The landlord's bonafide requirement for commercial use of residential property is valid if tenants are already using it commercially, and previous dismissals do not bar new petitions based on new evidence.

JUDGMENT :

Mr. Deepak Gupta, J.:- Two different tenants, namely, Satish Kumar Soni and Sudarshan Sharma (petitioners herein) of two adjoining shops forming part of the same property, owned by same landlord Smt. Dimpi Malhotra (respondent herein), have approached this Court by way of the present revisions, assailing the ejectment orders passed against them by learned Rent Controller, Ludhiana, and as affirmed by the Appellate Authority.

2. None of the counsels have any objection to hear and decide both these petitions together, as similar evidence has been produced in both the cases.

3. In order to avoid confusion, parties shall be referred as per their original status i.e. ‘landlord’ or ‘tenant’.

4. In the two ejectment petitions filed by landlord - Dimpi Malhotra on the same date in March, 2010, it was pleaded that Sardar Didar Singh and Sardar Shamsher Singh used to be owners of the property No. B-XIX/392 Maharani Jhansi Road, Ghumar Mandi, Civil Lines, Ludhiana. They had rented out one shop each (tenanted/demised shops) to the two respondents on monthly rent of Rs.700/- each, as per details given in para No.1 of the two petitions. The entire property i.e. B-XIX/392 Maharani Jhansi Road, Ghumar Mandi, Civil Lines, Ludhiana, was purchased by the petitioner from the previous owners by virtue of two registered sale deeds dated 17.08.1995 and this way, the petitioner became owner/ landlady of the property and the respondents became tenants under her on the same terms and conditions.

5. Ejectment of the two tenants was sought on the similar grounds i.e. non-payment of rent, the premises having become unfit & unsafe for human habitation, change of user and bonafide necessity of the petitioner. Same facts and circumstances have been pleaded so as to seek the ejectment. The Rent Controller has allowed the ejectment only on the ground of bonafide necessity of the landlord and that finding has been affirmed by the Appellate Authority, which is assailed before this Court.

6. One of the grounds to assail the impugned orders, raised by learned counsel for the petitioners is that landlady has put forth his necessity for the demised shops for commercial use in order to open a departmental store, whereas the property in question is a residential property and that such a change of use is not permissible.

7. The Appellate Authority after considering this contention, has rightly rejected the same. It is not in dispute that demised shops are being used by both the tenants for commercial purposes, as they are running shops therein. It has been held by Hon’ble Supreme Court in Nand Kishore Vs. Yashpal Singh, 2009 (16) SCC 634 that where residential building is given on rent for commercial purpose with mutual consent, then landlord thereof can seek eviction of the property on the ground that this residential building is needed for the commercial purpose. Moreover, once the appellant/ tenant himself is running a commercial activity at the spot, he cannot complaint at least on this ground.

8. Similarly, in Jarnail Singh Vs. Vijay Kumar, 2018 (4) PLR 700, it had been held by this Court that if a building is used for non-residential purposes, landlord cannot be deprived of possession thereof for being used for the same purpose. This Court observed further that it would be totally inequitable, if the landlord is deprived of an opportunity to use the building being used for non-residential purpose by the tenant. Same view was also taken by this Court in M/s Bharat Electricals Vs. Dr. Sukhdev Raj Goyal, 2012 (4) RCR (Civil) 26.

9. In view of the legal position as above, the contention raised by learned counsel for the petitioners is hereby rejected.

10. Another contention raised by learned counsel for the petitioners – tenants is that earlier ejectment petitions filed by the landlady in 2001 were dismissed in 2005 and even the appeals of the landlady were dismissed by the Appellate Authority and, therefore, the present petitions are not maintainable being barred b