Point of Law : Writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution should not be entertained when the statutory remedy is available under the Act, unless exceptional circumstances are made out.

JUDGMENT :

MANJU RANI CHAUHAN, J.

1. Heard Mr. Vinod Kumar Singh, learned counsel for the petitioners, Mr. Ran Vijay Singh, learned counsel for the respondent University, Ms. Pooja Agarwal, learned counsel for respondent no.4 and Mr. Shailendra Singh, learned Standing Counsel for the State respondents.

2. This writ petition has been filed by the petitioners for the following relief:

"I. a writ, order or direction, in the nature of certiorari, quashing the impugned order dated 27.08.2021 passed by the Registrar, Veer Bahadur Singh Purvanchal University, Jaunpur (Annexure No. 3 to this Writ Petition).

II. a writ, order or direction, in the nature of certiorari, calling for the records and quash the impugned order dated 26.08.2021 passed by the Vice-Chancellor, Veer Bahadur Singh Purvanchal University, Jaunpur (if any).

III. a writ, order or direction, in the nature of mandamus, restraining the respondent no.4 from working as Manager of Sri Mahanth Ramashray Das Sankottar Mahavidyalaya, Bhudkuda, Ghazipur.

IV. any other suitable, writ, order or direction, as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper under the facts and circumstances of the present case.

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3. On 7th October, 2021, the Court passed following order:

"The respondent nos. 2 and 3 are represented by Sri Ran Vijay Singh, Advocate. He may take instructions as to whether when there was no resolution for the extension of the term how the term had been extended. Place this petition as fresh on 8.11.2021."

4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that without any resolution having been passed by the members of the committee of management as provided under para 11.1 of the registered bye-laws of the society, the Vice-Chancellor I.e. respondent no.3, only on a letter of the manager of the Committee of Management, has extended the term of the committee of management for a further period of one year, while passing the impugned order dated 28th August, 2021, which is per se illegal. He, therefore, submits that order impugned is liable to be quashed.

5. In reply, learned counsel for the respondent-University submits that pursuant to the order of the Court dated 7th October, 2021, he has received instruction and as per the said instruction, the impugned order has been passed on the resolution of the Committee of Management, which has been passed by the eight members (out of 11 members) of the committee of management for extending the term of the committee of management for a further period of one year. He also placed a photo copy of the said resolution before the Court today, which is taken on record. Apart from the above, the learned counsel for the respondents submits that against the order impugned, the petitioner has an efficacious statutory alternative remedy by way of reference before the Chancellor of the respondent-University under Section 68 of the U.P. State Universities Act. He, therefore, submits that this petition be dismissed on the ground of the aforesaid statutory alternative remedy.

6. I have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties and have examined the records of the present writ petition.

7. The issue of exhausting statutory remedy has been considered time and again by the Apex Court.

8. A Constitution Bench of the Apex Court, in K.S. Rashid & Son Vs. Income Tax Investigation Commission & Ors., reported in AIR 1954 SC 207, held that Article 226 of the Constitution confers on all the High Courts a very wide power in the matter of issuing writs. The said power is limited. However, the remedy of writ is an absolutely discretionary remedy and the High Court has always the discretion to refuse to grant any writ if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party can have an adequate or suitable relief elsewhere. Similar view has been reiterated by the Apex Court in Sangram Singh Vs. Election Tribunal, Kotah & anr., reported in AIR 1955 SC 425, holding that the power of issuing writs are purely discretionary and no limit can be placed