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Andhra Pradesh High Court
Judges : B.S.REDDY, J.CHELAMESWAR, P.S.NARAYANA
G.Narasimha Murthy - Appellant
Versus
District Collector, Mahabubnagar - Respondent
Decided On : 04-06-06
Held : The basic structure of the Constitution, the power of judicial review of High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and the supervisory powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India also would suggestively negative such stand. Similarity of exercise of certain powers in service matters by these Tribunals cannot be equated with the extraordinary jurisdiction in relation to the issuance of prerogative writs etc. , conferred on the High courts by the Constitution of India. Be that as it may, on a careful analysis of the scheme of the Act, the Rules framed there under and on the crystalization and assimilation of the whole constitutional scheme, this Court is of the considered opinion that the powers of the A. P. A. T. in this regard cannot be equated with the powers of the High Courts under the different provisions of the Constitution.
It is no doubt true that the applicants approach the Tribunal first and the respondents contesting or not contesting the litigation may depend upon several factors and due to several reasons. By that itself, it cannot be said that the applicants or the respondents would fall under well defined classes so as to treat them as separate classes inasmuch as these parties are coming before the Tribunal for the purpose of agitating their legal rights and it is needless to say that several suitable directions also would be issued depending upon the facts and circumstances of a particular given case. Keeping in mind the object for which the Service Tribunals had been in fact established and also taking into consideration the different provisions of the Administrative tribunals Act, 1985, it cannot be said that the parties coming before the Tribunal can be classified on the ground of the parties approaching the Tribunal at the first instance and the parties expected to contest the matters and this cannot be taken as a valid classification for the purpose of putting a discrimination of fixing 30 days in the case of applicants and not putting any such restriction at all in the case of respondents. It may not be out of context if it is referred here itself that in the corresponding rule under Central Administrative Tribunal procedure Rules, 1987, such restriction had not been imposed. Even if the test of reasonableness to be applied, such imposition of restriction while exercising the Rule making power cannot be said to be reasonable and viewed from any angle, the restriction of imposing 30 days time for moving an application cannot be said to be reasonable, the same being arbitrary and discriminatory and being violative of article 14 of the Constitution of India. Rule 17 (2) of the A. P. A. T. Procedure rules, 1989 so far as "within 30 days from the date of dismissal" are hereby declared as arbitrary, discriminatory, unreasonable, irrational and unconstitutional being violative of the Article 14 of the constitution of India and the same is hereby struck down.
( 1 ) THE question of the power of the Andhra Pradesh administrative Tribunal (in short hereinafter referred to as a. P. A. T. ) to condone the delay beyond the period specified under Rule 17 of the Andhra Pradesh Administrative tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1989 (in short hereinafter referred to as rules for the purpose of convenience) beyond the period of 30 days specified had been referred to the Full Bench in the light of the decision of yet another Full Bench in G. Narsimha rao v. Regional Joint Director of School education, Warangal and others, 2005 (2) ALT 469 (FB), wherein it was held that a. P. A. T. has no jurisdiction to condone delay in filing review application in the light of the language of Rule 19 of the Rules.
( 2 ) SEVERAL writ petitions are being filed as against the orders of A. P. A. T. wherein the applications moved beyond time under Rule 17 are being dismissed on the ground that A. P. A. T. has no power to condone delay beyond the specified period.
( 3 ) SRI Rama Rao, the learned Counsel representing certain writ petitioners would maintain that the language employed in rule 19 is different from the language in rule 17 of the Rules. The learned Counsel also would contend that in case of review application, the matter would be within the knowledge of the concerned counsel, whereas in case of default orders, such orders may or may not be within the knowledge of the concerned Counsel of the party, as the case may be, and hence, inasmuch as there is no specific or express exclusion on the applicability of the limitation Act, 1963 under Rule 17 of the rules, an application to condone delay can be definitely maintained. The learned counsel also made certain submissions in relation to the powers of the Tribunal to dismiss for default which would have the power to restore also by implication. The learned Counsel also pointed out to section 29 (2) of the Limitation Act, 1963.
( 4 ) SRI Subrahmanya Sarma, the learned Counsel representing certain writ petitioners had drawn the attention of this court to Section 22 (3) (h) of the administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 (in short hereinafter referred to the Act ) and section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The learned Counsel also had carefully analyzed the language employed in Section 22 of the Act and would contend that Section 35 of the Act deals with the Rule making power and in exercise of the said power the Rules had been framed. The learned counsel while further elaborating the submissions had traced the historical background commencing from Sampath kumar to Chandra Kumar and also would maintain that the A. P. A. T. virtually is having all the powers of the High Court. The learned Counsel had drawn the attention of this Court to Sections 14 and 15 of the Act and also the relevant entries in List-I and List-II and Articles 225, 226, 227 and 323-A of the Constitution of India. The learned Counsel also would maintain that default orders are of different kinds and there are several default orders, which are being made in view of the defective cause List like wrong printing of the name of the Counsel or wrong printing of the numbers of the relevant O. As. , and the like reasons and hence the learned Counsel would contend that in such matters, principles of natural justice would come into play and when such default orders are made due to such mistakes, the A. P. A. T. is having inherent power to restore the matters, if not, the applicants would be seriously prejudiced. Sri Subrahmanya Sarma while elaborating his submissions also had drawn the attention of this Court to Paras 62, 64, 65, 66 and 68 of the decision of I. Chandra kumar v. Union of India, AIR 1997 sc 1125 and would contend that all the powers of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India so far as they relate to Service matters are concerned, had been transferred to the A. P. A. T. The learned Counsel also had drawn the attention of this Court to Section 14 (1) and secti
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