The court emphasized the importance of sufficient cause for condoning delay, highlighting the need for a party to act diligently and with bona fide motive. It also stressed the rigour with which the law of limitation must be applied.

ORDER :

(Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.) :

The instant intra-court appeal, under clause 10 of the Letters Patent, is directed against the order/judgment dated 28.06.2018 passed by learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P. (S) No. 4951 of 2010 by which the writ petition has been disposed of directing the respondents to ensure payment of gratuity to the petitioner, however, without interest, but leave encashment shall be paid to the petitioner with statutory interest @ 5% p.a. within a period of four weeks and upon payment of gratuity and leave encashment, the petitioner shall vacate the official accommodation within next eight weeks.

2. It has been pointed out on behalf of respondent – writ petitioner that after taking over of the P.T.P.S. in the holding company, i.e., Jharkhand Urja Vikas Nigam Limited (JUVNL) and the Respondent Nos. 4 and 5 being the functionaries of the P.T.P.S., there is no requirement to issue fresh notice upon the concerned respondents.

3. This aspect of the matter has not been disputed by Mr. Mrinal Kanti Roy, learned counsel appearing for the appellant.

4. Considering the said submission and since the P.T.P.S. has already been taken over by the holding company i.e., JUVNL, and the Respondent Nos. 4 and 5 being the functionaries of the P.T.P.S., there is no requirement to issue notice since they are now being represented by the holding company, i.e., JUVNL.

I.A. No. 415 of 2020

5. The instant appeal is admittedly barred by limitation since there is delay of 488 days in preferring the appeal, therefore, an application being I.A. No. 415 of 2020 has been filed for condoning such delay.

6. This Court, after taking into consideration the fact that the instant intra-court appeal has been field after inordinate delay of 488 days, deems it fit and proper, to first consider the delay condonation application before going into the legality and propriety of the impugned order on merit

7. Learned counsel for the applicant-petitioner has submitted that delay in preferring the appeal may be condoned by allowing the Interlocutory Application on the basis of grounds shown therein treating the same to be sufficient.

8. The grounds for condoning the delay in preferring the appeal, as has been mentioned in the interlocutory application at paragraph 3 is that the impugned order was received by the department in time and thereafter the concerned department sent the file to the Law Department for perusal and opinion to file the Letters Patent Appeal.

Further, it has been stated at paragraph 4 that the aforesaid all procedure has taken time to file Letters Patent Appeal before the Hon’ble Court, which caused delay in preferring this appeal.

9. Learned counsel for the respondents vehemently opposed the prayer for condonation of delay stating that reasons assigned in the Interlocutory Application are not sufficient.

10. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties on delay condonation application and before considering the same, this Court, deems it fit and proper to refer certain legal proposition as has been propounded by the Hon’ble Apex Court with respect to the approach of the Court in condoning the inordinate delay.

11. There is no dispute about the fact that generally the lis is not to be rejected on the technical ground of limitation but certainly if the filing of appeal suffers from inordinate delay, then the duty of the Court to consider the application to condone the delay before entering into the merit of the lis.

12. It requires to refer herein that the Law of limitation is enshrined in the legal maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties, rather the idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time, as has been held in the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Brijesh Kumar & Ors. Vrs. State of Haryana & Ors., (2014) 11 SCC