The main legal point established in the judgment is the significance of the expressions 'reasonable' and 'bonafide need' in determining a landlord's claim for eviction under the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, 1950.

1. - This second appeal has been preferred against the judgment and decree of the First Appellate Court dated 20.2.2001 by which it has affirmed the judgment and decree of the trial Court dated 12.11.1997 evicting the appellant-defendant from the suit premises under the provisions of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, 1950 (for short. "the Act").

2. The facts and circumstances giving rise to this case are that the respondent-plaintiff filed a suit for eviction of the appellant-defendant from the suit premises on the ground of default. The said suit was registered as Civil i Original Case No. 128/1983 and the same stood dismissed, vide judgment and decree dated 9.8.1988, by giving the benefit of first default. Again, the plaintiff-respondent filed Civil Original Suit No. 310/1988 in respect of the same suit property on the grounds of second default as well as the reasonable and bonafide need of the plaintiff-respondents and his sons for i opening a grocery shop. The appellant-defendant submitted the written statement stating that the plaintiff-respondent refused to accept the rent and the same was deposited in the trial court under the provisions of Section 19-A of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act. His further stand taken in the written statement was that the suit property was not required for personal and bona fide need of the plaintiff-respondent, rather he wanted to increase the rent. After trial, the trial court decree the suit. The defendant-appellant went in appeal and the same stood dismissed vide impugned judgment and decree. Hence this second appeal.

3. Mr. S.N. Trivedi, learned counsel for the appellant, has raised a large number of issues, including that the findings of facts recorded by the Courts below are contrary to the evidence on record, thus, being perverse, this Court may re-appreciate the evidence: the issue of partial eviction has not been considered properly which requires reconsideration: and the finding of fact recorded by the courts below on the issue of bonafide need of the landlord is also perverse and that issue also requires reconsideration. While deciding the case, the Court should lean towards the tenant as the Act has been enacted to protect the interest of the tenant.

4. On the other hand, Mr. Dinesh Maheshwarl, learned cousnel for the respondents, has submitted that the concurrent findings of facts do not warrant any interference by this Court. No substantial questing of law is involved in the case and, thus, the appeal is liable to be rejected at the initial stage itself.

5. I have considered the rival submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties and perused the judgments cited at the Bar.

6. Undoubtedly, the second appeal can be entertained only on a substantial question of law. The Hon'ble Apex Court has been taking a very serious view of the matter emphasising the High Courts should not entertain a second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short, "the Code") unless it raises a substantial question of law. In Panchu Copal Barua v. Umesh Chandra Goswami & ors., AIR 1997 SC 1041 , the Court observed that while entertaining the second appeal. the Court should not over-look the change brought about by the Amendment Act of 1976 restricting the scope of second appeal drastically and now it applies only to appeals involving substantial question of law, specifically set-out in the memorandum of appeals and formulated by the High Court. The Court, for the reasons to be recorded, may also entertain a second appeal even on any other substantial question of law, not formulated by it, if the Court is satisfied that the case involves such a question. Therefore, the existence of a substantial question of law is a sine-qua-non for the exercise of jurisdiction under the amended provisions of Section 100 of the Code. It is the obligation on the Court of Law to further the clear intendment of the Legislature and not to