B.I. against the petitioner for Criminal Breach of Trust and inves­tigation by them into that offence and the further direction to investigate whether petitioner has committed any other offence are recalled. (Para 136)

       (xi) Review—Order of Supreme Court—Power of Court under Articles 32 and 226 plenary power to correct its own mistake.

       Held : The powers of this Court under Article 32 and that of the High Court under Article 226 are plenary powers and are not fettered by any legal constraints. If the Court, in exercise of these powers has itself committed a mistake, it has the plenary power to correct its own mistake. (Para 134)