The appellate court should be cautious in interfering with orders of acquittal and the prosecution must prove its case beyond reasonable doubt.

JUDGMENT :

1. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied by the judgment and order dated 19.11.2008 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Lunawada, in Criminal Case No.36 of 1994 below Exh.49, the State has moved the present Appeal under Section 378(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

2. The factual matrix of the complaint is that on 24th March 1992 the complainant had visited the shop in the name and style of Sohil Electric falling into his area at Lunawada, wherein the packed electrical articles were lying in the shop for selling, such as, fluorescent tube-lights, wherein one packet of Lion Brand containing picture of Lady Bombay-2 was there. However, on the said packing material of packet, as per law, the particulars of the packers’ name & address, year of packing and other particulars regarding tax did not mention on it and thereby the accused persons have committed offence punishable under Section 39 of the Standards of Weights and Measures Act, 1976, read with Rule 6 of the Standards of Weights and Measures (Packaged Commodities) Rules, 1977.

3. The State has taken various counts. One such count is that the judgment and order passed by the learned Magistrate is contrary to law and evidence on record. Secondly, the learned Magistrate has erred in holding that the prosecution has failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt. It is also contended that perusing the deposition of the witness Karansinh Chandrasinh Solanki, it appears that the witness has also deposed about the procedure laid down by him, and ultimately, the learned Magistrate has failed to consider the same. Ultimately, a ground has been taken that it ought to have been appreciated so long as the chief examination of the complainant is concerned and, therefore, the State has prayed to set aside the judgment and order passed by the learned Magistrate since the order of acquittal is contrary to law and evidence on record.

4. Learned APP Mr.L.B.Dabhi for the State has heavily placed reliance upon the deposition of the competent Inspector of the concerned department and also placed reliance upon different documents and contended that the learned Magistrate has failed to appreciate the evidence on record in its true and proper perspective and thereby committed error in recording the acquittal of the accused persons for the offences punishable under the provisions of the Standards of Weights and Measures Act.

5. Per contra, learned counsel Mr.L.R.Pathan appearing with Mr.M.A.Sapa for accused nos.1 & 2 has heavily contended that upon bare perusal of the judgment and order passed by the learned Magistrate, it appears that there is no requirement to interfere with the same since the requisite procedure under law has not been followed. He further contended that the offence has been committed on 24th March 1992, whereas the captioned bill is a postdated bill of April 1992. The captioned bill is also required to be produced. Therefore, the learned Magistrate has rightly awarded acquittal to the accused persons and there is no requirement to interfere with the judgment and order passed by the learned Magistrate.

6. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and having gone through the arguments advanced by both the sides, before adverting to the merits of the case, it would be worthwhile to refer the scope of interference in acquittal appeals. It is well settled by catena of decisions that an appellate court has full power to review, re-appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. However, the appellate court must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is prejudice in favour of the accused; firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that, every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law and secondly, the accused, having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further